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Overview: The Ten Principles
This is a book about the big challenges facing workforce policy-
makers and practitioners in the early twenty-ﬁrst century.
As a practitioner on the local and state levels for more than 25 
years—the last ﬁve as director of a state labor department—I have seen 
considerable changes in the job training world. Two areas, job training 
and welfare, have shown marked improvement: Our government-fund-
ed job training system has become more market-oriented and effective 
over time, and employment of welfare recipients has risen signiﬁcantly 
since the federal welfare reform of the 1990s. In job training, the big 
challenges we now face lie in building on that market orientation and in 
positioning training in the face of the ongoing impact of technology and 
globalization on job opportunities. In welfare, the challenges lie in for-
mulating the next stage of welfare reform, in increasing job retention, 
and possibly in skills upgrading for former welfare recipients. 
In two other employment areas, workers with disabilities and the 
low-wage workforce, less progress has been made over the past 25 
years. Despite the landmark Americans with Disabilities Act, unem-
ployment among workers with disabilities has actually increased over 
the past decade, as has dependence of these workers on the government 
beneﬁt program Supplemental Security Income (SSI). Similarly, de-
spite extensive discussion in the press and in academia of the low-wage 
workforce, large segments of this workforce continue to show limited 
economic self-sufﬁciency and professionalism. Further, the skills up-
grading and career ladder projects that have been tried so far have had 
little success in improving the skills or wages of this group.
Thus, these four areas—job training, welfare, workers with disabili-
ties, and the low-wage workforce—each present distinct challenges for 
practitioners in 2005. 
For ﬁve years, from 1999 to 2004, as director of California’s Em-
ployment Development Department (EDD), the state’s department of 
labor, I was involved in numerous employment initiatives, both state-
wide and nationwide. These were aimed at restructuring job training 
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for Welfare-to-Work, and at restructuring training targeted at workers 
saddled with disabilities or low-wages. This book draws on the results 
of these initiatives, as well as on the results of other cutting-edge gov-
ernment- and foundation-funded efforts in recent years.
FOX AND HEDGEHOG: MANY THINGS VS. ONE BIG THING
“The fox knows many things, but the hedgehog knows one big 
thing.” In his 1953 essay “The Hedgehog and the Fox,” British phi-
losopher Isaiah Berlin uses this line from the Greek poet Archilochus 
as a starting point for his division of intellectuals and writers into either 
“foxes” or “hedgehogs.” The foxes (Aristotle, Pushkin, Goethe, Shake-
speare) deal in myriad ideas and truths, sometimes “unrelated and even 
contradictory.” The hedgehogs (Plato, Dostoevsky, Nietzsche, Dante), 
in contrast, “relate everything to a single central vision” or theme— 
“a single, universal organizing principle” (Berlin 1953).
Much of this book discusses the “many things” of the fox in mak-
ing job training programs more effective. It identiﬁes ways to improve 
performance among Workforce Investment Act (WIA) contractors, and 
it explores what the best uses of state discretionary WIA funds are. It 
also breaks down what makes an effective career ladder program, how 
postemployment welfare retention or skills advancement programs can 
succeed, and what kind of intensive training workers with disabilities 
must go through to get employment or keep their jobs. 
However, running through the book is also the “one big thing” of the 
hedgehog: policymakers and practitioners need to go well beyond the 
government program mind-set. This central principle recognizes that a 
system of government programs, even when well structured, will reach 
only a small percentage of the unemployed and low-wage workforce, 
no matter how much money is spent. Going beyond this program mind-
set means rationalizing the incentive structures of government beneﬁts. 
It also means giving a greater role to extragovernmental networks.
Rationalizing the incentive structure is done by aligning beneﬁts 
more closely with employment. Illustration can be drawn from the wel-
fare system. For years, government job training programs enrolled wel-
fare recipients and helped train and place them in jobs. Indeed, welfare 
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recipients form the group that has been most successful in job train-
ing from the 1970s to the present. However, the sharp drop in welfare 
rolls and the sharp increase in welfare recipients getting jobs came only 
when the incentive structure changed, starting with the Family Support 
Act of 1988 and culminating in the Personal Responsibility and Work 
Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA) of 1996. Further, some of 
the best welfare-to-work results have come from efforts by extragov-
ernmental groups: the faith-based and afﬁnity groups.
Conversely, for years individual employment programs for workers 
with disabilities have successfully placed these workers in jobs. Despite 
this, unemployment among workers with disabilities increased over 
the 1990s as the incentive structure of Supplemental Security Income 
(SSI), the main beneﬁt for workers with disabilities, went unchanged. 
The Clinton administration spent a lot of time trying to improve SSI’s 
employment orientation through the drafting and promotion of its Tick-
et to Work and Work Incentives Improvement Act (TWWIIA), which 
President Clinton signed in December 1999. Yet the act’s ﬁrst four years 
of implementation brought no signiﬁcant rise in the employment rate of 
workers with disabilities. 
Among extragovernmental networks, the faith-based groups are 
prominently emerging in the employment ﬁeld; they have had posi-
tive initial results in attracting volunteers and in motivating persons to 
work who have not been motivated by secular groups. Other promising 
employment and antipoverty projects are being tested using mutual-
support afﬁnity groups—groups of persons linked by race, ethnicity, or 
neighborhood who spur one another on in trying to achieve economic 
goals. The afﬁnity groups show how much can be accomplished in 
gaining employment and self-sufﬁciency by families working together, 
outside of government structures. 
THE TEN PRINCIPLES
As an organizational device, I have collected operational and policy 
lessons into Ten Principles. These principles are aimed at the profes-
sionals who design national, state, and local employment policy, as well 
as at the professionals who operate the training, both in the private and 
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in the public sector. In other words, they are aimed at both policymakers 
and practitioners.
When I was appointed EDD director in April 1999, our California 
state librarian and historian, Kevin Starr, called and advised, “Your of-
ﬁce is a rare window on California government and policy; keep notes 
and write about your experiences.” Lawrence Mead, New York Uni-
versity professor and welfare scholar, made a similar recommendation: 
“Chronicle your experiences,” he said. Over the years as EDD director, 
I did keep extensive notes, taking time three or four days a week to 
write about our workforce initiatives, including both those that moved 
forward and those that did not, and about our internal debates and daily 
work life. These experiences are incorporated in the Ten Principles.
The Ten Principles start with several of the key employment dy-
namics today. Principle One discusses why a strong private economy 
does more to reduce unemployment than any government program. This 
point will seem obvious to many policymakers, but it is often missed 
in discussions of job training and its interaction with other economic 
forces. Principle One also discusses the enormous job creation that is 
ongoing through good times and bad, and its implications for training.
Principles Two through Eight discuss the big challenges in job train-
ing as they involve Welfare-to-Work, workers with disabilities, and the 
low-wage workforce. Three chapters are given over to the low-wage 
workforce and to career ladder projects. The low-wage workforce is the 
area of job training that is least developed, both conceptually and opera-
tionally. Among the outstanding issues: What mobility is possible, and 
for how many workers within a ﬁrm or an industry? What investment in 
training should be expected of workers, of employers, and of the indus-
try? What is a sustainable skills upgrading model, one not dependent on 
short-term discretionary government training funds?
Principle Nine looks at extragovernmental networks, focusing on 
the Family Independence Initiative, based in Oakland, California. The 
project, which involves the aforementioned afﬁnity groups, is the brain-
child of Maurice Lim Miller, who spent 20 years running a government 
training program, eventually becoming convinced of the limits of gov-
ernment efforts.
Principle Ten brings job training into the new economic world of 
globalization, competition, and outsourcing.
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THE CRAFT OF JOB TRAINING
Present in all of the principles is the theme of job training as a craft. 
By “craft” is meant mastery of a body of knowledge, as well as a code 
of behavior and a sense of social obligation. There is no exam that one 
passes to enter the job training ﬁeld, no certiﬁcation process or graduate 
requirement. Yet the practitioners who are craftspersons are those who 
have taken time to learn about past employment initiatives, their con-
sequences (intended and unintended), and the ongoing shifts in job op-
portunities. They are like the craftspersons of the past, the silversmith 
or furniture maker or glass blower, in their concern for the work. They 
operate with an emphasis on results, not process; with integrity; and 
with a determination to develop a high-quality product. 
Over the past 25 years, I have met such craftspersons as they ful-
ﬁlled their roles at community-based agencies, local and state govern-
ment entities, private ﬁrms, industry associations, labor unions, and pri-
vate foundations. You will meet some of them in the next pages, as the 
Ten Principles are set out. 
They are the true directors of employment. 
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How Practitioners and Policymakers 
Improved the Job Training World—
and What Challenges Lie Ahead
In his autobiography, Fragments of the Century, Michael Har-
rington (1973) discusses his experiences in the 1950s and early 1960s 
as a union and socialist organizer, and why he left. “By the end of 1962, 
I felt that I was becoming a socialist jukebox,” he says. “For years I 
had crisscrossed the country, speaking, organizing, listening. I could 
answer most of the questions socialists are usually asked in my sleep—
and sometimes nearly did. There was a real danger I would turn into a 
hack.” 
That’s how I felt in late 1986 upon leaving as director of a local job 
training agency, the San Francisco Renaissance Center. I had run out of 
ideas and found myself repeating experiences and prescriptions—be-
coming a job training jukebox. Just as importantly, I felt that things 
were unlikely to change much in the job training world, particularly in 
regard to welfare dependency, rising teen pregnancy, and decaying in-
ner-city areas. The orthodoxies that existed among foundation ofﬁcers 
and staff, local government ofﬁcials, and the congressional leadership 
stiﬂed new policy directions.
But I was wrong. Over the next 13 years, things did improve in the 
job training world. Welfare and teen pregnancy approaches changed 
as policymakers and practitioners challenged the conventions about 
welfare recipients and jobs. Not only did welfare and teen pregnancy 
rates decline, but employment rates improved for former welfare re-
cipients. Failed theories about inner-city neighborhoods were replaced 
by approaches that demolished high-rise housing projects, reclaimed 
inner-city land, and reestablished neighborhoods that valued families. 
Further, the job training world responded to job losses in manufacturing 
and other sectors by implementing a structure of retraining and reem-
ployment that has become increasingly sophisticated over the past 20 
years. 
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This evolution of employment programs, and, more generally, of 
antipoverty programs, is important to note. So often we hear that the 
antipoverty world is static, that nothing can change, that ideas have 
little impact. But ideas, and the willingness to act on them, did lead to 
reshaped policy and operation. Nowhere is this more true than in the re-
sponse to the grim prospects that loomed over employment in the early 
1980s: deindustrialization, the underclass, and inner-city chaos.
PART 1: MEETING PAST EMPLOYMENT CHALLENGES
Back, back, back. To 1980. A time when policymakers and em-
ployment professionals were haunted by several specters: The specter 
of permanent unemployment for a part of the American labor force as 
global competition and technology eliminated jobs, especially well-
paid manufacturing jobs. The specter of a runaway underclass charac-
terized by welfare, illiteracy, and crime. The specter of inner-city areas 
of high-rise housing projects so foreboding that even the police were 
fearful of entering.
Deindustrialization was one of the themes of the early 1980s: once-
proud factories closing; great American industries such as steel and tex-
tiles unable to compete with companies in Japan, Taiwan, and elsewhere. 
The alarm sounded by The Deindustrialization of America (Bluestone 
and Harrison 1982) was taken up by politicians and the mainstream 
press, who were struck by its description of job losses in the auto and 
steel industries and its warning that America faced a permanent loss of 
its manufacturing base and decent-paying union jobs.
The book, subtitled Plant Closings, Community Abandonment, and 
the Dismantling of Basic Industry, argued that the big steel and auto 
companies were closing plants and moving jobs overseas not because 
these plants or their workers were deﬁcient, but to maximize proﬁts. 
Further, these plant closings were devastating for the workers, since 
these workers would never get equivalent jobs. Union steelworkers and 
autoworkers would go from middle class to working at 7-Eleven or at 
fast-food jobs for a fraction of their previous wages.
James Fallows, a former speechwriter for President Carter and na-
tional correspondent for the Atlantic, in 1984 visited the steel heartland, 
How Practitioners and Policymakers Improved Job Training   9
the 35-mile stretch along Lake Michigan running west through Gary 
and Hammond to South Chicago and housing the densest concentra-
tion of steel mills in the world. Two of the large mills in the area, the 
Wisconsin Steel Works, with 3,400 steelworkers, and the South Works 
of U.S. Steel, also with more than 3,000 steelworkers, had been shut 
down in the early 1980s, and Fallows (1985) depicted the dislocation 
and hardships caused by these plant closings, the anger of the local 
union leaders, and the emotional and attitudinal distance of the corpo-
rate executives. As Fallows noted, these workers had become national 
symbols of economic collapse and middle-class decline:
If there is one widely accepted symbol of today’s changing econ-
omy, the 1980s version of the allegorical Joad family hitting the 
road during the Depression, it is the proud steelworker who gets 
laid off in Youngstown and is reduced to ﬂipping burgers for one-
ﬁfth his former wage. He is said to be more than an individual trag-
edy, for in his downfall lie the beginnings of a “two-tier” society 
and the destruction of the middle-class. (1985, p. 57)
Yet during the next two decades a two-tier society did not emerge. 
Although inequality in incomes did increase from the 1980s through 
the late 1990s, middle-class jobs also emerged, and even manufacturing 
made a comeback. Auto and steel plants continued to close in the 1980s, 
but the American market system proved highly resilient in creating new 
jobs, even in manufacturing, and at various income levels.
For example, in California, manufacturing employment averaged 
2,012,700 jobs in 1979. By 1983, it had slipped to 1,927,000, but then it 
climbed to 2,068,000 by 1990. During the early 1990s, the loss of jobs 
in California’s aerospace industry led to a decrease in total manufactur-
ing employment. But, after dipping to 1,777,300 in 1994, manufactur-
ing employment rebounded to 1,904,000 in 2001 (California Employ-
ment Development Department 2003). 
The big job growth in California, as in other states, was outside 
of manufacturing. Civilian employment in California stood at an aver-
age of 10,566,000 in 1979. By 1990, total average civilian employ-
ment had grown to 14,319,000. It then declined slightly for the ﬁrst 
ﬁve years of the 1990s, but by 2001 total civilian employment was up 
to 16,435,000.
Not only did the market respond, but so too did our job training 
profession. Beginning in the 1980s, the U.S. Department of Labor 
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(USDOL) added a reemployment and retraining system for laid-off 
workers. Workers who had been laid off became eligible for a variety 
of reemployment services: direct job placement, job search workshops, 
vouchers for retraining, funds to cover moving expenses. The program 
grew exponentially: in 1982, California received $8.8 million in “dis-
located worker” funds. By 1999, the federal dislocated worker funds 
for California totaled $228 million. The process of job destruction and 
reemployment had become integrated into the training system. 
Today this reemployment system is a sophisticated one, adminis-
tered by city or county Workforce Investment Boards (WIBs), which 
are knowledgeable about the local economy. As soon as layoffs are an-
nounced, the local WIB will contact workers and meet with them to 
develop individual employment plans. Based on a worker’s particular 
situation, that worker may be placed directly into a job, or retrained, or 
provided assistance in moving to another area of the state or country.1 
The job paths of laid-off workers, including laid-off manufactur-
ing workers, over the past two decades have taken many directions. 
Some workers fell signiﬁcantly in pay and skills, as predicted by the 
deindustrialization theorists. But others landed decent-paying jobs in 
their former industries or in related industries, or through the retraining 
system. To take one example, in the late 1980s and early 1990s the aero-
space industry in California went through enormous downsizing, shed-
ding over 200,000 jobs. The conventional wisdom that emerged was 
that aerospace engineers and production workers would become either 
the long-term unemployed or hourly McDonald’s employees. In 1994, 
researchers at the RAND Corporation’s National Defense Research In-
stitute decided to test this assumption by examining the earnings of 
laid-off aerospace workers over the previous six years.
Those researchers’ resulting work, Life After Cutbacks: Tracking 
California’s Aerospace Workers (Schoeni et al. 1996), used wage data 
for all 517,148 workers employed in the aerospace industry at the be-
ginning of 1989 to track their earnings from 1989 to the third quarter of 
1994. Their outcomes were compared with those of a random sample 
of 20 percent of workers in durable goods manufacturing in California 
at the start of 1989. This sample numbered 315,856 employees. The re-
searchers found that the aerospace workers that had been laid off did not 
differ signiﬁcantly in employment outcomes from other manufacturing 
workers in California laid off during this period. Twenty-ﬁve percent of 
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the workers experienced a reduction in wages of at least 14.8 percent by 
the end of the period. However, the other 75 percent not only were em-
ployed but showed wage growth of at least 4.5 percent. A full quarter of 
the workers showed wage growth of at least 23.8 percent. So although 
one in four of the laid-off workers did see their wages fall signiﬁcantly, 
other laid-off workers managed to ﬁnd jobs with aerospace companies, 
and even more were able to transfer skills to other industries, in part 
assisted by the retraining system established.2 
A second employment specter of 1980 that failed to materialize as 
predicted—a failure that was due to the strength of the market and to 
policy changes in welfare and employment—was the underclass. In 
1979 and 1980, before he became America’s leading writer on the me-
dia, Ken Auletta researched and wrote about the job training world. He 
spent seven months sitting in on a job training class at the Wildcat Skills 
Training Center in Manhattan, and he tracked participants after they 
completed training and were placed in jobs.
The training class was part of a Manpower Demonstration Research 
Corporation (MDRC) national demonstration project targeted at four 
groups considered to be “hardest to reach”: long-term welfare recipi-
ents, ex-convicts, ex-addicts, and delinquent youths. The year-long 
project aimed to acclimate these unemployed workers to steady jobs. 
For the ﬁrst seven months, trainees learned work orientation and job 
skills. For the next ﬁve, they did supported work in the private or the 
government sector.
Auletta called his book The Underclass (Auletta 1982), and the title 
reﬂects the thinking of the time that America was seeing a new class of 
poor people and facing a new threat. These poor were not like the im-
migrant poor of the past. They were not trying to advance through hard 
work. Instead, they were becoming more and more entrenched in their 
antisocial behaviors—welfare, teen pregnancy, crime, drug addiction.3 
Auletta acknowledged that within the welfare population there were 
some with a strong work ethic and work orientation. But these were the 
exception, he said, in a new class that presented a new peril in America: 
I had a vague sense when I began reporting this book back in mid-
1979 that next to war and peace and the state of the economy, the 
underclass might be the most momentous story in America. Today, 
that vague sense has hardened into a conviction . . . I learned that 
the underclass, as Thomas Jefferson said of the Missouri Compro-
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mise, is “like a ﬁrebell in the night.” It is both America’s peril and 
shame. (Auletta 1982, p. xviii)
Over the next 20 years, though, the fears of Auletta and others about 
a growing and permanent underclass were not borne out. Welfare rolls 
did not increase; rather, they declined. Nationwide, the number of wel-
fare recipients fell by more than 50 percent from early 1994 to late 
2000. In California, CalWORKs (California Work Opportunities and 
Responsibility to Kids), the main program for low-income families 
(the state’s successor to Aid to Families with Dependent Children), saw 
caseloads rise to 921,011 in 1995 and then drop steadily, particularly 
after the passage of the federal welfare reform act PRWORA in 1996. 
Figure 2.1 shows the falling CalWORKs caseloads, which were down 
to 516,591 family units in 2001—a decrease of 44 percent in six years. 
As caseloads dropped (and former welfare recipients moved into 
jobs), opponents of the 1996 welfare reform bill claimed that the strong 
economy, rather than any change in government policy, was the main 
inﬂuence. This claim, though, became more difﬁcult to argue after the 
economy softened post-2001 and welfare rolls continued to be low. 
The teen pregnancy rates, after climbing through the 1970s and 
1980s, have declined nationwide and in California since 1991, as Fig-
ure 2.1 also shows. The U.S. teen birthrate declined from 62.1 births per 
1,000 in 1991 to 45.8 births in 2001, and the California teen birthrate 
declined even more, from 72.9 per 1,000 in 1991 to 45.2 in 2001.
Welfare scholar Isabel Sawhill of the Urban Institute links the 
decline in the teen pregnancy rates to falling rates of sexual activity 
among teens and to better contraception. She connects both of these 
factors to changes in government policy—to abstinence programs, to 
the time limits enacted in the 1996 welfare reform law, and to birth 
control programs. 
The decline in the-underclass-as-social-specter was the result also 
of new government and private sector thinking on the scale and design 
of inner-city communities. Government-owned high-rise housing proj-
ects, which had the government acting as landlord, and the big-govern-
ment-centric planning theories that held sway from the 1950s through 
the 1970s both were abandoned. In their place, housing that is privately 
owned, of much lower density (two to three stories), and that mixes 
income levels has taken root (Sawhill 2002).
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Figure 2.1  A Comparison of California and U.S. Teen Birthrates Age 
15–19 (per 1,000 females) and CalWORKs’ Annual Average 
Monthly Caseload, 1991–2001
I recall in the early 1980s visiting job training groups in Chicago, 
Washington, D.C., St. Louis, and Philadelphia. These visits included 
tours of housing projects that towered over (and deﬁned) inner-city 
communities, such as the Cabrini-Green and Robert Taylor projects 
in Chicago, or that sprawled over vast swaths of inner-city land, such 
as Nicholson Gardens in Los Angeles and East Capitol Dwellings in 
Washington, D.C.
Fast forward to 2000. Many of these housing projects either already 
have been torn down or are in the process of being torn down. East Cap-
itol Dwellings, a 577-unit housing project spread over 40 acres along 
Washington’s East Capitol Street, is being razed to build a mixed-use 
project of market-rate and subsidized single-family homes, row houses, 
and some apartments. The notorious Cabrini-Green, which included 15 
high-rises of 7, 10, or 19 stories, is being replaced by a series of mixed-
use developments like North Town Village, which comprises 261 con-
dominiums and town houses. In San Francisco, high-rise projects in 
the city’s Western Addition are being replaced by pleasant one- and 
two-story town houses.
SOURCE: Unpublished data from California Department of Social Services.
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Credit for this change goes to policymakers who were willing to 
question the conventional wisdom in how to design inner-city areas, 
who pushed for more home ownership for the poor, and who withstood 
the criticism advanced by self-styled advocates for the poor that mixing 
incomes in residential settings was inappropriate gentriﬁcation.4
PART 2: MEETING TODAY’S EMPLOYMENT CHALLENGES
Today, the big challenges for employment professionals are differ-
ent from those of 20 years ago. There have been gains made, but there 
are also now a greater number of low-wage workers and workers with 
disabilities on government beneﬁt rolls. Chapter 1 alluded to four areas 
of challenge, and it is worth introducing these four areas in more detail, 
to set the context for the Ten Principles. 
1. Job Training in the New Economy, Technology, and Globalization 
In the 43 years since the establishment of the Manpower Devel-
opment Training Act (MDTA) in 1962, the forms of job training have 
not changed signiﬁcantly. MDTA was a response to fears that automa-
tion was eliminating jobs, and it funded four major forms of training: 
1) classroom instruction, 2) on-the-job training, 3) work experience, 
and 4) assisted job placement. These forms make up the bulk of the 
government-funded training system today. 
At the same time, the performance of the training system has im-
proved over the years as it has assumed a greater market orientation. 
Training programs today are more tied to local labor markets and spe-
ciﬁc job placement than in the past, and they show greater ﬂexibility in 
adapting training to changing employer needs. 
One challenge of the coming years is to build the market orienta-
tion and accountability of the state training systems and of the national 
system while maintaining a healthy network of community-based orga-
nizations and other private training providers.
Beyond this challenge lies another: that of positioning training in 
the face of technology and globalization. Technology destroys some 
jobs and creates others, and it is important to distinguish which new 
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jobs represent opportunities for the training system. For example, in 
1999–2000, during the dot-com boom in California, thousands of dot-
com ﬁrms arose quickly in that state, did considerable hiring, and then 
collapsed within two years. These ﬁrms left an impact on the state’s 
employment: some of the dot-coms did survive, and they added to the 
state’s job base. Far more important, though, was the growth of what 
we came to call “new-technician” jobs: jobs as network administra-
tors, ﬁeld service technicians, or customer service technicians in the 
Old Economy ﬁrms—the banks, insurance companies, law ﬁrms, and 
engineering ﬁrms. By 2002, these new-technician jobs were providing 
a new middle level of jobs and a niche for job training.
Technology also changes the skills required in existing jobs, from 
auto repair technician to ofﬁce administrative assistant to medical bill-
ing operator. The training system largely has kept up with these chang-
es, and it must continue to keep close to employers and to adapt training 
to new technology. 
Globalization, as it increases job creation and destruction, will aug-
ment the role of job training for workers laid off or in danger of being 
laid off. It also will give greater prominence to job training organiza-
tions that are able to adapt rapidly to changing labor market opportu-
nities, and it will give push to a broader workforce system of lifelong 
learning.
2. The Next Stages of Welfare Reform—Retention and Skills 
Advancement
At the time welfare reform legislation was enacted, in 1996, it was 
hotly contested, not only politically but also intellectually. Its promi-
nent opponents in the welfare ﬁeld—Marion Wright Edelman, Peter 
Edelman, Wendell Primus—claimed that poverty rates would go sky-
high and that families would be thrown out into the streets.
They were wrong. Instead, as welfare scholar Sheldon Danziger 
(2002) concluded, “the increase in poverty predicted by critics of the 
1996 law has not occurred.” The welfare rolls decreased partly because 
recipients illegitimately collecting welfare went off the rolls, but mainly 
because recipients moved into jobs in unprecedented numbers. In Cali-
fornia, 84,743 welfare recipients found jobs in the one-year period of 
July 1994–June 1995. Four years later, in the similar period of July 
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1998–June 1999, 141,836 welfare recipients found jobs—an increase 
of 67 percent.5
Most workforce practitioners knew (and said) in 1996 that the ﬁrst 
jobs obtained by former welfare recipients would be low wage or less 
than full time. The skills and education level of most welfare recipients 
were limited—more than half in California lacked a high school di-
ploma in 1995—and so were their work experiences.
But even in these lower-wage jobs, the former welfare recipients 
were almost always economically better off than if they had remained 
on welfare. The welfare reform of 1996 and its subsequent implemen-
tation by the states did succeed in “making work pay,” in President 
Clinton’s phrase. This was due to several important policy changes on 
the federal and state levels: the states expanded earnings “disregards,” 
which allow recipients to have earnings that do not offset welfare ben-
eﬁts; and the federal government expanded the Earned Income Tax 
Credit and increased child care subsidies. Harvard professor David 
Ellwood (2000) has estimated that in 1986 a single mother who left 
welfare for a full-time minimum wage job could expect to make about 
$1,900 more than she was getting from the government—and lose her 
health beneﬁts. By 1999, she was getting $7,119 more and maintaining 
her health beneﬁts. 
While these economic improvements were important, they still 
left most former welfare recipients not very far above the poverty line. 
Further, even those former recipients with full-time jobs were often in 
shaky situations, where they were near quitting or the boss was near 
ﬁring them.
By 1999, state and local employment administrators across the na-
tion were on to the next stage of welfare reform: retention and skills 
advancement. The major research organizations—MDRC, Seedco, 
Public/Private Ventures—were testing approaches for keeping welfare 
recipients in jobs, for helping them ﬁnd replacement jobs quickly if 
they lost a job, or for teaching them skills to advance.
In California, retention and skills advancement was the top item in 
the governor’s 1999 welfare agenda. The goal: to try to prevent former 
welfare recipients from falling back out of the labor market and to as-
sist them in gaining work experience and skills, thereby advancing in 
wages.
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This was a big challenge, since the few attempts in California from 
1996 to 1998 at retention and advancement showed little success. Job 
skills classes at night and on weekends for former welfare recipients 
were not well attended. Employers had little interest in or ability to 
implement on-the-job skills upgrading. Computers placed in former 
welfare recipients’ homes to encourage on-line training sat idle.
3. The Lack of Economic Self-Sufﬁciency, Mobility, and
Professionalism among Large Segments of the Low-Wage 
Workforce 
By the start of the twenty-ﬁrst century, the underclass had been re-
placed as the topic of the government/foundation complex—the stud-
ies, conferences, and symposia—by another group construct, the work-
ing poor. By “working poor” is meant Americans working full time or 
nearly full time but not earning enough to be above, or very far above, 
the poverty line.
This focus on the working poor reﬂects several concerns among 
practitioners and policymakers today. Chief among these are income 
inequality, the increased demands on government services by the low-
wage workforce, the high turnover in low-wage jobs, and the lack of 
quality and craftsmanship in these jobs. 
Figure 2.2 shows family income inequality in California and the 
United States over a 30-year period. It does so by charting the ratio of 
the income of families at the 75th percentile to the income of families at 
the 25th percentile. The income inequality is greater in California than 
in the nation, due in large part to the inﬂux to California of immigrants 
with limited literacy and job skills. However, income inequality grew 
throughout the United States from 1979 to 1993, before leveling off for 
the rest of the decade (Daly, Reed, and Royer 2001).
No income or wage distribution, however unequal, is by itself a sign 
of social dysfunction or injustice. An unequal income distribution can 
be justiﬁed on the varied grounds of rewarding hard work, or risk, or 
economic efﬁciency, or growth. Yet as a nation we celebrate the politi-
cal and economic stability of a large middle class. 
Further, a large working-poor population draws on government ben-
eﬁts. Government programs providing welfare, health care, housing, 
and Food Stamps serve not only unemployed workers but also workers 
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who earn below certain income levels (based on family size). Thus, 
low-wage workers unable to pay on their own have their costs of health 
or housing or food socialized—that is, paid for by the government. In a 
recent study, “The Hidden Public Costs of Low-Wage Jobs in Califor-
nia,” three University of California, Berkeley, researchers estimate that 
$10.1 billion, or nearly half of the $21.2 billion received in public assis-
tance by California residents in 2002, went to families whose working 
members earn too little to be self-supporting. In other words, nearly half 
of all public assistance in California goes to working families. In select 
industries, notably agriculture, low wages are highly subsidized by the 
government through unemployment insurance. In such cases, low-paid 
workers are employed part of the year and collect unemployment insur-
ance for the remainder (Zabin, Dube, and Jacobs 2004).
In several key industries, the low-wage workforces are characterized 
by high turnover and low-quality service. A recent study of low-wage 
Figure 2.2  Ratio of Income of Families in 75th Percentile to Income of 
Families in 25th Percentile, California and Rest of the United 
States, 1969–1999
SOURCE: Daly, Reed, and Royer (2001).
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direct-care workers in California nursing homes found that over a three-
year period 60 percent of these workers left their initial ﬁrm and more 
than 50 percent left the long-term care ﬁeld (Ong et al. 2002). Similarly, 
high turnover has plagued child care, where studies have found that 
fully half of child care aides were no longer in the ﬁeld after four years. 
With workers coming and going, nursing homes, child care centers, and 
other low-wage employers (including hotels, motels, and restaurants) 
express frustration at trying to maintain a high level of service. 
In the past decade, the working poor have become a topic not only 
of studies and monographs but also of several books by journalists and 
novelists. Nickel and Dimed, by Barbara Ehrenreich (2001), is by far the 
best known. Ben Cheever’s Selling Ben Cheever (2001), Iain Levison’s 
A Working Stiff’s Manifesto (2002), and Don Snyder’s The Cliff Walk 
(1997) are other prominent contributions to this genre of the working-
class work world. 
 This new journalism on the low-wage workforce is a departure from 
the journalism of the previous three decades, which focused on wel-
fare recipients and the unemployed poor through books such as Elliot 
Liebow’s Tally’s Corner (1967), George Gilder’s Visible Man (1978), 
and Leon Dash’s Rosa Lee (1996). The new journalism reﬂects a con-
cern about the polarization of jobs that has grown beyond the job train-
ing profession.
As discussed more fully in Chapter 5, this new literature, particu-
larly Nickel and Dimed, does not tell the full story on the economics and 
mobility of the low-wage workforce. There is more movement upward 
among the low-wage workforce than is portrayed in these books and in 
the mainstream press. But the books do succeed in capturing character-
istics of many low-wage jobs, including the absence of investment in the 
skills of workers and the lack of reward for craftsmanship or quality.6 
In response to these broadening concerns over the low-wage work-
force, state and local governments and private foundations are turning 
to skills upgrading approaches. These approaches, often termed “career 
ladders,” seek to increase the wages of low-paid workers through im-
proving their skills and productivity and thus their ability to advance. 
At this point, career ladders are less developed than other elements 
in the job training world, hence they face conceptual and operational 
obstacles. Though publicly funded skills upgrading projects for low-
wage workers have been part of the job training landscape for over 
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30 years (I can recall the health care career ladders Governor Brown 
launched in 1978, when I was ﬁrst in Sacramento), these projects have 
never obtained much scale or sustainability. Today, job training profes-
sionals are faced with the challenge of designing skills upgrading 
•  that employers will adopt as being of value, 
•  that is sustainable, 
•  that is of some scale, 
•  that yields a wage increase—
and of doing all of this while meeting other responsibilities with federal 
workforce funds that are not expanding.
4. Workers with Disabilities
While the welfare rolls declined during the 1990s, nationwide the 
rolls of two other government beneﬁt programs, Supplemental Security 
Income (SSI) and Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI), sharply 
increased. By 1998, 3.6 million adults were unemployed and receiving 
SSI, and another 4.6 million were unemployed and receiving SSDI.
Many of these workers have physical disabilities. An even greater 
number have either developmental disabilities or mental health issues. 
In California in January 2003, the combined number of SSI and SSDI 
recipients was 980,000—larger than the size of the labor force of most 
states.
This growth in SSI/SSDI parallels the increase in the unemploy-
ment rate for workers with disabilities. The conventional wisdom is 
that, following passage of the Americans with Disabilities Act in 1990, 
unemployment among workers with disabilities declined. In fact, sev-
eral data sets show that the employment rate for these workers held 
static or even decreased in the late 1990s.
The SSI/SSDI population has not received the attention that the 
welfare population has in recent years, nor the push to employment. 
But that is beginning to change, and for good reasons. Some of these 
reasons involve the costs to federal and state government of having 
such a large (and growing) number of workers on long-term SSI/SSDI. 
Another reason is more positive: employers recognize the promise of 
workers with disabilities in today’s highly complex and specialized la-
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bor market. These workers bring strengths to many jobs, above those 
of other workers. They bring specialized skills and often a work loyalty 
not possessed by other workers.
The task for practitioners today lies, on one level, in designing tar-
geted, effective efforts that can build an inclusion model: a model to in-
clude workers with disabilities in mainstream employment rather than 
place them in separate workplaces or sheltered workshops. On another 
level, the task is to restructure government beneﬁt programs to encour-
age employment rather than long-term reliance on SSI/SSDI. 
GOVERNMENT SHOULD BUILD ON THE STRENGTHS OF 
LOW-INCOME FAMILIES AND COMMUNITIES
In their efforts to address these four areas of challenge—job train-
ing for the changing world, retention and skills advancement, the lack 
of results in the low-wage workforce, and the growing number of work-
ers with disabilities—practitioners would do well to explore how to use 
extragovernmental networks to build on the strengths of low-income 
families and communities, not prop up their weaknesses. Rather than 
looking at poor communities as social pathologies, as much of anti-
poverty thought has done over the past 40 years, perhaps it would be 
more accurate and more helpful to look at these communities for their 
strengths—the ambition of individuals, the formal and informal asso-
ciations of neighbors, the churches, and the faith-based groups.
The current structure of antipoverty programs has its roots in the 
Johnson administration’s War on Poverty, designed by federal govern-
ment ofﬁcials from 1964 to 1966. Though he was outside government, 
Michael Harrington played an important design role through the inﬂu-
ence of his book on the poor, The Other America, ﬁrst published in 1962. 
Harrington was one of the most learned and original public intellectuals 
of the past 50 years, but his ideas on poverty were deeply ﬂawed, and 
they came to undermine antipoverty efforts for years to come. 
During the 1950s, Harrington had traveled throughout the United 
States as a volunteer or low-paid organizer for the civil rights move-
ment, unions, and the Young People’s Socialist League. Encouraged 
in 1958 by the editor of Commentary magazine to write an article on 
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poverty in America, Harrington did a series on the poor, describing their 
numbers and conditions. This became The Other America.
Harrington not only attempted to quantify the poor (which he esti-
mated at between 40 and 50 million Americans) but to give a face to 
them (“the unskilled workers, the migrant farmworkers, the aged, the 
minorities, and all the others who live in the economic underworld of 
American life”), and most of all to emphasize what he called the “cul-
ture of poverty.” The poor not only lacked resources, they were beaten 
down, he said: “The American poor are pessimistic and defeated, and 
they are victimized by mental suffering to a degree unknown in Subur-
bia” (1962, p. 2).
They could not help themselves; they needed a hand up. Only one 
institution could provide this help—the federal government, with, as 
Harrington called it, a “comprehensive assault on poverty.”7 Reﬂect-
ing this view, President Johnson’s War on Poverty created a new anti-
poverty apparatus, based in the federal government, to spread money 
around for community action, job training, housing, counseling, and 
mental health.
Even as the War on Poverty bureaucracy arose, critics questioned its 
basic assumptions about the poor. Were the poor really so beaten down 
and pessimistic? And, if they needed help, was the federal government 
the right source of help? Were not the main beneﬁciaries of the War on 
Poverty the middle-class administrators and consultants who received 
jobs or contracts?
In subsequent years, the questioning has intensiﬁed, fueled by the 
success of immigrant groups, especially immigrants from Southeast 
Asia, in moving out of poverty. Since the 1970s, such immigrant popu-
lations have started businesses, bought homes, and accumulated assets. 
They have done so often without any of the Great Society government 
programs of the 1960s, using only the assistance of familial associa-
tions and the pooling of resources. And not only immigrants: millions 
of nonimmigrant Americans have advanced out of poverty during this 
time, without government antipoverty programs but with the assistance 
of faith-based associations.
For years, private foundations have funded extragovernmental ef-
forts aimed at duplicating immigrant networks so as to assist poor fami-
lies in working together to address their unemployment, their limited 
education, or their lack of assets. In the past few years, using legislation 
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passed during George W. Bush’s ﬁrst term as president, the federal gov-
ernment and state governments have begun to fund faith-based groups, 
especially in inner-city and rural areas. Such groups utilize volunteers 
in striving to help families work together. 
The extragovernmental networks challenge practitioners to think 
outside of the government-program mindset. They lead us to ask: What 
is the appropriate domain of government programs, and when should 
we look beyond government? Among extragovernmental networks, 
what are the most effective roles for the faith-based groups, the neigh-
borhood associations, and the networks of families? How can those of 
us in government or private foundations best support efforts outside 
of government—and does government or foundation ﬁnancial support 
actually harm these efforts?
Princess Margaret and the Matchmaker
Now-retired New York Times columnist William Saﬁre, from time to 
time, used to tell the chestnut from the 1950s about Princess Margaret 
and the matchmaker: “A Jewish matchmaker had the idea of matching 
up poor Sammy—a nebbish and a schlumph—with Princess Margaret, 
then the world’s most eligible woman. Sammy’s mother would not hear 
of it: The princess could not cook and was not Jewish. After weeks of 
persuading, with the matchmaker showing how the alliance with British 
royalty would help Israel, the mother gave her grudging approval. The 
matchmaker heaved a sigh of relief and said, ‘Now for the hard part.’”
Identifying the challenges for job training practitioners today is the 
ﬁrst step. Now for the hard part.
Notes
 1.  For example, in 2000, the Northern Rural Training and Employment Consortium 
(NoRTEC) Workforce Investment Board and the North Central Counties Con-
sortium (NCCC), the two WIBs covering the rural and timber areas of northern 
California, applied to the State of California seeking dislocated worker funds for 
770 workers affected by closures and layoffs in the region. Given that the ofﬁcial 
unemployment rate in the region was over 14 percent, we were skeptical about 
what jobs the laid-off workers could be trained for. The WIBs’ approach was a 
mix of training for health care (the one sector expanding), facilitating the hiring 
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of workers by individual employers, and providing ﬁnancial support and direc-
tion for some workers to move out of the area.
 2. In Does Training Work for Displaced Workers? A Survey of Existing Evidence, 
Duane Leigh (1990) of Washington State University reviews research on the ef-
fectiveness of government-funded retraining programs for laid-off workers. Job 
search assistance shows strong positive impacts on earnings and placement rates, 
while the other training forms show less dramatic impacts but often gains.
 3. For another example of the policy elites’ belief that there is a growing underclass, 
see Lemann (1986).
 4. Two national studies, both issued in May 2003, show dramatic declines in the 
concentration of poverty in urban slums. Jargowsky (2003) deﬁnes high-poverty 
neighborhoods as ones in which at least 40 percent of the people live in poverty. 
He ﬁnds that nationwide the number of people living in such neighborhoods fell 
by 24 percent from 1990 to 2000. Kingsley and Pettit (2003) ﬁnd that in Detroit 
the drop was even more precipitous: the number of people living in high-pov-
erty neighborhoods fell by 74 percent. In part, though, this reﬂects the drop in 
population in these low income areas during this period. Even so, Kingsley and 
Pettit note, “This shows that nothing is inevitable; the cycle of poverty can be 
reversed.”
 5. Testimony of Bruce Wagstaff, Department of Social Services, during the Cali-
fornia State Legislature’s Joint Oversight Hearing on CalWORKs, February 27, 
2001.
 6. Cheever, an out-of-work novelist and journalist and the son of John Cheever, 
takes a series of low-wage jobs over several years and writes about the artistry 
he ﬁnds among his co-workers. The low-paid sales staff at CompUSA and at 
Nobody Beats the Wiz impress Cheever with their commitment to serving cus-
tomers. Cheever, though, sees in these jobs—and in others as a Burns security 
guard, a sandwich maker, a car salesman—too few rewards for quality and too 
few opportunities to increase pay or position.
 7. For a fuller discussion of the role of Harrington and The Other America in shap-
ing the War on Poverty, see Isserman (2000).
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Principle One: 
The Unemployment Rate
A Strong Economy Does Far More to Reduce 
Unemployment Than Any Government Program
During 1999 and 2000, the ﬁrst two years of the Davis administra-
tion in California, the unemployment rate in the state dipped below 5 
percent. In several major urban counties—San Diego, Orange, Santa 
Clara—it reached lows of less than 3 percent. Then, in March 2001, 
the state rate began to climb, and it rose slowly over the next two years 
until it hit 6.5 percent in late 2002—not high by historical standards but 
well above what Californians had become accustomed to. In the ﬁrst 
days of January 2003, having won reelection the previous November, 
Governor Davis announced that the top three priorities of his second 
term would be “jobs, jobs, jobs,” and a task force of agency secretaries 
and department directors was formed to analyze recommendations for a 
jobs strategy (Gledhill and Marinucci 2003).1
Many of the recommendations that we on the task force received 
from advocacy groups focused on increased public spending, on pub-
lic works, or on direct government job creation. Though the desire for 
such remedies is common in times of higher unemployment, the recom-
mendations misunderstand the role of government and of government 
programs in inﬂuencing the unemployment rate. 
When we talk of designing job training and employment programs, 
it is important to place those designs in the context of private sector job 
creation. So, in Principle One, we start with three truths for practitio-
ners on the relation between the unemployment rate and efforts by state 
and local governments to lower it: 
1) A strong private sector economy has far more impact in reducing 
unemployment than does any government program—and also 
far more impact in reducing unemployment for the least-well-off 
workers.
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2) Even when the unemployment rate is high, there is an enormous 
amount of job creation. Each month in California, in good times 
and bad, at least 300,000 jobs are created. Policymakers too of-
ten focus on the publicized job layoffs and miss the jobs being 
created, usually in small increments of 1 to 10.
3) The national economy, as indicated by the U.S. unemployment 
rate, is by far the single greatest determining factor in the state’s 
unemployment rate. State government can exercise some impact 
on joblessness, though, through its administration of job training 
and welfare funds, as well as through its more general policies 
to promote private business growth.
FIRST TRUTH: THE BEST EMPLOYMENT PROGRAM IS A 
STRONG ECONOMY
During 1999, 2000, and 2001, California had some of its lowest 
sustained unemployment since the late 1940s. Figure 3.1 shows the an-
nual unemployment rate in California from 1971 to 2002. In the major-
ity of these years, the rate was above 7 percent, and in only two years, 
1988 and 1989, was the rate low enough to even approach the average 
rate of 1999–2001.
Moreover, in a number of the large urban counties of California—
San Diego, Orange, Santa Clara—the unemployment rate was under 
2.5 percent for many of the months of 1999 and 2000. In Santa Clara 
County, a county with a labor force of more than 1 million, the rate 
dipped to 1.6 percent in December 2000, and in Orange and San Diego 
counties, each with a labor force of more than 1.4 million, the unem-
ployment rate dropped to under 2 percent in late 2000.
What caused this low unemployment? Was it an increase in job 
training or in antipoverty funds? A different type of job training? Gov-
ernment job creation? Overwhelmingly, the low unemployment was the 
result not of job training or antipoverty programs or government job 
creation, but of a strong private economy.
During 1999 and 2000, the job training funds spent in California 
(primarily a combination of Workforce Investment Act, adult educa-
tion, community college, and Employment Training Panel funds) were 
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not signiﬁcantly greater than those that had been spent in the previous 
decade. Further, the job training and antipoverty groups funded were 
the same groups funded in previous years. And with unemployment so 
low, there was no federal or state government job creation effort.
In late 2000, when Oakland mayor and former California governor 
Edmund “Jerry” Brown Jr. joked to me that “you’re the most successful 
EDD director ever,” he was quick to add, “Actually, the only way that 
EDD can really impact California unemployment is if you laid off all 
of your 10,000 workers.” Even this comment overstated EDD’s impact, 
though, since 10,000 additional Californians becoming unemployed 
would not signiﬁcantly affect the unemployment rate in a civilian labor 
force of more than 17 million Californians, altering it by only six one-
hundredths of 1 percent.
That a strong private economy is the main determinant of jobs and 
good wages is widely recognized by economists—and usually is the 
starting point for their discussions of employment programs. The prin-
ciple is highlighted in three recent works by economists that are among 
those I recommend to EDD staff and other professionals in my work as 
Figure 3.1  Unemployment Rate in California, 1971–2002  
(%, annual by average)
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a research fellow with the Milken Institute. All three make the point of 
the central importance of a strong private economy to jobs and wages, 
especially for the most vulnerable workers. These works are described 
under the following bullets.
• In Finding Work: Jobs and Welfare Reform, the volume’s edi-
tors, David Card, professor of economics at the University of 
California, Berkeley, and Rebecca Blank, dean of the Gerald R. 
Ford School of Public Policy at the University of Michigan, have 
collected studies on the employment and wages of low-skilled 
workers, especially former welfare recipients. Their introduction 
notes the strong run of the national economy from the end of the 
1991 recession to 2000: unemployment nationwide reached a 30-
year low by the end of the decade (Card and Blank 2000, p. 2). 
Not only did the proportion of the population with jobs rise, but 
employment among the least skilled workers increased the most, 
as seen in Figure 3.2. Further, as Figure 3.3 shows, low-paid 
workers, especially men, experienced noticeable wage gains.
• In “Area Economic Conditions and the Labor Market Outcomes 
of Young Men in the 1990s Expansion,” Richard Freeman, As-
cherman Professor of Economics at Harvard University, and Wil-
liam Rodgers, Cummings Professor of Economics at the College 
of William and Mary, pose the query, “To what extent has the 
1990s boom improved the labor market outcomes of young non-
college-educated men? How much has the boom helped young 
African American men who are the most disadvantaged and so-
cially troubled group in the U.S.?” (Freeman and Rodgers 1999, 
p. 3). The authors study employment and earnings data during 
these periods and conclude that “young men in tight labor mar-
kets in the 1990s experienced a noticeable boost in employment 
and earnings,” including low-income African American youths 
(pp. 19–20).
• In “Recession and Reaction,” Manuel Pastor, chair of Latin 
American and Latino Studies at the University of California, 
Santa Cruz, and Carol Zabin, associate chair of UC Berkeley’s 
Center for Labor Research and Education, examine employment 
and earnings of low-wage workers in California. During the 
boom years of 1999–2000, employment and wages of low-paid 
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Unemployment Rates By Education Level (Men and Women Age 25+)
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Figure 3.2  Unemployment Rates by Education Level  
(%, men and women age 25 and over)
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workers made signiﬁcant gains and reversed the growing income 
inequality of the previous decade. When the economy worsened 
in 2001–2002, the gains in people working and in wages for the 
lowest quintile of workers largely disappeared (Pastor and Zabin 
2002).2
All of these economists argue for targeted policies to help low-
skilled and low-wage workers, even in times of strong private growth. 
Card and Blank (2000, pp. 12–13), for example, note that wage subsi-
dies (the Earned Income Tax Credit and enhanced earnings disregards) 
and ﬁnancial incentive programs (health care and child care subsidies) 
have shown an ability to increase the employment and hours of less-
skilled workers in good times and bad. Yet Card, Blank, and the other 
economists recognize that private sector growth is a more powerful 
catalyst for less-skilled workers than any of these targeted policies.
In early 2003, EDD joined with the San Francisco Foundation to 
sponsor a half-day session on the working poor in the Bay Area as part 
of the California Adult Education Administrators’ Association’s annual 
conference in San Francisco. Manuel Pastor, the keynote speaker, made 
a PowerPoint presentation on “Bridges and Barriers: Navigating Work 
in California’s New Economy.” Pastor (2003) carefully went over the 
data on the area’s low income households by number of hours worked, 
ethnicity, geography, and industry sector. One of the presentation’s pag-
es was called “Is There a Recipe to Lift the Bottom?” Two ingredients 
to the recipe were “Education and training for life-long development” 
and “New networks and connections to overcome isolation.” But Pas-
tor emphasized that the greatest impact would come from general eco-
nomic growth, which during the late 1990s sharply reduced the poverty 
rates of all ethnic groups in California—most of all African Americans 
and Latinos—as shown in Figure 3.4.
During the ﬁrst months of President Clinton’s administration in 
early 1993, a spirited debate took place on reducing unemployment 
(Woodward 1994). The discussion pitted, among others, Robert Rubin, 
secretary of the treasury, against Robert Reich, secretary of labor and 
self-proclaimed advocate for the poor in the administration.
Reich argued for a massive job creation and job training effort. 
During the 1992 campaign, Reich had proposed a guaranteed federal 
retraining program for anyone poor, unemployed, or on welfare; the 
program would provide an income subsidy for two years. The idea was 
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rejected by Clinton after his economists pegged the cost at close to $100 
billion. Now, in the administration’s ﬁrst 100 days, Reich was back, 
pushing a program of large-scale government expenditures in education 
and training.
Rubin argued for holding the line on government spending, as part 
of a strong approach of deﬁcit reduction. The deﬁcit was increasing and 
by 1997 would threaten to reach an unprecedented $360 billion. This 
deﬁcit, unless checked, would bring higher interest rates and would 
reduce dollars for private investment. Though workers on welfare or 
unemployment might not see as much job training money, they would 
gain by deﬁcit reduction through job creation (Woodward 1994).
President Clinton largely followed Rubin’s approach. As the deﬁcit 
declined, the economy did rebound, showing a sustained economic ex-
pansion from 1993 through 2000.
Figure 3.4  Poverty Rates for Californians by Race, 1991–2001
Poverty Rates for Californians Over the 1990s
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Pe
rc
en
t i
n 
po
ve
rt
y
Anglo Latino Black Asian
SOURCE: Calculations by UC Santa Cruz professor Manuel Pastor, based on the 
March 2002 Supplement of the Current Population Survey, U.S. Census Bureau.
32  Bernick
SECOND TRUTH: AN ENORMOUS JOB CREATION GOES 
ON THROUGH GOOD TIMES AND BAD
In 2002, EDD researchers undertook the most extensive tracking 
of job creation and destruction ever done in California. Using payroll 
reporting data, EDD researchers tracked job changes (creation and de-
struction) that had taken place over a 36-month period, from the start of 
1999 through the end of 2001 (Hardiman and Holden 2003).
Figure 3.5 shows the job creation and destruction tracked by quarter 
over the three years. In each of these quarters, job creation totals more 
than 900,000, meaning that at the very least 300,000 new jobs were cre-
ated per month. And in the 10 quarters for 1999, 2000, and the ﬁrst half 
of 2001, job creation remains above 1 million.
Figure 3.5  California Job Creation and Destruction by Quarter, 1999–
2001 (in millions of jobs)
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Job destruction is more variable and seasonal. Yet in each of the 
quarters job destruction totals more than 750,000. It peaks in the ﬁrst 
quarter of 2001, when it tops 1,300,000.
The job creation and destruction levels vary by industry and by time 
of year. Agriculture is by far the most volatile industry, with creation 
ranging from 12 to 42 percent of average quarterly employment and 
destruction ranging from 9 to 45 percent. In contrast, construction and 
retail trade vary no more than 7 points in either creation or destruction: 
construction ranges between 9 and 16 percent; retail trade between 5 
and 12 (Hardiman and Holden 2003, pp. 16–17).
The very active job creation and destruction we see depicted is not 
limited to California. This dynamic is present throughout the nation. 
For the fourth quarter of 1999, the Bureau of Labor Statistics report-
ed the national job creation rate at 8.3 percent (compared to 8.5 for 
California) and the national job destruction rate at 7.4 percent (7.3 for 
California). Individual studies on job creation/destruction rates for the 
state of Vermont, the Washington-Baltimore region, and the Rust Belt 
cities of Michigan, Ohio, and Pennsylvania found these rates to be only 
slightly less than California’s (Faberman 2001, 2002; Vermont Depart-
ment of Employment and Training 2004).3
The job creation/destruction data have several meanings for local 
and state practitioners:
• The major job layoffs that dominate newspaper coverage (i.e., the 
Silicon Valley layoffs, such as Agilant dismissing 2,200 workers) 
in truth are not a major part of the jobs lost or gained. In Cali-
fornia, even if a layoff totals 1,000 workers over three months, it 
amounts to less than 1 percent of the jobs gained or lost during 
this period.
• Even in job sectors that overall are losing jobs, there will be 
many job openings. In recent years, sectors such as technology 
and health care justiﬁably have been given great attention, as they 
have been and will continue to be big job gainers, both in rate of 
growth and in absolute job openings. However, even sectors like 
construction, wholesale trade, and transportation—not projected 
to be big job gainers—will have numerous openings, from turn-
over of jobs as well as turnover of personnel.
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• A healthy local or state economy is not one that is not losing jobs 
but one that is generating enough jobs to keep up with or ahead 
of job loss: The “creative destruction” of the market economy 
that the Moravian-born Harvard economist Joseph Schumpeter 
(1943) could discern and write about more than 60 years ago 
continues to be the hallmark of the market economy today.
THIRD TRUTH: STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS CAN 
AFFECT THE STATE UNEMPLOYMENT RATE
Though the national economy is the main factor in the state un-
employment rate, state and local governments affect this rate by their 
ability to inﬂuence the factors conducive to business growth and by 
their ability to effectively operate job training and placement programs. 
Figure 3.6 shows the national unemployment rate and the California 
unemployment rate from January 1993 to January 2003. The state rate 
closely tracks with the national rate, declining during the mid-to-late 
1990s as the national rate declines, and increasing from 2001 onward as 
the national rate increases.
“What can a state government do to impact the unemployment 
rate?” asked the governor’s communications deputy director, Dennis 
Petrie, when we ﬁrst discussed Governor Davis’s jobs initiatives in late 
2002. After seeing Figure 3.6, he e-mailed, “Are we extraneous?”
“Not exactly,” I wrote back. “A state impacts the unemployment 
rate in several ways.” 
First, there is the impact a state can have by keeping business taxes 
low and providing the other components of a healthy business envi-
ronment, particularly public safety and transportation. The relation be-
tween state tax rates and business growth is highly inexact: it is roughly 
estimated that a 10 percent tax increase reduces economic activity by 1 
to 3 percent.4
Beyond these efforts, the state can generate jobs through state 
spending on transportation, housing, and school construction. In 2002, 
California voters passed the largest education bond in the history of the 
state, $13 billion (including $11.4 billion for school construction), and 
that same year they approved a $2.1 billion housing bond.5 Expedit-
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Figure 3.6  U.S. and California Monthly Unemployment Rates, January 
1993–February 2003 (%)
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Labor Market Information Division.
ing the approval and construction of these facilities by rapidly process-
ing them through the environmental impact assessment and permitting 
stages offers a means of jump-starting the state economy.
Further, the state is able to direct federal job training funds to those 
sectors and occupations where they will have the greatest employment 
impact. By early 2003, there were not a lot of jobs for which employers 
could not ﬁnd workers. Two that did exist, and continue to, are nurses 
and math and science teachers. To the extent that the state makes these 
jobs targets and aims its federal training funds at the Californians least 
likely to ﬁnd jobs on their own, it maximizes its impact on reducing 
unemployment.
So a state government, if not the main driver of its unemployment 
rate, need not be a potted plant. At the same time, state government, 
as embodied by its governor, should not overpromise or try to claim 
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undue credit, as is the temptation for some governors. An example is 
Michael Dukakis, three-term governor of Massachusetts. In his 1988 
presidential campaign, Dukakis took great credit for the “Massachu-
setts Miracle”—the growth of high-tech industry in Massachusetts dur-
ing the 1980s and the decline of the state’s unemployment rate to under 
3 percent. Dukakis’s staff, with the candidate’s approval, convinced the 
national press to write stories about Dukakis’s policy acumen.6
Unfortunately for Dukakis, after he lost the presidential race, he 
remained governor for two more years. The Massachusetts economy 
soured, unemployment increased, and he decided not to seek reelection 
to a fourth term. His campaign book, titled Creating the Future: The 
Massachusetts Comeback and Its Promise for America (Dukakis and 
Kantner 1988), faded from view.
Notes
 1.  Gray Davis, State of the State Address, January 8, 2003. During the spring of 
2003, nearly every day brought new attacks on the Davis administration for cuts 
made in the state budget and for the high state unemployment rate. The budget 
deﬁcit had climbed steadily during 2002, from $3 billion early in the year to 
$10 billion, $15 billion, and then to $35 billion by November. Since by the state 
constitution California government cannot run a budget deﬁcit, the governor was 
required to either raise taxes signiﬁcantly or cut spending signiﬁcantly. Davis 
proposed a middle course of both tax increases and program reductions, which 
brought criticism both from the Republicans in the legislature who opposed tax 
increases and from the Democrats who opposed program cuts. Each day brought 
a new protest rally to the capitol steps. One day in March 2003, 5,000 community 
college teachers, administrators, and students marched from Tower Bridge to the 
capitol to protest cuts in the community college budget; on other days, protest 
rallies were held by advocates for the disabled, for welfare recipients, or for 
neighborhood health centers.
 2.  See also Wilson (1996). Though Wilson, Geyser University Professor at Har-
vard University and director of the Joblessness and Urban Poverty Research 
Program, ranges widely in When Work Disappears to advocate a number of big 
government approaches—public works job creation, regional government, new 
job placement centers in inner cities—at the book’s center is the recognition that 
private sector job creation (or the lack of it) is the driver of inner-city poverty. 
Several recent Century Foundation books treat income inequality, including Gal-
braith (1998); Herzenberg, Alic, and Wial (1998); and Osterman (1999).
 3. For overall job creation and destruction in U.S. manufacturing, see also Davis, 
Haltiwanger, and Schuh (1996).
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 4. In a review of the literature on the relation between state business taxes and 
economic activity, economist Timothy Bartik (1994) of the Upjohn Institute con-
cludes that the average estimate is −0.3, meaning that if taxes are raised by 10 
percent, economic activity will be reduced by about 3 percent.
 5. Ofﬁce of the Governor, “The Build California Initiative,” March 5, 2003.
 6. Dukakis encouraged this praise, solemnly telling the press how he carried ar-
ticles about Swedish land planning to read on his campaign plane.
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Principle Two: Job Training
Build on the Market Orientation of 
Effective Job Training Programs to Build 
an Effective Job Training System
The Workforce Investment Act of 1998 (WIA), centerpiece of the 
government’s job training system, distributes more than $8 billion in 
funds nationwide each year. 
How can this money be spent most effectively by job training op-
erators today? Over the past two decades, job training programs have 
improved in performance as they have become more market-oriented—
that is, more tied to local labor markets and job placements. How do we 
build on these gains, and how do state and local administrators build 
systems of effective training beyond individual projects?
Further, what should we expect from our job training system? How 
much can an effective job training system increase wage rates or place-
ment levels? More generally, how much can it inﬂuence the unemploy-
ment rate? What can we say to the criticism of job training as merely 
shufﬂing around the unemployment?
PART 1: HOW THE CURRENT JOB TRAINING SYSTEM 
EMERGED OVER THE PAST 40 YEARS
To understand the current job training system, it is valuable to sum-
marize how it has emerged over the past 40 years. The forms of train-
ing—the ways training is done—have remained similar throughout this 
time.
The Manpower Development Training Act (MDTA), enacted in 
1962, is the foundation of the current system. MDTA was a response to 
fears that automation was eliminating jobs, and to the belief that work-
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ers needed new skills to compete in the emerging technological and 
service economy of the 1960s and 1970s. Respected labor economists 
predicted that manufacturing workers, including autoworkers and steel-
workers, would soon be extinct.
MDTA funded four major forms of training: classroom instruction, 
on-the-job training, work experience, and assisted job placement. In 
San Francisco, the ﬁrst MDTA training, in 1963, featured 26 weeks 
of classroom instruction in clerical skills for unemployed, mainly low-
income adults recruited by EDD. The training was a mix of typing, 
shorthand, remedial English, and a course called the “The World of 
Work.” Subsequent MDTA training in San Francisco taught other prac-
tical skills: auto mechanics, upholstering, television repair, and medical 
secretarial.1 
MDTA continued through the 1970s, augmented by four job train-
ing programs begun in the 1960s that focused on the unemployed in 
inner-city areas. The Concentrated Employment Program (CEP), New 
Careers for the Poor, Job Opportunities in the Business Sector (JOBS), 
and the youth-focused Neighborhood Youth Corps (NYC) were all gov-
ernment-funded efforts to provide training, work experience, or direct 
job placement to reduce unemployment, targeted at center-city areas.2 
In 1974, these job training programs were consolidated under the 
Comprehensive Employment and Training Act (CETA). CETA contin-
ued youth and adult training. It also added a new approach, job cre-
ation in the public sector. CETA training programs were not different in 
kind from MDTA, being a mix of the four training forms. CETA youth 
programs provided mainly job experience, literacy classes, and prevo-
cational training. The adult programs focused on direct job placement 
and training that could be done in a year or less (clerical skills, business 
machine repair, welding, nursing).
Public sector job creation had been undertaken on a small scale in 
the 1960s, but it was under CETA that this approach, called Public Ser-
vice Employment (PSE), reached an employment level unprecedented 
since the Works Progress Administration (WPA) during the Depression. 
In 1978, 752,000 workers were employed under PSE, in positions as 
basic as clerical and laborer jobs in local government and as artsy (and 
questionable) as musicians in CETA orchestras or actors in CETA dra-
ma groups.
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From the start, PSE was heavily criticized (the jobs were make-
work, the critics said; they should not be supported by taxpayer money; 
they displaced other public employees), and with the change of nation-
al administration in 1981, PSE was eliminated that September. Since 
1981, there has been no sizable program of public sector job creation.
Over the past two decades, the job training system has been recon-
stituted twice: in 1983, when CETA was replaced by the Job Training 
Partnership Act (JTPA), and in 1998, when JTPA was replaced by WIA. 
Each time, though, the forms of training and even the training agen-
cies—the community-based organizations, community colleges, and 
proprietary schools—continued largely unchanged.
Yet while the forms of training today would be recognizable to an 
MDTA ofﬁcial 30 years ago, the training process has been reﬁned over 
the years to the point that it makes the MDTA models look clunky in 
comparison. The MDTA classroom training was often so long, at 40 
weeks or more, that participants dropped out to pursue paid employ-
ment. The community colleges that conducted the training had weak 
ties to employers. The training ofﬁcials rarely tracked participants to 
determine job outcomes.
In contrast, most training programs today contain no more than 
three to four months of classroom training, sometimes with additional 
on-the-job training, and always with placement assistance. Training 
participants are tracked upon completing their training, and training 
providers publicize their placement rates. Most training providers know 
their industry sector, whether it be health care or information technol-
ogy or banking, and know the employers.
PART 2: ELEMENTS OF EFFECTIVE JOB TRAINING 
PROGRAMS
What makes an effective job training program? 
Several researchers over the past decade have compiled lists of the 
elements of effective job training,3 but few, if any, possess the long-
range experience and perspective that Bob Marr, my former colleague 
at EDD, did. Until the change in administration last year and his subse-
quent death this year, Bob had been at EDD since 1964. Over that 40-
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Bob Marr’s Seven Elements of Effective Job Training Programs
1.  There is no one right form of training. Ef-
fective programs employ various mixes of the 
traditional training forms—classroom train-
ing, on-the-job training, and direct job-place-
ment assistance—depending on the skills 
sought by their clients, the local employers.
2.  Effective programs keep close tabs on local 
labor markets and regularly adjust training to 
reﬂect hiring in the region.
3.  In structuring training, effective programs utilize a training 
curriculum that is developed in close contact with employers in 
a speciﬁc industry sector (hospitality, health care, ﬁnancial ser-
vices) and that reﬂects the skills these employers seek. The most 
effective training-program developers know their industry sectors 
from top to bottom.
4.  Effective programs don’t try to train everyone. They screen 
applicants, using an assessment process that ensures training par-
ticipants possess the literacy skills for training and the motivation 
to be in this industry sector.
5.  Effective programs use a case management process that is not 
heavy with staff, but that tracks participants during training and 
for a two-year period following training.
6.  Effective programs identify job openings or potential job 
openings before training. The preferred scenario: an employer 
has job openings and commits to hiring participants who com-
plete training. Alternatively, the training agency is able to identify 
likely job openings among a number of employers.
7.  Effective programs foster a strong sense of mission among 
training staff. This is the intangible element of effective job train-
ing programs but perhaps the most important, as it leads staff to 
invest extraordinary efforts in job placement success.
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year period, he was involved in every job training program in California 
from MDTA to WIA. He joined me in compiling seven elements of 
effective training, which the box on the facing page summarizes.
Elements 4, 5, and 6 are straightforward, but for elements 1, 2, 3, 
and 7, let me add a few details.
Flexibility. The better programs are ﬂexible and adapt to chang-
ing employer needs. Job training projects today use three main training 
forms—classroom training, on-the-job training, and direct job-place-
ment assistance—in a variety of permutations (adult work experience, 
the fourth form, is rarely used). Classroom training can include voca-
tional classes as well as literacy training and English as a second lan-
guage; it also encompasses placement services. Projects mix classroom 
and on-the-job training.
Sector expertise. Effective training programs take the time to un-
derstand an industry sector in detail and develop credibility among 
sector employers. Among the better training programs we funded that 
have strong sector ties: the Bay Area Video Coalition, which maintains 
close contact with the region’s Internet and Web-design employers; the 
Children’s Collective of San Bernardino and Riverside counties; the 
Los Angeles City College health care partnership; and the Los Angeles 
Harbor College security sector partnership.
Industry associations traditionally are not very active in the job 
training world. However, these groups know the most about their in-
dustry sectors, and we went out of our way to seek their participation. 
In July 2002, the governor’s ofﬁce allocated several million dollars in 
discretionary WIA funds to an industry association, the California As-
sociation of Health Facilities (CAHF), to train 2,000 new certiﬁed nurs-
ing assistants. This turned out to be one of the better training programs 
in the state, placing over 90 percent of participants in jobs. CAHF knew 
what its employer members wanted in training—a mix of classroom 
and on-the-job training. The nursing home employers actually hired and 
paid the trainees from the ﬁrst day of training.
Ties to employers. In 2003, we funded a project in San Mateo 
County to train 18 workers who had just been laid off at San Francisco 
International Airport—primarily airline screeners—to be biotechni-
44  Bernick
cians at Genentech. The four-month training was done through Skyline 
Community College in San Bruno and was followed by an eight-week 
paid internship at Genentech—paid for half by Genentech and half by 
job training funds. Genentech committed to hire everyone who com-
pleted the training and internship. This is the preferred situation: having 
an employer commit to hiring.
However, linking training to a speciﬁc job opening is difﬁcult, since 
employers rarely know when they will have job openings or will have 
enough openings at one time, or can wait until training is completed to 
ﬁll an opening. The next best thing is to identify a number of employers 
who, among them, are likely to have sufﬁcient job openings when train-
ing is completed. In 2003, the Sacramento Employment and Training 
Agency, the local WIB, funded a hotel employer consortium to train 42 
unemployed workers. Six hotels in Sacramento, including the Double-
tree, the Embassy Suites, and the Sheraton, made up the employer con-
sortium. Though individually the hotels were leery of committing to 
hiring workers, combined they were able to generate enough job open-
ings at the front desk and in food services, housekeeping, and sales to 
make such a commitment.4
Sense of mission. The sense of mission cannot be overemphasized. 
One of the best programs EDD has funded since 2000 has been the 
Positive Resource Center in San Francisco. Positive Resource does not 
do training but rather does direct job placement for persons with HIV/
AIDS, many of whom are receiving Supplemental Security Insurance 
(SSI). The placement rates are high, and program participants report 
high levels of satisfaction. Positive Resource is not doing anything tech-
nically different from other training programs. But the staff members 
deeply believe in its mission and spend extra time to ensure placements. 
In turn, the job seekers reﬂect this energy in their job-search efforts.
After we distributed Bob Marr’s list at EDD and among other train-
ing agencies, Bob asked, “Shouldn’t we include some reference to the 
role of an entrepreneurial executive director? Effective training organi-
zations often reﬂect the entrepreneurialism and passion of the executive 
director.” Good point. Over the past two decades, all of us in the ﬁeld 
have seen training organizations collapse once a program founder or 
program entrepreneur departs.
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While an entrepreneurial leader can create an effective training 
agency, most training agencies, especially ones with this strong sense 
of mission, are not dependent on their top leadership. The Positive Re-
source Center has had three executive directors during the past few 
years, but its sense of mission has led to continued high performance. 
Also in San Francisco, Arriba Juntos (“Upward Together”) lost its long-
time executive director, Leandro Soto, in the early 1990s and has since 
gone through several successors, but it has maintained an effective 
training portfolio.
PART 3: BUILDING AN EFFECTIVE JOB TRAINING SYSTEM
Recognizing the elements of effective job training is one task for 
local and state employment ofﬁcials. A second task is building a system 
out of these effective programs. This maximizes the reach of limited 
training funds. 
We made mistakes at EDD in system building. Initially, we used 
the traditional request-for-proposal (RFP) process too often in mak-
ing funding decisions and relied too heavily on written proposals. We 
funded programs at amounts that were too large. We did not push train-
ing organizations hard enough to reduce their costs. Over my ﬁve-year 
tenure, the funding process was tightened as we improved our means of 
evaluation and reduced the proposed costs per participant.
Here again let me bring in Bob Marr. The box on the next page 
encapsulates a number of the lessons we learned about system building 
using state or local funding sources.
Below, let’s take each of these elements individually.
1. Follow the signals of the local labor market. Training is best 
structured from the ground up, by local training providers responding 
to signals from local labor markets. State government should not spend 
a lot of time planning training programs based on employment projec-
tions, since the state is not very efﬁcient at getting real-time local em-
ployment information. Rather, this real-time information—including 
that of employers who are now hiring and employers likely to be hiring 
in the next months—can only come from local employment and train-
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ing agencies (including temporary help agencies). These local agencies 
are best able to relay training opportunities to state government. When-
ever possible, the state should solicit their proposals and ideas.
2. Keep amounts small, and extend the reach of training funds. 
Among the labor departments of the larger states, training grants of 
$1 million or more have been common. Yet there are few economies 
of scale in job training, and grants of far lesser amounts yield more job 
placements and test more training approaches. Limiting training grants to 
under $500,000—and $250,000 in most cases—is a good guideline. Oth-
erwise training agencies could start behaving like defense contractors.
Bob Marr’s Eight Elements of Building a System  
of Effective Job Training Programs
1.  Follow the signals of the local labor market.
2.  Keep amounts small, and extend the reach of 
training funds.
3.  When soliciting training proposals from lo-
cal providers, take the budget put forward in 
a proposal and reduce it by 30 percent.
4.  In evaluating training proposals, go beyond 
the written proposal to conduct fact-ﬁnding 
in multiple ways.
5.  Don’t ignore the resources and knowledge of the local WIB.
6.  Track the employment and earnings of training participants for 
some years after training—but make sure the tracking data are 
in a form that can be used by practitioners and policymakers.
7.  Don’t let WIA undermine the network of community-based or-
ganizations (CBOs).
8.  Ignore the theoretical job training and employment structures 
advocated by former labor secretaries Marshall and Reich—as 
a practitioner, you know more than they do.
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It’s easy in state government to lose sight of the large amounts 
of funds being distributed. In May 2003, EDD sent out a request for 
proposals for job placement of housing project residents. The highest-
ranked training group asked for the maximum of $350,000. When I 
said we needed to cut this back to $175,000, an EDD grant ofﬁcer ques-
tioned whether the group still would want to do the training for “only” 
$175,000. In the real world, of course, $175,000 is an enormous amount 
of money for training.
3. When soliciting training proposals from local providers, take 
the budget put forward in a proposal and reduce it by 30 percent. 
In the fall of 2002, EDD sent out a request for projects to train regis-
tered nurses and licensed vocational nurses under the Governor’s Nurse 
Workforce Initiative. The maximum grant amount was set at $3 million. 
Predictably, most of the applicants asked for $3 million. After deciding 
which projects were best, EDD went back and asked each provider to 
reduce its budget to $2.1 million. Although funding was cut by nearly a 
third, the providers, when pushed, were able to achieve over 90 percent 
of their original training numbers. In other words, with 30 percent less 
funding, they were able to train almost the same number of participants. 
Their original proposals had had big cushions built in.
4. In evaluating training proposals, go beyond the written pro-
posal to conduct fact-ﬁnding in multiple ways. For years, EDD relied 
on an evaluation system by which written proposals were received and 
scored by a panel of staff or outside readers. This approach had the value 
of keeping politics to a minimum. But also it put too large a premium on 
proposal writing skills and did not always identify the better programs. 
Evaluation might start with a written proposal but should emphasize 
site visits and the program’s experience with the local WIB.
5. Don’t ignore the resources and knowledge of the local WIB. 
Of the more than $600 million in federal WIA funds that comes to Cali-
fornia annually, 85 percent is distributed to local WIBs, and the gover-
nor has authority over 15 percent. A similar ratio exists for other states. 
Governor Davis used the 15 percent discretionary funding in two main 
ways: 1) on major initiatives involving training by faith-based organi-
zations, training for the health care professions, and training and job 
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placement for veterans; and 2) on a series of projects chosen as effec-
tive or innovative through two formal project solicitations.
In the ﬁrst years, we made the governor’s funding decisions largely 
independently of the local WIBs. This was a mistake, since the gov-
ernor’s limited funds could best be used to help projects get off the 
ground. If a project was to continue on a long-term basis—if it was to 
become institutionalized—it needed to win funding from the local WIB. 
In 2000, we funded the Hollywood Entertainment Museum, which pro-
posed to enroll high school dropouts, help them obtain a general equiv-
alency diploma (GED), and place them into entry-level jobs behind the 
camera. Rather than see this funding as one- or two-year demonstration 
money, the museum returned each year, expecting continued funding. 
Finally we told its people, “Enough. You need to win support from the 
local WIB.”
By 2003, we were beginning to link funding to local WIBs. Our 
health care workforce initiatives require that training proposals be sub-
mitted by the local WIB and carry matching funds provided by the local 
WIB. For other discretionary projects, the local WIB is becoming part 
of the review process, and this role has continued under the current 
governor’s administration.
6. Track the employment and earnings of training participants 
for some years after training—but make sure the tracking data are 
in a form that can be used by practitioners and policymakers. In the 
mid-1990s, California State Senator Patrick Johnston, the legislature’s 
longtime expert on job policy, was frustrated by what he considered a 
lack of accountability in the job training system. He sponsored legisla-
tion to establish a performance-based accountability (PBA) system, by 
which the state government would track participant employment and 
earnings for a three-year period.
The PBA system is now in place and so far has tracked the employ-
ment and earnings of four groups of workers who enrolled in job train-
ing between 1995 and 1998—a total of more than 500,000 workers. 
The tracking has proved relatively easy, using workers’ Social Security 
numbers and EDD’s base wage ﬁle of earnings. What has proved dif-
ﬁcult is presenting the information in a form that is useful to state or 
local ofﬁcials and training agencies. Among other things, PBA does not 
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have the random assignment or control groups that have been used in 
the better academic studies.5
Johnston continues to follow PBA, even though he left state gov-
ernment in 2002. He notes that PBA has produced reports that are hun-
dreds of pages in length and that drill down to the local provider level. 
However, PBA has not succeeded in converting the information into a 
format that is helpful to decision makers, or that yields judgments about 
more effective or less effective programs, or even that yields judgments 
on the value of training versus other interventions.
7. Don’t let WIA undermine the network of community-based 
organizations (CBOs). Over the past four decades, a network of com-
munity-based organizations (CBOs) undertaking job training has grown 
in most communities throughout the country. Some of these CBOs date 
back to the 1960s or 1970s; others have emerged in the past few years.
In the ﬁrst months of WIA implementation, these organizations in 
California came to EDD to express fears that welfare reform would put 
them out of business by directing training money to the One-Stop Ca-
reer Centers. Their fears have proved accurate. Recent studies on WIA 
show that money available to training agencies (particularly CBOs) has 
decreased sharply under WIA (Conway and Radermacher 2003; Frank, 
Rahmanou, and Savner 2003). The training money is being used instead 
to support the network of One-Stop ofﬁces. Nearly all CBOs in Califor-
nia have shrunk over the past four years, and some have disappeared.
As the data on WIA spending (and on the large percentage of funds 
going to the One-Stops) became evident, we took steps to make sure the 
network of job-training CBOs in California did not continue to atrophy. 
We moved to sharply reduce the number of One-Stop centers, which 
had grown to more than 400 in the state, and to sharply reduce the 
money going to these centers.
The quality of CBOs is uneven, and perhaps 15–20 percent rely on 
politics and should not be in operation. But the majority of CBOs bring 
several values to the job training system. They are entrepreneurial, and 
they know that their survival depends on successful job placements, 
in contrast to the community colleges or local school districts, which 
have a guaranteed source of funds. They often are part of the com-
munity or neighborhood fabric and are active in volunteer and civic 
activities. Further, their pay rates often are modest—well below those 
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of other educational and social service operators—and they adhere to 
the precept that nobody should be getting rich by working for antipov-
erty programs.
8. Ignore the theoretical job training and employment struc-
tures advocated by former labor secretaries Marshall and Reich—
as a practitioner, you know more than they do. Among the more pro-
liﬁc writers on job policy are former secretaries of labor Ray Marshall 
and Robert Reich. Marshall served under President Carter from 1977 to 
1981, and Reich served during President Clinton’s ﬁrst term, from 1993 
to 1997. They share an advocacy of extensive government structures as 
the answer to workforce challenges. This is exactly what is not needed, 
as most practitioners know.
In late 1984, the Carnegie Foundation launched the Carnegie Fo-
rum on Education and the Economy, which had the goal of dramati-
cally upgrading the skills of the American workforce. According to the 
project’s backers, the majority of American workers did not have basic 
math and literacy skills, let alone the more complex skills necessary for 
competing in a global economy.
In Thinking for a Living: Education and the Wealth of Nations, Mar-
shall, a Carnegie trustee, and Marc Tucker, the project’s director, give a 
summary of the project’s research ﬁndings and make recommendations. 
The book advocates an elaborate big-government system by which a 
government Employment Service6 would provide a range of services to 
low-wage workers, including paid job search and paid relocation to new 
jobs, a new system of technical and professional certiﬁcation, and spe-
cial youth centers in every neighborhood that would aim to reduce the 
movement of young people into and out of low-wage jobs. It also sets 
out a private sector system by which employers would invest at least 
3–5 percent of their payroll total in training their workers (Marshall and 
Tucker 1992). Similarly, Reich in several of his books advocates a sys-
tem of new government structures to undertake job training or retrain-
ing (Reich 1991, 2000, 2002). 
Though none of Marshall’s ideas have been put into practice, Reich 
was inﬂuential in establishing the One-Stop system. As noted above, 
this system, in its ﬁrst years, has sharply reduced the money going to 
training; the money instead has gone to fund the One-Stop bureaucra-
cies. The European-style employment structures advocated by both 
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Marshall and Reich are at odds not only with the political climate but 
also with the most effective models of worker training and placement. 
Neither Marshall nor Reich ever worked on the local level in job 
training, and this absence shows in their writings. Their ideas on job 
training are removed from the realities of costs; from the tendencies 
of bureaucracies, once established, to expand; and from the abilities of 
nongovernmental CBOs, faith-based groups, and community associa-
tions to reach persons that government programs do not.
PART 4: WHAT CAN WE EXPECT OF AN EFFECTIVE JOB 
TRAINING SYSTEM?
Let’s say that we are able to follow Bob Marr’s principles and build 
an effective job training system. What can we expect such a system to 
achieve in terms of increasing wages or job placement rates?
Numerous studies have been conducted over the past 30 years on 
the impacts of training programs. In 1994, two prominent labor econo-
mists, Harvard’s Lawrence Katz, chief economist at the U.S. Depart-
ment of Labor, and Princeton’s Alan Krueger, Katz’s successor as chief 
economist, led a USDOL review of studies on the economic impacts 
of employment and training programs, and at that time they identiﬁed 
more than 100 serious nonpartisan studies for review. Since their re-
view, there have been at least 100 additional major studies conducted. 
The studies of the past 30 years reveal two main dynamics. First, 
across the economy, job training participants showed modest employ-
ment and income gains in comparison with similarly situated workers 
not participating in training. Second, among individual programs that 
are effective, the gains can be slightly higher (USDOL 1995). 
The ﬁrst serious large-scale studies of job training were conducted 
under CETA, using the USDOL-funded Continuous Longitudinal Man-
power Survey (CLMS). CLMS tracked training participants for a num-
ber of years after their completion of training.
In 1982, the Congressional Budget Ofﬁce, using CLMS, exam-
ined wage information on 3,200 participants then over 24 years of age 
who had entered CETA training between January 1975 and June 1976 
and had stayed for at least seven days. Data on a comparison group of 
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30,000 workers was obtained from the March 1976 Current Population 
Survey, and wage comparisons were made at 6, 16, and 36 months after 
program entrance.
The CBO found that, for women, CETA increased average post-
program earnings by $800–$1,300 a year. Of this increase, 80 percent 
was due to an increase in the amount of time worked. Among men, 
gains were modest: after experiencing an earnings drop in the year be-
fore training, male participants returned to their more usual earnings 
levels after they left the program. The CBO researchers concluded that 
training programs were short term (averaging 20 weeks in 1980) and 
relatively inexpensive ($2,400 per participant) and had some impact 
on participant gains, primarily because of an increase in the amount 
of time that participants worked. But this impact was not great enough 
to move participants very far above the poverty line (CBO and NCEP 
1982).
Consultant Laurie Bassi, then an economist at Georgetown Univer-
sity, did an independent examination of the CLMS data using a sample 
of CETA participants from 1976 and tracking them for two years after 
training completion. In a 1983 article, “CETA: Did It Work?” she sum-
marizes her ﬁndings, which are similar to those of the CBO researchers: 
the main earnings gains are among adult women and are linked to an 
increase in time worked (Bassi 1983). 
Reviewing the reports of the CBO, of Bassi, and of other CETA 
training studies, Gary Burtless of the Brookings Institution in 1984 
concludes that these programs “have not eliminated, or even substan-
tially reduced, poverty among the working age population, but they 
have made a modest difference in the lives of many who participated 
in them.” He adds that “proper training can occasionally turn a welfare 
mother into a computer technician. (In fact, some welfare mothers will 
become computer technicians without any government aid.) But there 
is no magic training course that can guarantee every welfare mother 
self-sufﬁciency in a well-paid job” (Burtless 1984, p. 22).
For the Job Training Partnership Act, the impact studies became 
more sophisticated with the use of random assignment. The U.S. De-
partment of Labor sponsored a multisite, multiyear National JTPA Study 
to assess training impacts. Applicants at 16 local JTPA programs across 
the nation were randomly assigned to either a participant group (one en-
rolled in a training program) or a control group (one not enrolled). Two-
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thirds of the JTPA applicants were assigned to the participant group and 
one-third to the control group.
The National JTPA Study gathered information on the participant 
and control groups enrolled at the 16 JTPA programs from November 
1987 through September 1989. Wages were tracked for 20,000 partici-
pants over a 30-month period following the random assignment.
The adult JTPA participants averaged wages that were higher than 
the control groups, but not dramatically so. Male adult JTPA partici-
pants earned an average of $1,599 more than control group members 
during the 30-month period, and female adult JTPA participants earned 
an average of $1,837 more than control group members (Bloom et al. 
1997; Orr et al. 1994).
Many practitioners have been surprised by how modest these wage 
gains were. They see job training participants, nearly always unem-
ployed at the start, going through training in computer repair or nursing 
or secretarial skills and landing jobs in their training ﬁelds. But the 
study ﬁndings in part reﬂect the ability of low-income workers to ﬁnd 
jobs through their own networks. A percentage of unemployed workers 
are getting jobs every day—including jobs as computer repair persons, 
secretaries, or certiﬁed nurse assistants—without any formal job train-
ing program.
To a greater extent, the ﬁndings reﬂect the limited role of job train-
ing among the many other factors in employment. David Card notes 
that the wage gains are small because the interventions (trainings of 
usually less than ﬁve months) are small compared to other educational 
interventions, such as college. Card notes that estimates indicate one 
year of high-quality college education raises earnings by 10 percent in 
later life. As most job training interventions last only one-fourth to one-
third of a year, the 2–3 percent earnings gains are to be expected. “At 
one time, I think analysts were hopeful that returns to job training could 
be much greater (per year of time invested) than returns to traditional 
schooling,” Card says, “but I think that was unrealistic.”7 
There is a second set of studies over the past two decades—this 
one focusing on individual projects, especially some of the better-per-
forming ones. These studies include a mix of before-and-after compari-
sons (comparing trainees’ employment before and after training) and 
head-to-head comparisons (comparing trainees with other low-income 
adults). While not beneﬁting from the value of random assignment, 
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they do provide a closer look on the project level, especially at the bet-
ter-structured training projects.
These studies show the majority of participants placed in jobs relat-
ed to their training and at slightly more signiﬁcant increases in earnings 
than the systemwide studies. As is consistent with the major CETA and 
JTPA studies, these studies show the greatest gains in training programs 
for welfare recipients8 (Clark et al. 1995; Elliott et al. 2001; Osterman 
and Lautsch 1996; St. George 2001; Zambrowski and Gordon 1993).9
PART 5: THE RELATION BETWEEN JOB TRAINING AND 
THE UNEMPLOYMENT RATE 
Does job training mainly shufﬂe unemployment among the poor?
In March 2003, the Silicon Valley/San Jose Business Journal car-
ried the headline, “Professor: Worker Retraining is Worthless” (Silicon 
Valley/San Jose Business Journal 2003). The story referred to a recently 
published book, The Job Training Charade, by Gordon Lafer, an as-
sistant professor at the University of Oregon’s Labor Education and Re-
search Center. The book’s main argument: the $8 billion that the gov-
ernment spends each year on job training is almost entirely wasted. Job 
training does not reduce unemployment, he writes; at best it shufﬂes 
unemployment from one group of the poor to another.
The argument, while not new, is one that practitioners continue to 
be faced with. “To what extent are training efforts a shufﬂing of the 
unemployment?” we are asked and ask ourselves. 
Lafer’s book is really two books. One is a polemic against the cur-
rent market economy in the United States. It puts forward a number of 
not-thought-out ideas meant to improve the position of low-wage work-
ers: reducing the power of business lobbies, stopping competition from 
goods made under illegal conditions in other countries, and capping 
prescription drug and health care costs. None of these have anything to 
do with job training.
The second book-within-a-book, though, is a more thoughtful one. 
It is densely annotated and shows knowledge of the structure of job 
training programs, from CETA to JTPA and WIA. In this book, Lafer 
builds on the major longitudinal CETA and JTPA studies, noted earlier 
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in this chapter, to argue that “in an economy where . . . decently paying 
jobs are in short supply and skills are a relatively minor determinant of 
wages, job training programs are asked to perform an impossible task” 
(Lafer 2002, p. 116). Job training programs do not signiﬁcantly raise in-
comes across large groups because they operate in an economy without 
enough decent-paying jobs.
This is the heart of Lafer’s argument: there are not enough good 
jobs, and job training programs do not increase the number or quality of 
jobs. The employment problem is not lack of training, it is lack of jobs. 
In Lafer’s view, training, at best, means that some low-income workers 
get jobs rather than others.
In fact, at any given time the number of jobs and the level of wages 
are inﬂuenced by numerous factors outside of job training, including 
ones identiﬁed by Lafer: the rules set for trade and imports, the mon-
etary policy of the Federal Reserve, and decisions about immigration. 
What Lafer fails to adequately recognize is that one of the factors that 
inﬂuence jobs and wages is the skill and motivation of workers. The 
number of jobs in the economy is not ﬁxed, independent of worker 
skill and motivation. Workers, in part, carve out their own jobs or wage 
levels.
Ironically, no one has expressed this as clearly as George Gilder, 
whose best-selling book Wealth and Poverty, published in 1981, in-
ﬂuenced employment policy in the early 1980s. Though Gilder was a 
critic of most government job training programs and especially of gov-
ernment job creation programs, he recognized the role of worker moti-
vation in creating employment.
In his chapter “The Make-Work Illusion,” Gilder (1981, p. 153) 
notes that “whenever the American economy approaches recession, 
there is always a boom in the business of saving or creating jobs.” Poli-
ticians call for money to create jobs directly in government, or to subsi-
dize jobs in businesses that are failing, but these are phony jobs: they do 
not respond to real needs as expressed by the willingness of individuals 
or local governments to pay for them. Workers create jobs by offering 
motivation or skills that businesses or governments are willing to pay 
for. Gilder writes, “A guaranteed job denies the crucial fact that all jobs 
are to some extent created by the worker; it is only he who can guaran-
tee the job, by the act of supplying labor, undergoing hardship, achiev-
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ing distinction, and thus become part of the struggle by which human 
life improves itself ” (p. 158).
This passage may place the employment process in terms overly 
philosophic (Gilder continues with a passage by the Spanish human-
ist philosopher José Ortega y Gasset to the effect that “all life is the 
struggle, the effort to be itself ”), but Gilder does capture the role of the 
will and the efforts of the worker in job creation.
Just as the nation’s economy does not have a ﬁxed number of jobs 
at any time, so too an employer usually does not have a ﬁxed number. 
In most hiring cases the employer will identify a job opening and so-
licit applicants. However, in some cases the employer can be inﬂuenced 
to carve out a position by the skills or desire to work that a worker 
brings to the workplace. In the movie Kramer vs. Kramer, the newly 
unemployed advertising executive played by Dustin Hoffman goes to 
a Christmas Eve party and, on the spot, persuades an employer to give 
him a job. Though this is the exception, it is not uncommon that, in the 
absence of an identiﬁed opening, an advertising executive or account 
manager or administrative assistant convinces an employer that he or 
she will add value to the business. The job training system increases the 
ability of workers to carve out jobs—in part through increased skills, 
in part through a greater knowledge of job openings, and in good part 
through the motivational training and emphasis on customer service 
that is part of any well-run job training program.
Lafer would have been more accurate if he had given some credit 
to the role of job training as one of several factors inﬂuencing total 
employment. But it is true that while training’s impact is not negligible 
on job creation, it cannot ensure low unemployment. Further, the job 
training system, even when well structured, is limited in its impact on 
certain target groups of interest today to practitioners—principally, the 
low-wage workforce, former welfare recipients who have been placed 
in jobs but are still collecting welfare, and workers with disabilities.
In the next few chapters, we examine what practitioners can do be-
yond the job training system to address these groups.
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Notes
 1.  Some other MDTA examples from San Francisco: in July 1965, 116 students 
enrolled in a 52-week course for medical secretaries; in early 1967, 16 students 
enrolled in a 55-week course in business machine repair; in September 1971, 
15 students enrolled in a 52-week course for licensed vocational nurse training 
(Bernick 1984a).
 2.  Although CEP targeted money at center-city areas, the training approaches were 
similar to MDTA—CEP programs in San Francisco included a 42-week training 
for draftsmen, sponsored by the Engineering Societies Committee for Manpower 
Training (ESCMT), through which around 20 participants a year were hired as 
draftsman-trainees. Half of their salary was paid by the employer and half by 
CEP (Bernick 1984a).
 3.  The National Governors Association in 1997 assembled 10 principles of effec-
tive workforce programs; the Department of Labor has put out lists of “what 
works”; the Levi Strauss Foundation and the San Francisco Foundation have 
funded studies of criteria for training success. See National Governors Associa-
tion (1997), Klein-Collins (2003), and Hoachlander and Stoddard (1987).
 4. Bob Marr and Julie McLeod, EDD report, “Sacramento Hotel Career Ladder 
Program,” July 25, 2003.
 5. California Workforce Investment Board, “What Is the Performance Based Ac-
countability System?” California WIB Agenda Packet, pp. 58–59, meeting, 
Sheraton Grand Hotel, Sacramento, May 30, 2002. http://www.calwia.org/ 
doc_ﬁles/53002SB.pdf (accessed August 8, 2005).
 6.  Each state has an Employment Service; in California we refer to it as the Job 
Service Division of EDD. 
 7. David Card, e-mail to the author, July 10, 2003. These major studies can min-
imize training impacts, especially the impacts of effective training programs. 
John Colborn, deputy director of economic development at the Ford Foundation, 
notes that the National JTPA Study fails to take into account other employment 
assistance (community college, adult education) received by the control groups 
who do not receive JTPA services—a point acknowledged by the study’s authors. 
Further, in averaging earnings gains among many different programs and partici-
pants, the overall ﬁndings mask the variety of outcomes among training projects, 
approaches, and participants.
 8.  In the USDOL (1995) study What’s Working (and What’s Not), economists Katz 
and Krueger emphasize the positive wage gains shown in most adult training 
programs and note that the greatest repeated success of training occurs with fe-
male welfare recipients.
 9. A summary of these studies and others is compiled by Smith et al. (2002).
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Principle Three: The Working Poor
A Big Part of the Conventional 
Wisdom on the Working Poor Being 
in Dead End Jobs is False—but Not All
I’ve stopped counting how many times I’ve heard politicians, writ-
ers, and academics, critical of the free-market economy, claim the fol-
lowing about the working poor:
“There are many dead-end jobs in today’s economy, particularly in 
the emerging service economy. These are the jobs not only in fast-food 
restaurants, but also in nursing homes, hotels, retail stores, and cleaning 
companies. Workers in these jobs are the long-term working poor, who 
are locked into a life on the economic margins.”
In fact, as recent longitudinal wage studies (and other recent wage 
studies) demonstrate, there is considerable mobility among the low-
wage workforce, as I will show. There are many workers who start in 
jobs in nursing homes, hotels, retail stores, and even fast-food restau-
rants and advance within their companies or within their industries. 
Others use the skills or job experience they gain in entry-level jobs to 
advance by changing industries.
This chapter is divided into two parts. Part 1 discusses recent re-
search by EDD on wage mobility in the California workforce, and also 
discusses related research conducted nationwide. Further, we examine 
some of the recent literature on the low-wage workforce, particularly 
Barbara Ehrenreich’s popular Nickel and Dimed, and why this litera-
ture is misleading about wage mobility. Part 2 looks more closely at the 
low-wage workforces of three key industrial sectors: nursing homes, 
child care, and agriculture. We ﬁnd little investment in worker skills, 
high workforce turnover and instability, and industry economics that 
discourage individual employers from making investments in their low-
wage workforce.
60  Bernick
PART 1: WAGE AND JOB MOBILITY
In 2000, EDD joined with economist Michael Dardia, a research 
fellow at the Public Policy Institute of California, to launch a series of 
studies on wage mobility in California. The ﬁrst major study involved 
tracking the wage progress of 133,000 California workers from 1988 to 
2000. Using EDD’s wage ﬁles, Dardia and EDD researchers were able 
to track wages at four-year intervals of 1992, 1996, and 2000.
Although median annual earnings for workers at all income levels 
rose during this period, the greatest percentage gains were among the 
lowest-paid workers. Among workers in the lowest 20 percent of earn-
ers in 1988, median annual earnings more than doubled during the 12 
years. Further, more than half of the workers in the lowest 20 percent of 
earners in 1988 advanced to a higher earnings quintile by 2000 (Dardia 
et al. 2002).
Table 5.1 shows both absolute and relative measures of mobility by 
quintile from 1988 to 2000. “Absolute mobility” measures the mobility 
of the sample of California workers compared to the entire California 
workforce. Mobility by this measure is very high, especially for the 
workers in the bottom quintile. Eighty percent of these workers were 
able to transition to a higher earnings quintile by 2000.
“Relative mobility” measures the shift in the relative earnings po-
sition among the same group of workers over time. Relative mobility 
adjusts for the natural tendency of earnings to increase because of age, 
experience, or economic growth. By this measure, mobility is still high: 
54 percent of workers in the bottom quintile in 1988 had moved to a 
higher quintile by 2000.
As Dardia et al. (2002) note, there are two caveats to this mobility. 
First, the study was not able to control for age (a subsequent study is 
planned to do so), and the bottom quintile contains workers who are un-
der 18, students, or part-time workers—each of whose wages generally 
increase over time. Further, there was not a lot of movement from the 
bottom quintile to the top two quintiles. Most of the movement from the 
bottom quintile was to the next two quintiles.
The EDD study contains detailed analysis of mobility patterns 
across industries. Table 5.2 shows the distribution of workers by indus-
try and by 1988 earnings. It indicates that two industries—agriculture 
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Earnings position in 2000
Same quintile Moved up Moved down
Earnings position 
in 1988
In relation to 
all workers
(“absolute”)
Within 
sample
(“relative”)
In relation to 
all workers
(“absolute”)
Within 
sample
(“relative”)
In relation to 
all workers
(“absolute”)
Within 
sample
(“relative”)
Top quintile 78 58 — — 22 42
Fourth quintile 37 36 42 21 21 44
Middle quintile 31 31 53 29 16 40
Second quintile 25 34 62 36 10 29
Bottom quintile 20 46 80 54 — —
Table 5.1  Absolute and Relative Mobility for a Sample of California Workers, 1988–2000 (%)
NOTE: Cross-sectional samples are based on those individuals working all four quarters of each year.  — = data not available.
SOURCE: Dardia et al. (2002, p. 7). Data from UI base wage and BEL ﬁ les, California Employment Development Department.
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and retail trade—have a disproportionately high share of workers in the 
bottom quintile. The business services sector, including temporary help 
agencies, also has a high share of these lowest-quintile workers (Dardia 
et al. 2002, p. 8). The study further found that over the 12-year period 
there is a great deal of movement among industries, as shown in Figure 
5.1. Nearly 70 percent of business services workers and nearly 60 per-
cent of wholesale trade workers were employed in a different industry 
in 2000 than they had been in 1988 (p. 8). And Table 5.3 shows that, 
as might be expected, earnings growth is highest for those leaving the 
lowest-paying industries (retail trade and agriculture). “The percentage 
increase in median earnings was much greater for workers who started 
out in the bottom half of the distribution than for those in the top half,” 
report Dardia and his colleagues (p. 9).
The EDD studies are consistent with other recent studies of wage 
and job mobility in the United States. The majority of these studies fo-
Table 5.2  Earnings Distribution of California Workers in Each Industry, 
by Quintile, in 1988
1988 earnings distribution (%)
Industry
Bottom 
quintile
Second 
quintile
Middle 
quintile
Fourth 
quintile
Top 
quintile
Agriculture 46 29 13 7 6
Construction 14 19 20 23 25
Nondurable mfg. 17 22 23 22 17
Durable mfg. 9 18 22 25 26
Transportation and util’s 8 12 20 31 28
Wholesale trade 16 23 23 20 19
Retail trade 42 23 15 13 7
Business services 28 23 19 14 17
Health services 18 26 22 18 16
Education services 21 15 19 23 22
Other services 25 21 19 16 18
Other industries 10 19 22 21 29
SOURCE: Dardia et al. (2002, p. 8). Data from UI base wage and BEL ﬁles, 
California Employment Development Department.
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cus on relative mobility. Reviewing these studies, Daniel P. McMurrer 
and Isabel V. Sawhill (1996a) estimate that about 45 percent of workers 
change places over a ﬁve-year period and about 60 percent change over 
both nine- and seventeen-year periods.1
McMurrer and Sawhill (1996a, p. 2) note that “studies of relative 
mobility have produced remarkably consistent results, with regard to 
both the degree of mobility and extent of changes in mobility over 
time.” Though mobility has not increased over the past three decades, 
neither has it decreased, and while income inequality grew between 
1973 and the late 1990s (as widely noted), the movement of workers 
between income groups continued at a substantial level.
Recent Popular Literature on the Working Poor
The picture of mobility that emerges from wage studies is consider-
ably different from that drawn in recent books on the working poor. As 
mentioned in Chapter 2, the past few years have seen the publication 
of several books by writers and journalists examining the low-wage 
world: Barbara Ehrenreich’s Nickel and Dimed, Ben Cheever’s Sell-
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Figure 5.1  Share of 1988 Workers Who Left Their Initial Industry  
by 2000
SOURCE: Dardia et al. (2002, p. 8).
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ing Ben Cheever, Iain Levison’s A Working Stiff’s Manifesto, and Don 
Snyder’s The Cliff Walk.
Each of these books offers insights into the world of low-wage ser-
vice jobs. They stand in contrast to an earlier era: In the 1960s and 
1970s, the “underclass” was at the top of policymakers’ agenda, and 
several books emerged by middle-class writers journeying into this 
world, including Tally’s Corner by Elliott Liebow (1967) and The Un-
derclass by Ken Auletta (1982).2 The past decade has seen the “work-
ing poor” become a top issue, and middle-class writers have likewise 
journeyed into the world of the low-wage workforce. However, because 
they chronicle relatively short time frames, the books miss truths about 
how low-wage workers advance.
Table 5.3  Real Earnings Growth for Industry-Stayers and Industry-
Leavers, 1988–2000
Workers in the same 
industry in 1988 and 2000
Workers who changed 
industry from 1988 to 2000
Industry
Median 
earnings in 
1988 (2000 $)
Median 
change by 
2000 (%)
Median 
earnings in 
1988 (2000 $)
Median 
change by 
2000 (%)
Agriculture 22,161 5 19,015 46
Construction 47,972 11 33,487 20
Nondurable mfg. 40,599 9 32,920 14
Durable mfg. 47,620 15 38,983 12
Transport & util’s 51,488 13 40,038 16
Wholesale trade 43,413 14 32,053 25
Retail trade 29,309 10 18,368 83
Business services 37,503 27 28,311 40
Health services 36,163 14 27,572 29
Education services 42,401 22 27,462 44
Other services 37,990 19 28,152 46
Other industries 47,131 22 33,954 15
SOURCE: Dardia et al. (2002, p. 9).
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Nickel and Dimed
In Nickel and Dimed: On (Not) Getting By in America, Ehrenreich 
(2001) takes a series of low-wage service jobs over a year’s period—as 
a waitress in Florida, a housecleaner and nursing home aide in Maine, 
and a Wal-Mart employee in Minnesota. She takes these jobs without 
indicating her education and background on her job applications and 
lives only on the wages she earns, which means she has to stay in cheap 
motels and apartments. Ehrenreich is a talented journalist and observer, 
and she captures certain characteristics of service-sector jobs: the difﬁ-
cult physical labor of the cleaning and nursing home jobs, the petty hu-
miliations and the psychological and drug tests that must be submitted 
to by a Wal-Mart retail clerk, and the little indignities of waitressing.
Yet as Christine Curran (2002) points out in a review of the book, 
Ehrenreich stays at jobs no more than four months. She does not invest 
any real interest or training in her job. Nor does she approach her job 
with any attempt at providing quality or craftsmanship. 
And these are the ways workers move up in organizations—even 
retail clerks, nursing home personnel, and room attendants. They show 
an enthusiasm for the job. They identify with the goal of the company 
and with the quality of service. Most of all, they stay in a job or in 
a company for a period of years. No worker advances if she moves 
around every four months.
Ehrenreich gives us glimpses of her co-workers (the other nursing 
assistants, room cleaners, and waitresses), but only glimpses—of con-
versations, family backgrounds, current living situations. She does not 
try to understand in any detail or depth their work histories or why they 
might or might not be advancing.
Selling Ben Cheever
Similarly, Ben Cheever (2001) sets out in 1995 to write about work 
in the service sector, and over a period of ﬁve years takes jobs as a 
Burns security guard, a telemarketer, a salesman at CompUSA, a sales-
man at Nobody Beats the Wiz, a sandwich maker at Cosi Sandwich Bar, 
and (most memorably) as a car salesman at Wegman Auto. His descrip-
tions of these jobs are ﬁnely written and rich with humor—and the book 
deserves far more attention than it has received among employment 
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professionals and the general public (it was overshadowed at publica-
tion by Nickel and Dimed).
However, the book has the same limitation as Nickel and Dimed in 
understanding mobility. Cheever stays in these jobs for only a matter 
of months, and many of his interactions are with fellow workers who 
are new to their jobs. We are introduced to several former white-collar 
workers who have been ﬁred or downsized recently from higher-status 
and higher-paying jobs—a former IBM manager who is working at the 
car lot on commission, a certiﬁed public accountant who is working at 
the computer store, a Burns security guard who tells Cheever he’d been 
a phone-company executive. To Cheever, these workers are evidence 
that the growing service sector is creating a class of workers stuck with 
low wages (the book’s subtitle is Back to Square One in a Service Econ-
omy).3 However, these workers have not been in their jobs for multiple 
years, and based on the research on displaced workers there is reason to 
think that they will not be stuck. Even within the service sector there is 
a wide range of wages and incomes.
The Cliff Walk
The Cliff Walk: A Job Lost and a Life Found (1997) is Don Sny-
der’s description of how he loses his job as a college English profes-
sor, remains unemployed for a lengthy period of time, and is reduced 
to supporting his family through Food Stamps and handouts. He then 
slowly gets his life back together, ﬁrst by taking a job as a golf course 
maintenance man ($8 an hour), then as a carpenter ($15), and ﬁnally 
as a handyman. As the book ends, he is just getting back to a middle-
class lifestyle. The book has many work-related themes, including the 
employment possible once Snyder sheds his sense of entitlement as a 
college professor.
A Working Stiff’s Manifesto
The fourth book of this set, Iain Levison’s A Working Stiff’s Mani-
festo (2002), is the one book of this group written by someone who is 
truly a member of the nonprofessional service sector, with no clear ave-
nue out. Levison (who acknowledges that “in the last ten years, I’ve had 
forty-two jobs in six states”) describes a succession of jobs: working in 
a crab-processing plant in Alaska, moving furniture in North Carolina, 
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and delivering heating oil in Pennsylvania. Levison, like Ehrenreich, 
has an eye for the physical and psychological harshness of these jobs 
(made worse by how badly the afﬂuent clients and bosses behave to-
ward employees), but at several points the reader wants to suggest that 
he stop moving around so much and carve out a career in one ﬁeld.
PART 2: IMPORTANT LOW-WAGE WORKFORCES AND  
THE LIMITED WAGE/SKILL ADVANCEMENT WITHIN 
THESE WORKFORCES
As Part 1 showed, there is greater mobility from low-wage jobs in 
America than is often portrayed. At the same time, low-wage workers 
in certain major industries, including long-term nursing care, child care, 
and agriculture, are not advancing in numbers within their industry, and 
worker turnover is high among these workforces.
Governor Davis in 1999 asked EDD to examine these three work-
forces. At the time, employers in these industries were telling the gov-
ernor that they could not ﬁnd qualiﬁed workers. But this inability turned 
out to be linked strongly to the low wages of the jobs, combined with 
low investment in skills upgrading and few opportunities for advance-
ment. 
1. Nursing home and long-term care. The nursing home or long-
term-care workforce was the ﬁrst examined, in response to the clamor 
made by nursing home employers to the governor in 1999 that they were 
unable to ﬁnd certiﬁed nursing assistants, the key direct-care workers. 
In the early twenty-ﬁrst century, health care is the sector of the Califor-
nia economy with the greatest demand for workers. In January 1999, 
there were 904,800 payroll employees in health care in California, and 
by July 2002 this number had grown to 973,900, according to EDD’s 
employment-by-industry statistics.
Long-term care is a major subsector of the health care workforce; 
it had an estimated 140,000 employees in California in 2000. Within 
long-term care, by far the largest category of workers is the direct-care 
certiﬁed nursing assistant (CNA). In 2000, 102,000 California work-
ers had active nursing assistant certiﬁcations, and 72,000 of these were 
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working as CNAs. Approximately 49,000 of the CNAs worked in long-
term care settings; the remainder were primarily in acute care settings 
(Franks et al. 2002; Ong et al. 2002).
In 2000, EDD contracted with the University of California, Los An-
geles (UCLA), School of Public Policy and Social Research to conduct 
the most in-depth analysis of the CNA workforce in California that has 
been done. Over the next 18 months, the UCLA researchers, headed by 
Paul Ong and Ruth Matthias, gathered information not only on the size 
and demographics of the workforce, but also on pay levels, mobility, 
and workplace stability. Their report, “California Caregivers: Final La-
bor Market Analysis” (Ong et al. 2002), paints a picture of a workforce 
that is low paid, with little movement to higher-paid positions, and is 
highly transient and unstable. 
On average, CNAs in California in 2000 received an hourly wage of 
$9. Wages were as high as $13 an hour in the unionized urban San Fran-
cisco Bay Area facilities but as low as $7 an hour in the nonunion sub-
urban and rural facilities. Many CNAs lived on the economic margins, 
and about a quarter of CNAs received welfare at some point between 
1995 and 2000.4 Over time, CNAs who stayed in nursing home care 
achieved very minor wage gains, and few CNAs advanced to the higher 
job categories of licensed vocational nurse (LVN) or registered nurse 
(RN). The wage premium increases for CNA experience averaged less 
than 1 percent a year—very low relative to other job categories. Only 
5–12 percent of CNAs went on to become LVNs (Ong et al. 2002).
Figure 5.2 shows what percentage of CNAs working in California 
at the start of 1998 remained in their jobs through 2000. During these 
three years, 52 percent of CNAs working in the caregiver industry left 
their ﬁrm, and over 70 percent of other CNAs left their ﬁrm. As shown 
in Figure 5.3, 70 percent of CNAs certiﬁed in 1995 had let their CNA 
certiﬁcation lapse by 2001.
2. Child care. The high turnover of the nursing care ﬁeld is mir-
rored in child care. The average child care worker with a college degree 
earned around $20,000 a year in 1999, whereas one without a college 
degree earned around $16,000 a year. Staff turnover rates have run 
30–40 percent a year in California, and studies have found that over 
three- and four-year periods the majority of child care workers leave 
the ﬁeld (Caspary 2002). One recent study conducted among 75 centers 
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SOURCE: Ong et al. (2002), p. 49.
Figure 5.2  Certiﬁed Nurse Assistant Employee Retention RatesFigure 5.2  Certified Nurse Assistant Employee Retention Rates
Sources: CNA Registry Files, Department of Health Services, 1995-2001 and UI Base Wage and BEL files, 
Employment Development Department, 1998-2000. 
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Figure 5.3  Certified Nurse Assistant Licensing Survival Rate (1995-2001) 
Source: CNA Registry Files, Department of Health Services, 1995-2001. 
Notes: The survival rate equals the percent of CNAs issued a license in a given year that still has a license 
in 2001.
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in northern California found that 76 percent of all of the staff members 
who worked at these centers in 1996 no longer worked there in 2000, 
and that approximately half of these teachers and directors had left the 
child care ﬁeld (Whitebook et al. 2001).5
3. Agriculture. Agriculture is a major employer in California. 
Some 800,000–900,000 people work for wages on California farms 
at some time during a typical year, and about half of these, 400,000, 
work year-round. According to University of California, Davis, labor 
economist Phil Martin and his UC Davis colleague Ed Taylor, most 
farmworkers in California are seasonally employed on one farm for 
less than six months each year and earn a quarter of the average factory 
worker’s annual salary. Farmworkers’ average hourly earnings are $6–
$8 (versus $12–$14 for manufacturing workers). Farmworkers average 
around 1,000 hours of work a year—about half as many as manufactur-
ing workers (Martin and Taylor 2000).6
Moreover, farmworkers show the least wage and job mobility of 
any industry in California. In the EDD wage mobility study (Table 5.2), 
in 1988 the largest percentage of agricultural workers were mired in the 
bottom quintile of earnings (46 percent). Over the next 12 years, the 
wage gains for workers who remained in agriculture were by far the 
smallest (5 percent) of any industry (Table 5.3). Only those who left ag-
riculture during the 12 years—more than 40 percent, as shown in Figure 
5.1—earned signiﬁcantly higher wages, posting gains of 46 percent.7
Increasing mobility as a goal
Increasing mobility among these three low-wage workforces—
long-term nursing care, child care, and agriculture—as well as among 
low-wage workforces in hospitality and allied health care, became a 
Davis administration priority early on in 1999—just as increasing mo-
bility for low-wage workforces was becoming a priority of practitioners 
nationwide. The lessons of our experiences, and of experiences in other 
states, are contained in the next two chapters. 
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Notes
 1. See also McMurrer and Sawhill (1996b), a companion piece that goes into great-
er detail on some of the studies.
 2. “The underclass” was deﬁned in Chapter 2 as a class of poor people not trying to 
advance through work but instead mired in antisocial behaviors. 
 3. Cheever sets out to show the lack of job security, as well as the low wages, char-
acteristic of a good part of the service economy of the mid-1990s. Much of what 
he writes about, though, is the artistry in these jobs. “When you want to become 
a car salesman, does that mean you’ve hit the bottom of the barrel?” a fellow car 
salesman–trainee asks him, to which Cheever replies, “No, it depends on what 
kind of salesman you turn out to be,” then goes on to describe the quality of work 
he ﬁnds among some other car salesmen, as well as among the low-paid sales 
staff at CompUSA and even at Nobody Beats the Wiz. A fellow salesman at the 
Wiz goes out of his way to sell customers only what they need, even giving up 
commissions.
 4. CNAs in California are overwhelmingly female (over 88 percent). Only 13.3 
percent of CNAs had less than a high school degree, while nearly 20 percent had 
an associate’s or a bachelor’s degree. In a survey of 30,000 CNAs, 51 percent 
listed English as a primary language, 22 percent listed Spanish, and 17 percent 
listed Tagalog (spoken in the Philippines), indicating the industry’s reliance on 
an immigrant population. 
 5. See also Whitebook and Eichberg (2002). For a more detailed look at the prob-
lem of high turnover in the child care ﬁeld, see Whitebook and Sakai’s (2004) By 
a Thread: How Child Care Centers Hold On to Teachers, How Teachers Build 
Lasting Careers.
 6.  Martin and Taylor (2000) further note that California farmworkers averaged 23 
weeks of farmwork a year in the mid-1990s, three weeks of nonfarmwork, and 
26 weeks without farmwork. “In most cases,” they say, “time not working is 
spent outside the United States.”
 7.  Among other industries, workers in business services who remained in their ﬁeld 
showed median wage gains of 27 percent; those in education services, 22 per-
cent; and those in durable manufacturing, 15 percent.
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Principle Four: Building Career
Ladders for the Working Poor
Designing Effective Career Ladders Requires 
Single- and Multiemployer Skills Upgrading
Increasingly, practitioners both in government and in private foun-
dations are experimenting with career ladder projects as a means of 
improving the wages and mobility of low-paid workers. This human 
capital strategy envisions low-wage workers—in nursing homes, ho-
tels, back-ofﬁce banking, even in farmwork—improving their skills 
through targeted training and advancing in pay. 
Can targeted skills upgrading lead to wage increases or better jobs 
for low-wage workers? Operationally, how is skills upgrading best 
structured: what are the roles for the public and private sectors, and 
how can costs be allocated among private employers (or multiemployer 
organizations), unions, and the government? Further, is there a way to 
make career ladders sustainable, so that training is not dependent on 
discretionary government funds? 
The next two chapters discuss the design and operation of career 
ladder projects. This chapter identiﬁes forms of career ladders that have 
yielded skill and wage gains, and the elements that make them effective. 
The next chapter sets out how practitioners might achieve a sustainable 
system of skills upgrading for low-wage workforces.
CAREER LADDERS SPAN SECTORS AND TAKE  
SEVERAL FORMS
Career ladder projects have not been limited to one sector but have 
spanned such sectors as health care, hospitality, banking, and even ag-
riculture. In California, the state government, through a “Career Lad-
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ders for the 21st Century” initiative, funded more than 30 career ladder 
projects between 2000 and 2003. As the following box indicates, these 
projects constructed ladders in a number of different sectors.
 
“Career Ladders for the 21st Century” Projects
Kaiser Permanente (medical assistants) 
Training for laundry workers, janitors, and other low-wage 
workers to become medical assistants or unit assistants (2001).
California Bankers Association (back-ofﬁce ﬁnancial) 
Training for a mix of back-ofﬁce data entry workers in banks 
(2001).
Rands Systems (machinists) 
Training for machinists in small machine ﬁrms (2001).
Rim Hospitality (hotel workers) 
Training for low-wage hotel workers, conducted at several 
properties of Rim Corporation (2001).
Techniform Metal Curving (metal-forming workers) 
Training for metal-forming workers drawn from multiple 
employers (2002).
Life Care Centers (nursing home workers) 
Training of certiﬁed nursing assistants at a nursing home chain 
(2002).
Fairmont San Jose (hotel workers) 
Training of low-wage hotel workers at a major hotel (2002).
Beach House Inn (restaurant workers) 
Training of restaurant workers at a restaurant chain (2002).
Santa Monica College (health care workers) 
Training of certiﬁed nursing assistants at several nursing homes 
(2002).
SOURCE: Unpublished material, Employment Development Department.
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Career Ladders Take Not One Form but Five
As well as spanning industry sectors, career ladder projects in Cali-
fornia and elsewhere have taken not one form but several. These have 
arisen out of the different structures of job ladders or lattices among 
industries, the different opportunities for cross-training and horizontal 
mobility, and the different roles of unions and industry associations. 
The following list summarizes the ﬁve main forms of career ladders: 
 1.  A career ladder developed and operated by a large ﬁrm that 
results in new skills and wage gains for the ﬁrm’s low-wage 
workers. Example: Kaiser Permanente’s career ladder for its 
laundry workers and other low-wage earners, training them to 
become medical assistants and placing them in that position 
upon completion of training.
 2. A career ladder by a multiemployer organization (indus-
try association, labor union, for-proﬁt or nonproﬁt training 
ﬁrm) that results in new skills and wage gains for the low-
wage workers of several ﬁrms. Example: the Hotel Employees 
Restaurant Employees (HERE) unions’ training of low-wage 
workers across several hotels for upgrades.
 3. A career ladder by a multiemployer organization that creates 
new paraprofessional job categories of higher pay and skill 
level and trains low-wage workers for these positions. This ap-
proach most directly alters the structure of jobs in the industry, 
not merely the skills of workers. Example: the California As-
sociation of Health Facilities’ creation of new paraprofessional 
jobs of higher pay and responsibility for CNAs.
 4. A career ladder by a multiemployer organization that prepares 
low-wage workers for job openings that may arise in the next 
year or two. Wage increases do not result immediately upon 
completion of training, since ﬁrms cannot guarantee job open-
ings or placements at the training’s completion. Examples: the 
California Bankers Association’s training of data entry work-
ers for higher-level jobs in banks, and the California Restau-
rant Association’s training of low-wage restaurant workers for 
supervisory jobs.
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 5. A career ladder by a multiemployer organization that cross-
trains workers to achieve “horizontal mobility”—higher in-
come derived not necessarily through higher wages but through 
extended work hours or work shifts. Examples: the HERE 
unions’ cross-training to enable low-wage hotel workers to gain 
additional hours, and UFW’s cross-training of farmworkers to 
increase the number of crops that they can work.
In identifying elements of effective career ladders, we can distin-
guish broadly between 1) single-employer career ladders, in which a 
major employer joins with government in a training program to upgrade 
the skills of its low-wage workforce, and 2) the more challenging multi-
employer career ladders. In the latter, an industry association or a labor 
union brings together several employers for skills upgrading of their 
employees. It often attempts to involve midsized and small employers 
and to establish skills upgrading for low-wage workers as an industry-
wide practice. 
PART 1: SINGLE-EMPLOYER CAREER LADDERS
The single major employer with a need for trained workers at mul-
tiple skill levels is a promising venue for career ladders. In recent career 
ladder projects with single large employers, workers have obtained new 
skills and have achieved both job advances and wage gains, albeit on a 
modest scale. Further, in these projects the employer has been willing 
to absorb training costs—in some cases up to 50 percent of direct costs. 
Illustrations of wage gains and employer participation can be drawn 
from career ladders at Kaiser Hospitals in the health care sector and 
from Fairmont Hotels and Resorts and Rim Hospitality in the hospital-
ity sector. 
These examples also show the variations within this career ladder 
form. At Kaiser, all career ladder participants take the same training 
course, targeted at speciﬁc job categories, whereas at Fairmont and 
Rim, the training has been individualized, so that participants choose 
from a mix of classes. At Kaiser, mobility has meant vertical mobility, 
in which the worker accrues additional skills to advance to a job of 
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higher pay, while at the hotels, mobility has meant a horizontal mobil-
ity, where a worker’s additional skills serve to expand hours worked or 
duties assumed. 
In 2000, California’s health care giant, the 84,000-worker Kaiser 
Permanente, participated in one of the ﬁrst career ladder projects, in-
volving a mix of public and private funds. The project was a joint ven-
ture of Kaiser and the union representing Kaiser’s lower-wage workers, 
Service Employees International Union (SEIU) Local 250. It set out to 
train 144 entry-level workers to become medical assistants, acute-care 
nursing assistants, or unit assistants.
A portion of the employment structure of a Kaiser acute-care hospi-
tal is shown in Figure 6.1. The hospital has more than 40 different job 
categories in six divisions. Workers not only move up within divisions 
but also move between divisions for more skilled and higher-paying 
jobs. For example, a food preparation worker might move up in his di-
vision to become a cook or food service manager, or he might move to 
another division to work as a nurse’s aide or laundry worker.
Kaiser joined with SEIU Local 250 on a career ladder program for 
entry-level workers in janitorial and housekeeping (which Kaiser calls 
“environmental services”), food preparation, laundry, and reception. 
One hundred forty-four workers were chosen to participate from Kaiser 
hospitals in Sacramento and the San Francisco Bay Area. All entry-lev-
el workers in these regions could apply, and participants were chosen 
based on seniority and the ability to complete the training, according to 
information compiled by Kaiser on the project.
The participants were trained to ﬁll one of three paraprofessional 
care jobs at Kaiser: unit assistant, medical assistant, or acute care nurs-
ing assistant. For all three jobs, Kaiser was motivated to upgrade its 
own workers, since in the tight labor market of 1999–2000 it found 
itself unable to ﬁnd trained unit assistants or medical assistants. To the 
participants, the jobs represented pay raises and an opportunity to move 
into patient care.
Compared to similar workers in other settings, the unionized house-
keepers, food preparation workers, and laundry workers at Kaiser all 
earn good wages, from $12 to $13 an hour. Still, the patient care jobs 
represented immediate pay increases. Acute care nursing assistants start 
at $13.75 an hour, while starting salaries for medical assistants and unit 
assistants are $15.80 an hour. The various Kaiser career ladder pro-
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Figure 6.1  Some of the Career Ladder Pathways in the Kaiser Permanente Acute Care Setting
SOURCE: Unpublished diagram from Kaiser Permanente.
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grams lasted from 10 weeks for acute care nursing assistant to 13 weeks 
for medical assistant and unit assistant. Participants attended 40 hours a 
week, receiving their existing wage levels during training. Participants 
who completed the program were guaranteed job advancement. Kaiser 
reported in 2002 that over 92 percent of participants had completed 
training and moved into their new jobs (Table 6.1).
Kaiser paid 50 percent of the wages of workers attending training; 
the remaining 50 percent was paid for by government training grants 
from the U.S. Department of Labor, by the governor’s WIA discretion-
ary funds, and by state Employment Training Panel (ETP) funds. The 
training funds also paid the direct costs of instructors and training mate-
rials. The guaranteed job upgrades at the end of the training, combined 
with the ﬁnancial commitment of Kaiser, made this project competitive 
for government funding.
A second example of a single-employer career ladder program 
comes from the Fairmont San Jose, a high-end, large, unionized ho-
tel. Undertaken in 2002, the Fairmont career ladders focused on lower-
skilled workers in several divisions: front desk agents, restaurant serv-
ers, doormen, laundry workers, and room attendants. Like the Kaiser 
career ladders, the Fairmont training was designed in conjunction with 
a union, in this case the HERE International Union. 
As shown in Figure 6.2, major hotels like the Fairmont San Jose 
are like little cities, containing their own food, cleaning, and mainte-
nance operations. Five or six divisions usually are present; these in-
clude housekeeping, food and beverage, front desk, sales, controller, 
and human resources. (Because of space limitations, here only some 
are represented.) There are numerous mobility paths up the divisions as 
well as between divisions. A front desk agent can advance to front desk 
supervisor in the front desk division, or move to ofﬁce clerk or accounts 
receivable clerk in the controller division. A dishwasher might advance 
to prep cook within the food and beverage division or move to a higher-
paying position in housekeeping. 
The Fairmont trained 220 frontline workers drawn from its front 
desk agents, restaurant servers, doormen, laundry workers, and room 
attendants. The training was tailored to each worker and made up a 
total of 200 hours. Workers could take classes in three main skill ar-
eas: general business skills (i.e., interviewing techniques, identifying 
opportunities to advance), interpersonal skills and team building, and 
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Class
Service area/
facilities
Number 
enrolled
Number 
graduated
Graduation 
rate (%) Trainees’ former positions Dates and location
Acute care nursing 
assistant (ACNA)
North East Bay:
Walnut Creek, 
Vallejo
21 20 95 Housekeeping aide, appt. 
clerk, ﬁle clerk, record clerk, 
teleservice rep., medical asst., 
service partner, medical record 
analyst, lead service partner, 
appt. clerk, PBX operator & 
health care contact specialist
January–March 
2001, Contra Costa 
College
ACNA Capital 
Service Area: 
Sacramento, 
Roseville, South 
Sacramento
26 23 88 Emergency dept. clerk, 
ﬁle clerk, appt. clerk, 
housekeeping aide, pharmacy 
clerk, teleservice rep.
June–August 2001, 
American River 
College
 ACNA Capital 
Service Area: 
Sacramento, 
Roseville
21 21 100 Emergency dept. clerk, 
ﬁle clerk, appt. clerk, 
housekeeping aide, 
teleservice rep.
March–May 2002,
American River 
College
ACNA upgrade East Bay: 
Oakland, 
Hayward, 
Richmond
22 18 81 CNAs from long-term care 
facilities represented by Local 
250
May–July 2001, 
Contra Costa 
College
Table 6.1  Results of Career Ladders for Lower-Wage Workers Sponsored by Kaiser Permanente and the Shirley 
Ware Education Center (SEIU Local 250)
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SOURCE: Unpublished data from Kaiser Permanente.
Unit assistant North East Bay: 
Walnut Creek, 
Vallejo
22 20 91 Care partner, medical 
asst., housekeeper, cashier/
receptionist, ﬁle clerk, health 
care contact specialist, 
admitting rep., service partner, 
dietary aide/nutritionist
June–August 2001, 
Contra Costa 
College
Medical assistant South Bay and 
Golden Gate: 
Redwood City, 
South San 
Francisco
14 13 93 Call center, health information, 
chart room, pharmacy, 
telecommunications, 
psychiatry, radiology
June–August 2001, 
College of San 
Mateo
Medical assistant South Bay 18 18 100 Housekeeper, cashier/
receptionist, health care 
contact specialist, service 
partner, clerk, surgery 
scheduler, birth recorder, 
storekeeper
July–September 2002, 
West Valley College
Totals 144 133 92
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Figure 6.2  Part of a Hotel Job Structure, Showing Numerous Mobility Paths and Approximate Salary Ranges
NOTE: Wage numbers represent 25th and 75th percentiles in 2003. Wage ranges reﬂect differences in employee characteristics and 
time on the job as well as facilities in different geographic areas and of different sizes.
SOURCE: Unpublished diagram supplied by Bob Marr, California Employment Development Department.
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commercial skills. For example, a worker who wanted to move from 
front desk to banquet server or who wanted to get additional hours as a 
banquet server might take a class in commercial skills on setting up and 
breaking down conference and banquet spaces. A laundry worker who 
wanted to get into food service might take classes in food handling, 
food allergy awareness, and guest safety and protection.
The Fairmont received just under $433,000 from the state’s Em-
ployment Training Panel (ETP) for the project. In return, the Fairmont 
agreed to pay its workers their normal wages during the hours of train-
ing, the cost of which amounted to over $400,000, the hotel estimated. 
Though it did not promise speciﬁc job promotions, it did guarantee a 
5 percent pay increase for workers who completed training and stayed 
for 90 days. Motivated by the guaranteed pay increase, over 75 per-
cent of participants completed training and stayed for the requisite time 
(Fairmont San Jose 2002).1 
A second single-employer career ladder program in the hospital-
ity ﬁeld was sponsored by Rim Hospitality, owner of 22 midsized and 
nonunion hotel properties (each with 40–80 employees) in California. 
Rim recruited 78 workers from ﬁve of its suburban properties in Santa 
Rosa, Auburn, and Davis. The workers were drawn from room atten-
dants, dishwashers, and prep cooks in food and beverage; front desk 
representatives; switchboard operators; and parking attendants. Divi-
sion managers were asked to nominate employees, and employees were 
given the opportunity to nominate themselves. All participants had to 
have been with Rim at least 90 days, though the majority had been with 
Rim for more than ﬁve years. 
At the time, Mary Ann Kuhn, Rim’s human resources manager, ex-
plained the reasons for the company’s participation: “We’re experienc-
ing a 100 percent annual turnover in jobs like dishwasher and busper-
son,” she said in a 2001 interview. “We hope to create goodwill for Rim 
as our employees see that the company is investing in them, and (we) 
want our employees to see Rim as a career. We hope to ﬁnd out what 
our workers want to become, and tailor individual training plans.”
Such a plan was drawn up for each employee. A participant could 
take up to 64 hours of training, with courses drawn from four cate-
gories: 1) English as a second language; 2) business skills (including 
guest services, working a shift at the desk, and security); 3) leadership 
skills (team building, coaching and mentoring skills); and 4) commer-
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cial skills. Upon completion of training, each employee received a 5 
percent wage increase. To obtain the $75,000 in ETP funds, Rim agreed 
to pay employees their normal wages during the training, institute the 5 
percent wage raise upon training completion, assist trainees in boosting 
wages through increased work hours (horizontal mobility) or job ad-
vancement (vertical mobility), and track for ETP the progress of train-
ees over two years.
In its ﬁrst-year tracking, Rim concluded that the cross-training of 
skills allowed trainees to avoid reduced hours when business was slow 
and to augment work time in other periods. Room attendants were able 
to gain extra hours as housekeepers cleaning the public spaces in the 
hotel, busboys were able to gain extra hours as servers, and servers as 
banquet setup staff. “Trainees learned skills in food service, or facilities, 
or housekeeping that allowed them to extend hours; equally, they were 
able see the broad range of work opportunities in the hotel,” Kuhn said, 
“—opportunities to increase hours, and strategies for accessing them.” 
Further, within the ﬁrst quarter of completing training, a number of the 
trainees advanced to higher level positions, as shown in Table 6.2.
Table 6.2  Seven Cases of Worker Advancement for Individual Trainees 
Who Completed Rim Hospitality’s Career Ladder Training
  At time of entry into training program      90 days after completing training
Occupation Hourly wage ($) Occupation Hourly wage ($)
Room attendant 6.75 Front desk staffperson 8.00
Room attendant 6.50 Asst. exec. housekeeper 9.00
Front desk staffperson 10.25 Asst. general manager 14.00
Front desk staffperson 8.35 Front desk supervisor 9.00
Front desk staffperson 8.65 Sales coordinator 10.25
Front desk staffperson 8.50 Catering manager 12.75
Room attendant 6.75 Room inspector 8.00
NOTE: Each entry represents a single worker and shows a different career path taken.
SOURCE: Unpublished data from California Employment Training Panel.
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DESIGNING EFFECTIVE SINGLE-EMPLOYER  
CAREER LADDERS
From the experiences of Kaiser, Fairmont, and Rim, as well as those 
of other single employers, we can identify the following four guidelines 
for designing effective single-employer career ladders:2 
 1. Government training funds should only be used in single-em-
ployer career ladders to expand mobility opportunities beyond 
those existing in the company, not to fund skills upgrading that 
would otherwise be conducted. As the job structures at Kaiser 
and Fairmont indicate, major employers have multiple paths 
of mobility. Government training funds should only be used in 
single-employer career ladders to spur training and advance-
ment that the company would not undertake on its own.
 2. Training is best targeted at speciﬁc job openings, but alter-
natively it can be tied to openings in the future, since there 
is some immediate wage gain and reasonable expectation of 
future wage gain. The Kaiser model, that of tying training to 
speciﬁc job openings, is the preferred approach, as it ensures 
advancement and wage gain. However, this frequently is not 
possible, even with a major employer. An alternative is the 
Fairmont/Rim model, in which training is tied to an immediate 
wage gain and to skills for future advancement.
 3. The training design should identify longer-term advancement 
opportunities beyond the immediate training. The single-em-
ployer career ladders have been short term—less than four 
months—so wage and job gains have been limited. The indi-
vidual training plans should identify longer-term advancement 
opportunities, including skills that employees will need to ad-
vance.
 4. Both the government and the employer should contribute ﬁ-
nancially, with the distribution of costs based on the wage 
gains and job placement that the employer commits to. In each 
of the three career ladders noted above, the employer has as-
sumed the cost of employee wages during training. The distri-
bution of costs will differ between projects, depending on the 
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advancement and wage gains that the employer commits to 
before training.
PART 2: MULTIEMPLOYER CAREER LADDERS
Major employers, such as Kaiser, Fairmont, and Rim, are only a 
small part of the employer pool. If skills upgrading is to reach a greater 
number of workers—especially low-wage workers who are worst off—
it must look to multiemployer career ladders. Principally, these projects 
involve industry associations, labor unions, and private and nonproﬁt 
training ﬁrms. Multiemployer career ladders provide a greater chal-
lenge to practitioners, as they bring in midsized and smaller employers 
who have fewer resources of their own to spend on training, few mobil-
ity paths within their own organizations, and the lowest-paid workers. 
As economists Amanda Ahlstrand, Laurie Bassi, and Daniel Mc-
Murrer discuss in Workplace Education for Low-Wage Workers (2003), 
the multiemployer organization can distribute the costs of developing 
and operating training among ﬁrms.3 It can thus involve the small and 
midsized ﬁrms. Among the California career ladder projects, Rands 
Systems, a for-proﬁt training ﬁrm, pooled training among operators of 
small machine shops in Southern California; California Bankers As-
sociation, an industry association, pooled training of back-ofﬁce work-
ers among small and midsized banks; the California Association of 
Health Facilities (CAHF), a second industry association, pooled train-
ing among nursing homes; and HERE, a union, pooled training among 
multiple hotels.
Among California multiemployer career ladders, the CAHF train-
ing for nursing home employees and the HERE training for low-wage 
hotel employees are illustrative. The CAHF training indicates how a 
multiemployer organization, using its knowledge of employer needs, 
can coordinate training among employers and establish skills upgrading 
that is tied to job advancements. The HERE training also was rooted in 
sector expertise and experience, though its impacts were dulled by the 
short-term nature of the training and the lack of ties to wage gains. 
On the surface, nursing homes would not seem to be a promising 
venue for career ladders, given the high turnover of employees and the 
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absence of many established job ladders. However, nursing homes be-
came the source of the main health care career ladders because of the 
enthusiasm of the industry association, CAHF, which represents more 
than 1,500 long-term care facilities in California, including 800 skilled 
nursing facilities.
“Our member facilities can’t ﬁnd enough workers,” CAHF educa-
tion ofﬁcial Ken Merchant said in a June 1999 interview. “Our facilities 
need RNs, LVNs, administrators, and most of all, they need CNAs.” 
Merchant estimated that 20,000 CNAs would be hired immediately if 
the workers could be found. Over the next ﬁve years, Merchant and 
CAHF designed projects to both recruit and train new CNAs, and other 
projects to assist existing CNAs to advance.
CAHF’s career ladders reﬂected Merchant’s view that CNA turn-
over could be reduced by advancement opportunities. In a 2001 report, 
“The Long Term Care Workforce Crisis: CNA Career Ladders and 
Nurse Training,” Merchant outlined the industry’s need for CNAs and 
proposed potential remedies. These included a statewide media cam-
paign to recruit CNAs, better working conditions, and an industrywide 
program of career ladders. Merchant (2001) wrote, “If CNAs have a 
sense that they can advance, then they have a reason to stay.” In em-
ployer meetings that Merchant arranged throughout the state in 2000 
and 2001, employers echoed this view. The personnel director at Bev-
erly Enterprises, then California’s largest nursing home owner, told us 
that “the industry is incurring high costs with the registries, and we 
need ways not only to attract workers to the ﬁeld, but to keep them.”4
One CAHF advancement strategy involved increasing the mobility 
in the existing job ladder of CNA to LVN. Licensed vocational nurse 
is a job of signiﬁcantly higher pay; its salary ranges from $50,000 to 
$70,000. The advancement is not easy, as becoming an LVN requires 
completing 1,300 hours of instruction. Though LVN classes are offered 
at little or no cost at community colleges, few CNAs have the time, re-
sources, or even the literacy or language levels to take advantage of the 
classes. Only an estimated 5–12 percent of CNAs become LVNs. 
To increase this mobility path, CAHF assumed the role of training 
intermediary; it leveraged government training funds by using adult ed-
ucation funds and by soliciting ﬁnancial participation from employers. 
In Riverside County, Plott Family Care Centers, a nursing home owner, 
joined with Riverside Community College to enable 27 CNAs to up-
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grade their skills to those of LVNs. The employees attended class at the 
worksite for 20 hours a week and worked 20 hours a week, and they 
received wages for the 40 hours. Half of the wages during training were 
paid by the employer and the other half came out of state training funds. 
The instructional cost was paid by Riverside Community College and 
from state training funds. In San Jacinto, the Valley Health System, an-
other nursing home owner, joined with the local community college to 
train 30 CNAs to become LVNs. In these cases and others, the employer 
operated multiple facilities and was able to absorb the new LVNs.
Table 6.3 shows the CNA-to-LVN projects in the state, indicating 
location of training, whether the CNA receives regular wages during 
training hours, and the government’s and employer’s ﬁnancial contribu-
tions.
A second skills upgrading strategy by CAHF involved working with 
its employers to create new paraprofessional job categories between 
CNA and LVN: senior nursing assistant (SNA), restorative nursing as-
sistant (RNA), and certiﬁed memory impairment specialist (CMIS). 
Each of these positions represents a gain in pay and responsibility for 
CNAs. This strategy is discussed in greater detail in the next chapter’s 
section on career ladders and new job structures.
The HERE unions, as multiemployer associations, are involved 
throughout the nation in designing and operating career ladders. HERE 
unions also are main participants in the AFL-CIO’s “Working for Amer-
ica” initiative, which emphasizes skills upgrading as part of a “high 
road” strategy of creating higher paying jobs through higher-skilled 
American workers. The unions, as they are sector-based, understand 
the structure of jobs in a sector and the needs of employers. Union of-
ﬁcials possess detailed knowledge of how workers can advance in a 
ﬁrm or sector, the formal and informal networks they can use, the pay 
levels and responsibility levels they can expect. Further, they under-
stand the craftsmanship that beneﬁts the workers, the employers, and 
the industry. 
HERE unions in four California cities—Los Angeles, San Diego, 
San Jose, and San Francisco—designed a pilot career ladders program 
in 2001 that focused on the dishwashers, housekeepers, and other lower-
wage workers in hotels. A study commissioned by the unions concluded 
that these line employees most often failed to advance not because of a 
lack of technical skills but because of their lack of English language or 
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Table 6.3  CNA to LVN Career Ladders
Program  CAHF members  Funding source    Employer support
Program 
length    LVN trainer
Caregiver training 
initiative round 
programs
Facilities owned 
by Plott Family 
Care Centers/Plott 
Nursing Homes
WIA funds and 
employer funds
Employer pays student 
wages in a 20-20 
program and provides 
substantial in-kind 
support
18 months College of the 
Desert
Regional 
occupational 
program, CNA to 
LVN programs
Various 
Sacramento-area 
employers
Department of 
Education ADA 
funds, covering 
tuition and 
materials
Handled on a case-
by-case basis, ranging 
from minimal support 
up to full employer 
payment for tuition 
costs and wages during 
training days
12, 18, or 
24 months
Grant Joint 
Union High 
School District in 
Sacramento
Apprenticeship 
model, CNA to 
LVN programs
Various Fresno-
area employers
Department 
of Education 
ADA funds and 
Montoya funds, 
covering tuition 
and materials
Handled on a case-
by-case basis, ranging 
from minimal support 
up to full employer 
payment for tuition 
costs and wages during 
training days
12, 18, or 
24 months
Clovis Adult 
School in Fresno
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SOURCE: Unpublished data from California Association of Health Facilities.
Program  CAHF members  Funding source    Employer support
Program 
length    LVN trainer
Employer/local 
WIA board/junior 
college CNA to 
LVN program, 
Stanislaus County
Various Stanislaus 
County members
50% WIA; 
50% employer, 
community 
college, and other 
funds
Employers pay 
$5,000 per candidate 
in direct tuition cost, 
plus $2,000 in in-
kind support. Most 
offer students income 
support, either using 
20-20 models or loans 
that are forgivable if 
the student remains 
with the employer as 
an LVN.
18 months Modesto Junior 
College, with 
training at 
Emanuel Medical 
Center, Turlock
Employer/
local WIA 
board/regional 
occupational 
program, CNA 
to LVN program, 
Los Angeles 
County
Facilities owned 
by DK Fortune & 
Associates
WIA funds 
through the South 
Bay WIB
18 months Los Angeles 
County (LA 
Uniﬁed School 
District)
Table 6.3  (continued)
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literacy skills, their paltry job interview skills, and their limited knowl-
edge of advancement processes. The career ladder design focused on 
English as a second language, basic computer skills, customer ser-
vice, and knowledge of job opportunities at the hotel. Funded with a 
$500,000 grant from the California Community Colleges Chancellor’s 
Ofﬁce, the training started small, with designs that ranged from 8 to 41 
hours, as shown in Table 6.4. A total of 123 workers in the four cities 
participated. 
The hotel employers paid a portion of employee wages during the 
training. However, given the brevity of the training, the employers did 
not commit to any job advancement or wage gains.
Following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the bottom 
fell out of the hotel industry in California. San Francisco’s HERE Local 
2 reported in early 2002 that one-third of its members, 3,000 workers, 
faced layoff or signiﬁcantly reduced hours. For the ﬁrst nine months 
after September 11, the career ladders initiative went on the unions’ 
back burner; then it emerged with a declared focus on cross-training 
and horizontal mobility to address the drop in hours. The workers who 
Table 6.4  HERE Unions’ Pilot Career Ladder Projects, 2002
City                  Training Number of participants
Los Angeles 32-hour training at LA Trade 
Technical College: mix 
of VESL,a introduction to 
computers, and guest services
20 housekeepers, 
banquet stewards, 
and housemen from  
3 hotels
San Diego 41-hour training in VESL and 
individual career plans
15 housekeepers and 
front-ofﬁce staff
San Jose 32-hour training in customer 
service and individual career 
plans
16 room attendants
San Francisco 8-hour training in individual 
upgrade plans
72 dishwashers
a Vocational English as a second language.
SOURCE: Unpublished data from California Labor Federation.
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were targeted for career ladders training were those whose hours had 
been signiﬁcantly reduced since September 11.
The HERE career ladders project that emerged in early 2003 was 
funded by nearly a million dollars in the governor’s discretionary WIA 
funds and was built on the curricula of the pilot projects. The four proj-
ects, summarized in Table 6.5, all required workers to attend training 
on their own time, primarily in the evenings. All included VESL train-
ing and career counseling, and the San Diego career ladders included 
a worker-based mentorship program to assist workers in identifying 
opportunities for additional hours or new jobs (Bricker 2002; San Di-
ego Employee Training Institute 2002; City College of San Francisco 
2002). 
Jim Potterton, an instructor at San Jose City College, was retained 
in late 2003 by the California Labor Federation to evaluate this proj-
ect. Potterton’s evaluation noted the willingness of workers to attend 
training on their own time and the likely value of the mentorship and 
English-language training, but described as “problematic” any job and 
wage gains. Employers made no commitments for increased hours, 
wage gains, or promotions, and neither employers nor unions undertook 
any tracking of wage gains.
Table 6.5  HERE Career Ladders for Workers Reduced to Part-Time 
Status, 2003
City                  Training Participants
Los Angeles VESLa—40 hours
Career advancement strategies—
24 hours
15 VESL students
75 workers (including 
the VESL group)
San Diego VESL—90 hours
Career advancement—43 hours
75 trainees
31 trainees
San Jose VESL—60 hours 40 trainees
San Francisco VESL
Food and beverage skills training
50 trainees
25 trainees
a Vocational English as a second language.
SOURCE: Unpublished data supplied by Jim Potterton, San Jose City College, for the 
California Labor Federation.
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Following the project’s completion, HERE Local 2 in San Francis-
co used money from its own joint labor and management training trust 
fund to continue the counseling on horizontal and vertical mobility with 
low-wage workers. Since even unionized workers at major hotels are 
not guaranteed a full set of hours, this inexpensive counseling can be a 
cost-efﬁcient use of the union’s training funds. However, the governor’s 
discretionary WIA funds were not renewed in 2004, and, although the 
counseling has continued, neither the unions nor the employers have 
identiﬁed funds to continue language or skills training.
DESIGNING EFFECTIVE MULTIEMPLOYER  
CAREER LADDERS
Examining multiemployer career ladders in other states, we ﬁnd 
that, as in California, they are primarily in initial stages and of small 
scale (Colborn 2005). Yet from the existing projects we can identify 
ﬁve elements of effective multiemployer skills upgrading:
 1. The effective multiemployer organization is based in the indus-
try sector and possesses credibility with employers. As with 
effective job training for the unemployed, effective skills up-
grading is rooted in knowledge of the structure of jobs in the 
sector and the needs of employers. The industry associations 
and labor unions usually possess this sector expertise, as do 
select training agencies. The training agencies that succeed 
are those that are not perceived as antipoverty entities, looking 
only to worker gains and unconcerned with the industry. Labor 
unions succeed as multiemployer organizations in career lad-
ders to the extent that they are able to design skills upgrading 
that beneﬁts employers as well as workers.
 2. Multiemployer career ladders, like single-employer career 
ladders, are best tied to speciﬁc job openings; alternatively 
they should be tied to some wage gain and carry a reasonable 
expectation of future wage gains. The CAHF licensed voca-
tional nurse training is an example of training tied to immedi-
ate promotions and wage gains. However, this is the less com-
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mon situation—one in which an employer knows when open-
ings will occur (or has sufﬁcient openings at all times) and can 
time the training. Alternatively, multiemployer career ladders 
should be expected to meet two tests if they are to receive gov-
ernment or foundation training funds: a tie to some immediate 
wage gain, and tracking of employees to measure future wage 
gains. Without signiﬁcant employer buy-in, the training can 
be insufﬁciently focused on skills needed for advancement or 
improved performance.
 3. Training costs should be allocated among the participants: the 
employers, the workers, the multiemployer association, and the 
government agencies providing workforce training funds. To 
distribute costs among these parties, workforce training funds 
should be used to leverage ﬁnancial participation by employ-
ers. Unions can be expected to participate ﬁnancially where a 
joint labor-management trust fund exists and where workers 
are expected to undertake at least some of the training on their 
own time. 
 4. Multiemployer career ladders should be about having an im-
pact on the structure of jobs as well as the skills of workers. 
The multiemployer associations, because they are industry-
wide, have an opportunity to affect the structure of jobs, not 
just the skills of workers. Career ladders should be not only 
about mobility for individual workers but also about creating 
additional mobility positions. The role of multiemployer as-
sociations in inﬂuencing job structure is discussed in greater 
detail in the next chapter, including CAHF’s role in creating 
additional higher-paying paraprofessional positions in nursing 
homes.
 5. Multiemployer career ladders should have as their core objec-
tive the professionalization of the low-wage workforce. High-
quality multiemployer associations, especially high-quality 
industry associations and labor unions, are built on the idea of 
craftsmanship. Career ladder projects, to be sustainable, must 
be about improving craft in an industry sector as well as about 
higher wages. This professionalization is discussed in the next 
chapter as one of the principles underlying a sustainable skills 
upgrading system. 
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It is possible to identify elements of effective single-employer and 
multiemployer career ladders, and to identify examples of both that 
have been able to show wage gains linked to skill gains. But taken to-
gether, both single- and multiemployer projects exist today as relatively 
small pockets in the employment ﬁeld. Further, they have often been 
dependent on discretionary government training funds and have ceased 
operation when these funds have ended.
This has been the dynamic of career ladders for some years. For ex-
ample, during Jerry Brown’s two terms as governor of California, from 
1974 to 1982, he established a career ladder program, the California 
Worksite Education and Training Act (CWETA), that achieved some 
success in producing greater worker mobility. In the long-term health 
care subsector, for example, CWETA increased the movement of work-
ers from CNA to LVN and created new paraprofessional job categories 
such as geriatric technician. However, the program was funded using 
discretionary state training funds. Soon after the next governor, George 
Deukmajian, took ofﬁce, the program ended—the expertise, the experi-
ence, the structure, all lost.
In the years since Jerry Brown’s career ladders, other career ladder 
efforts in the state and nation, some of them effective, have come and 
gone. Practitioners have grappled with how to achieve a more sustain-
able skills upgrading system, and today sustainability remains a goal for 
most career ladder projects. The next chapter examines how workforce 
partners are used in achieving a sustainable skills upgrading system, as 
well as some of the principles that need to underlie such a system.
PART 3: THE AGRICULTURE CAREER LADDERS THAT 
DIDN’T DEVELOP
Governor Davis always spoke with emotion when he spoke about 
the farmworkers in California. These farmworkers perform the hardest 
physical labor, he would say. They do the work that other California 
workers do not want to do. They keep food on our plates at affordable 
prices. They deserve to make a decent living. 
Partly because of the governor’s strong views, improving the wages 
and job mobility of California’s farmworkers became one of our career 
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ladder priorities. But our efforts in this sector had less impact than in any 
other sector. Attempts to increase wages or mobility were undermined 
by the undocumented workforce that dominates California agriculture, 
as well as by the impacts of globalization on California agriculture.
Over four years, our career ladders in agriculture centered on an 
appealing career ladders effort already under way in 1999, run by the 
Farmworker Institute for Education and Leadership Development 
(FIELD). FIELD is a spinoff of the United Farmworkers, which is part 
of the AFL-CIO, and it set out to apply to agriculture the AFL-CIO’s 
“high-road strategy” of increasing wages through increasing skills. Da-
vid Villarino, a longtime union organizer and the executive director of 
FIELD, saw career ladders as bringing about wage increases through 
farmworker skills development leading to increased productivity. In a 
1999 speech, he described FIELD as being “as much about strengthen-
ing the agriculture industry in California as it is about beneﬁting farm-
workers.”
A few years earlier, in 1996, FIELD had joined with one of Califor-
nia’s unionized rose growers, Bear Creek Corporation in the southern 
Central Valley, on a career ladders effort for farmworkers in rose pro-
duction. FIELD and Bear Creek obtained government training funds 
to upgrade the skills of company workers in preparing and harvesting 
bare root roses. Bear Creek, a Japanese-owned company, also used the 
training to emphasize teamwork among employees, including collec-
tive problem solving.
According to FIELD, the project showed the effectiveness of skills 
upgrading for farmworkers. Although no independent analysis was con-
ducted, FIELD’s literature claimed that rose quality improved signiﬁ-
cantly, allowing Bear Creek to sell more of its roses at a higher grade. 
By 1999, according to FIELD, Bear Creek’s percentage yield of pre-
mium roses had increased by 54 percent over 1996. Over the three-year 
period, the number of workdays lost because of injury decreased by 800 
percent, and the average cost of a worker’s compensation claim plum-
meted from $27,000 to $1,200. For the workers, average hourly earn-
ings increased from $7.62 to $8.07, and piece-rate earnings increased 
from $11.13 to $16.12 (CalWIB and DOLETA 2002). 
The Clinton Labor Department saw Bear Creek Rose as a model of 
farmworker-employer cooperation, and in 1999 FIELD received near-
ly $800,000 from the department to set up a farmworker/grower train-
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ing institute, which FIELD named Strengthen Our Agribusiness Region 
(SOAR). Through the institute, farmwork would become professional-
ized, and productivity and wages would increase (FIELD 2002, pp. 4–5). 
Over the next two years, FIELD commissioned a series of research 
studies on three main crops of the San Joaquin Valley—table grapes, 
bare root roses, and citrus (Alvarado 2001; Kwass 2002; Means 2001; 
Mines and Shelley 2001). These studies broke down farmwork into dis-
tinct tasks. “While much of the work farmworkers do requires general-
ized physical skills,” a FIELD research report stated, “each crop has 
specialized tasks that a person must be properly trained to do correctly 
and efﬁciently . . . All of these skills take time to learn, and time to per-
fect before the worker is fully proﬁcient” (FIELD 2002, p. 10).
A study team from Bakersﬁeld College identiﬁed six distinct tasks 
in growing table grapes, including pruning, debudding, tipping, and ty-
ing. Table 6.6 lists the skill standards involved in one of these tasks, 
pruning. A farm workforce that mastered these skills would increase the 
grape industry’s productivity. At the same time, since table grapes were 
paid partly by piece-rate, the individual farmworker would increase his 
wages. 
Similarly, seven distinct skills were identiﬁed by the Bakersﬁeld 
College team in the growing of bare root roses, including brush cutting, 
saw shedding, de-eyeing, dethorning, counting, wrapping, and tying the 
bundles (Means 2001). 
In 2001, FIELD set out to put the research into practice and estab-
lish partnerships with growers, similar to the one with Bear Creek Rose. 
But the growers showed little interest. For the nonunion growers, the 
association with FIELD raised the prospect of letting the union into the 
workplace. Even the unionized growers saw little role for a formalized 
training program at a time when they were under pressure from foreign 
competition to keep wages low. 
Anthony Alvarado, a professor at Fresno State University and one 
of the FIELD researchers, noted at the time the difﬁculty of replicating 
the bare root rose training with other crops, including the main crops 
of citrus and grapes. With these crops, the premium was on physical 
speed and dexterity. As Alvarado wrote in his FIELD analysis of the 
citrus crop,
Virtually anyone in the central California region who is associ-
ated with farm labor would be able to pick an orange correctly, 
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10.
Table 6.6  The Craft of Farmwork: Skills in Pruning Table Grapes
Job 
classiﬁ cation Pruner
Job skill 
standards
Additional 
competency
Physical 
demands
1. Can demonstrate ability to distinguish between new wood 
and old wood from the previous year, which is different in 
color
2. Can demonstrate ability to distinguish between a spur and 
a cane and select appropriate spurs or canes to cut
3. Can demonstrate knowledge of the number of spurs or 
canes to leave, depending on variety of grape
4. Can demonstrate knowledge of spur/cane position to 
determine the right/left orientation on wires
5. Can demonstrate ability to determine weak/strong spurs/
canes for pruning
6. Can demonstrate understanding of grower’s instructions to 
determine the length of cuts and number of spurs/canes to 
leave on the vine
7. Can demonstrate knowledge of how and where to cut so 
as not to harm the plant, placing clean, sharp cuts at the 
proper distance from the trunk
8. Can demonstrate ability to identify parts of vine that no 
longer produce and remove them
9. Can demonstrate ability to properly utilize hand tools and 
equipment, including pruning shears and rip saw
Can demonstrate ability to inspect and maintain 
equipment; i.e., where to oil, when to change blades, and 
how much to tighten bolts as to not smash or tear the plant
1.   Moderate-level hand-eye coordination
1. Standing for extended periods of time
2. Repetitious hand, wrist, or elbow movement
3. Frequent bending, twisting, or reaching
4. Must have the ability to exert muscle strength repeatedly 
over time
SOURCE: Means (2001).
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knowing to clip the stem above the navel without damaging the 
branch or dislodging the navel from the fruit. However, nearly 10 
percent of a worker’s compensation in citrus harvest is piece rate. 
Compensation and, indeed, even qualifying for a crew requires a 
high level of proﬁciency and physical dexterity, even though the 
basic skill can be learned (according to workers) in an hour or two. 
(Alvarado 2001) 
Alvarado surveyed farmworkers, who told him that they would in-
vest their own time in job-related training if it would lead to higher 
wages. However, FIELD was unable to convince growers that training 
could yield greater productivity and justify higher wages.
Nor did the growers respond to a second career ladders strategy that 
FIELD put forward: cross-training to ensure an adequate workforce for 
growers among the different crops and to ensure a longer work year for 
workers. The limited work year was a main cause of the low average 
farmworker income. (In 1998, California farmworkers averaged less 
than 26 weeks of work.) Since harvests of the various crops come at 
different times of the year, FIELD saw an opportunity for improving the 
movement of workers between crops by serving as a central labor ex-
change for growers.5 However, growers were not interested in a FIELD 
central labor exchange. The growers had come to rely over the previous 
decade on a system of farm labor contractors supplying undocumented 
workers. The growers were reluctant to share workers among crops or to 
take any action that reduced their ability to call workers on demand.6
In late 2001, FIELD did implement a training program for farm-
workers that involved some specialized skills (mainly English as a 
second language [ESL]), as set out below in Table 6.7. The ESL train-
Table 6.7  FIELD’s Career Ladder Training for Farmworkers, 2002–2003
Course Length of course Number enrolled
English as a second language 10 wks. (night class)
5 wks. (day class)
442 (2002)
285 (2003)
Crop cross-training 2 days —
Forklift driving 3 days —
Pesticide application 1 day —
First aid/CPR 1 day —
NOTE: — = data not available.
SOURCE: Unpublished data from Farmworker Institute for Education and Leadership 
Development (FIELD).
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ing totaled 150 hours. In contrast, each of the four skills trainings—in 
crop cross-training, forklift driving, pesticide application, and ﬁrst aid/
CPR—was less than 20 hours.
This structure of training reﬂected the desires of the farmworkers—
nearly all foreign-born—to learn English, and the farmworker response 
to the training was huge. FIELD set up training in three small agricul-
tural communities outside of Bakersﬁeld: Delano, Shafter, and Arvin. 
According to Bronwyn Mauldin, FIELD’s research director, having 
“the training locations near the ﬁelds allowed workers to attend class 
after work, and to walk or share transportation to classes. We had farm-
workers coming from their ﬁelds after work and taking classes.” A total 
of 442 farmworkers enrolled in 2002, and 285 in the ﬁrst half of 2003. 
All opted for the ESL training (Level 1 or Level 2),7 and about half took 
the crop cross-training. A third took the forklift driving or pesticide ap-
plication trainings.
Yet the goal of most of the farmworker students in learning English 
was not to advance in agriculture but to ﬁnd jobs outside of agricul-
ture. In fact, even in FIELD’s own worker testimonials, the participants 
speak of learning English to leave agriculture (FIELD 2003).   
• A 21-year-old participant: “My last job I worked for a Farm La-
bor Contractor, picking grapes, and I earned $6.75/hr. My reason 
for entering FIELD was to learn how to speak English and to ﬁnd 
employment out of the ﬁelds.”
• A 45-year-old participant: “My reason for entering FIELD was 
to learn English and to get a better-paying job. My last job I did 
ﬁeld work in grapes and almonds and earned $6.25 hour. My 
career goal is to be a cashier or receptionist.”
Other farmworker participants identify career goals of leaving agricul-
ture to become nurses and child care workers.
FIELD has not given up, and it continues to explore skills upgrad-
ing strategies to improve wages and mobility in agriculture. But up 
to this point, its efforts show the difﬁculty of installing career ladders 
when the employer community is not committed, despite very active 
marketing by FIELD. More basically, FIELD’s efforts show the limits 
of career ladders in an industry that has become dependent on a low-
wage workforce because of foreign competition and an availability of 
undocumented workers. 
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Phil Martin of the University of California, Davis, is California’s 
foremost authority on agriculture workforce studies, having studied the 
state’s agriculture workforce for more than 20 years. He is skeptical that 
any skills upgrading can lead to higher wages as long as there is a large 
pool of undocumented workers willing to work for lower wages. 
In an article for California Agriculture in early 2000, Martin and 
coauthor Ed Taylor observe that for many years now, agricultural labor 
organizers have striven to make farmwork more like other labor sec-
tors in California—that is, to obtain beneﬁts, more stable employment, 
and higher wages. However, for all their efforts, organizers have not 
met with much success—it all comes back to the fact that there is a 
large labor pool that will do the work for low wages. Instead of farm-
work becoming more like nonfarmwork in California, the opposite has 
happened: low-wage markets in nonfarmwork are coming to resemble 
those in farmwork—they have unstable employment and no beneﬁts.8 
For farmwork, Martin and Taylor (2000) see little prospect of change.
“The industry is built on a low-wage workforce,” they write. “As 
long as growers can get undocumented workers, they have little incen-
tive to invest in technology or any workforce training or systems that 
might improve wages.”9
Notes
 1. California Employment Training Panel, “One-Step Agreement for the Fairmont 
Hotel San Jose,” meeting of the panel, June 27, 2002, Sacramento, California.
 2.  For an overview of emerging career ladder programs throughout the nation and a 
ﬁne analysis of the challenges for practitioners, see Giloth (2003) and Kazis and 
Miller (2001).
 3.  Ahlstrand, Bassi, and McMurrer (2003) survey major employers on training pro-
vided to low-wage workers. Though they proﬁle a number of major employers 
who are investing in their low-wage workers, they acknowledge that most em-
ployers do not see the beneﬁts of doing so. The movement of low-wage work-
ers among ﬁrms, the costs of training (both direct costs and wages paid during 
training), and limited discretionary income for small and midsized ﬁrms, all are 
reasons why training is not conducted. The authors suggest that ﬁrms look at 
multiemployer organizations, which spread costs among employers in an indus-
try sector, as one means of overcoming these obstacles.
 4. Meeting at Beverly Enterprises, 1999.
 5. For example, over 80 percent of citrus workers in the San Joaquin Valley are 
employed in citrus in March and April, but less than 60 percent are employed in 
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May. In bare root roses, 80 percent of the workforce is employed in June and July 
but less than 30 percent in February. FIELD estimates that over 50 percent of 
citrus workers also work in grape harvest season, and 30 percent of grape work-
ers also work in citrus. However, although this cross-employment exists, there 
remains a gap between the current level and what might be achieved through a 
central labor exchange.
 6.  At EDD, we too tried to interest growers in a central labor exchange that would 
better coordinate worker movement among crops, but we achieved little suc-
cess. Bob Garcia, statewide head of EDD’s Job Service, met with growers in the 
San Joaquin Valley in 2001. They worried that they would not mobilize enough 
workers to meet their harvest needs. Garcia and Diego Haro, head of the valley 
Job Service ofﬁces, developed a labor exchange structure they called the Farm 
and Agricultural Recruitment Management System (FARMS). In FARMS, the 
EDD agriculture outreach workers would collect detailed information from em-
ployers on how many workers they needed and when they needed them. EDD 
would share this information with the farm labor contractors, the local EDD 
staff, and other growers, to coordinate workers among crops. “While this work-
force coordination makes sense for the industry as a whole, individual growers 
do not see it [as being] in their individual interests,” Haro reported after meeting 
with growers. “Each grower wants a workforce on demand, and has no incentive 
to share with other growers his contacts with farm labor contractors or workers. 
Such sharing is perceived as threatening a grower’s ability to obtain workers 
quickly when he needs them for harvest.” After a year, FARMS ended because 
of the lack of grower interest.
 7. These are levels set by FIELD; Level 2 is for workers with greater English pro-
ﬁciency.
 8.  In the same article, Martin and Taylor (2000) note that the agricultural labor 
market has not changed much over the past century in California. Since the early 
twentieth century, California agriculture has been dominated by agribusiness—
large farming businesses rather than family farms—employing seasonal work-
ers. “One remarkable feature of the California labor market is how little change 
there has been in the basic parameters over the past century—using bilingual 
middlemen to hire crews of seasonal workers,” they write. “A farmer from 1900 
would be bafﬂed by drip irrigation, vacuum cooling, and the widespread use of 
computers, but would be very familiar with the use of bilingual contractors and 
crew bosses to assemble immigrant farmworkers to perform seasonal harvesting 
tasks.”
   This system of seasonal workers generally works well in meeting the indus-
try’s needs in harvesting fruit and vegetables. Few crops are not fully harvested 
because of lack of workers. Hundreds of workers often are assembled on very 
short notice to harvest a crop in one part of a region—say, the Central Valley—
for three weeks or so, and then reassembled a short time later in another part of 
the valley. 
   But the system also means the agriculture industry has a workforce that lacks 
steady employment, receives low wages, and depends on government unemploy-
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ment insurance, housing, and health beneﬁts. This socializes the industry’s labor 
costs across the economy.
 9. In 1983, Martin anticipated this agriculture workforce dynamic continuing so 
long as there exists a large pool of undocumented workers. See Martin (1983).
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Principle Five: Maintaining Career 
Ladders for the Working Poor
Sustaining Effective Career Ladders Means 
Inﬂuencing the Structure and Craft of Jobs
Existing career ladder projects are developing from the ground up, 
in a marketplace of approaches. Individual union branches, industry 
associations, and state and local governments are all testing projects. 
Usually there is little contact between these projects, which are often in 
competition with each other for resources. The projects test what em-
ployers are willing to pay for, what workers are willing to invest their 
own time in, and what brings vertical or horizontal mobility or wage 
impacts. 
This is the way that a skills upgrading system should be built—not 
from a single uniﬁed or cooperative effort, but from testing, reﬁning, 
competing. In California’s hospitality sector, for example, career ladder 
projects are variously sponsored by unions, by nonunion employers, by 
the industry association, and by private training ﬁrms. They may provide 
short-term vocational English as a second language (VESL), longer-term 
VESL, individual career counseling, and speciﬁc technical skills.
Converting this dynamic process into a sustainable career ladder 
system involves building on the dynamism, not reducing it. Practitio-
ners will be challenged to expand their roles in skills upgrading in three 
main ways:
 1)  They must create sector-based partnerships that link workforce 
funds and foundation funds (both of which seed career ladder 
projects) with the local community college districts and joint 
labor-management trust funds that have been providing skills 
upgrading for years.
 2)  They must foster sector-based partnerships with employers and 
with workforce intermediaries that will inﬂuence the structure 
of mobility within a sector, not just the skills of workers.
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 3)  They must further encourage these sector-based partnerships 
with employers and workforce intermediaries to professional-
ize the low-wage workforces.1
PART 1: LINKING CAREER LADDERS OF THE 
WORKFORCE SYSTEM WITH COMMUNITY COLLEGES 
AND JOINT LABOR-MANAGEMENT TRUST FUNDS
Conferences and studies on America’s low-wage workforces usu-
ally emphasize what training doesn’t exist. Yet we should not overlook 
the signiﬁcant opportunities that low-wage workers do have today to 
gain skills through adult education or the community colleges, at little 
or no cost.
In the United States, we have built an impressive complex of what 
Norton Grubb of the University of California, Berkeley, has termed 
“second-chance institutions”: institutions for individuals who need to 
restart their work lives. This restarting may arise because of changes 
in the economy, or geographic mobility, or individual preference, or 
desire to advance in the workplace. The second-chance institutions in-
clude four-year colleges, which today are more open to older students; 
youth programs and dropout prevention programs; job training; welfare 
to work; proprietary schools; and community colleges.
At the individual level, these second-chance institutions allow peo-
ple to rejoin the economic mainstream. From a collective perspective, 
second-chance institutions allow the economy to adjust to changes in 
the requirements of work and to shortages and surpluses of labor. “They 
[are] part of the complex of institutions that have made our economy 
more ﬂexible and robust since the 1960s,” says Grubb (2001).
Community Colleges: Advantages and Limitations for  
Skills Upgrading
The community college system is the most extensive of the second-
chance institutions, especially for workers seeking new or better jobs. 
Skills upgrading for workers is not the sole mission of the nation’s more 
than 1,000 community colleges: the community colleges prepare high 
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school graduates for four-year institutions as the students earn a two-year 
associate’s degree from the community colleges. But skills upgrading is 
a main mission, and it covers literacy, English for foreign speakers, and 
technical skills. Technical skills, in turn, may include everything from 
dental hygienist to medical transcriber to auto mechanic.
Workers can attend classes, often at night, at little or no charge. An 
in-home health worker, for example, could attend a literacy course or 
an ESL course to improve her language skills for as short or as long a 
period as she desired. She could next take a course in a technical skill, 
say, that of a medical assistant, that could prepare her for a better-pay-
ing job. The language and technical classes for the most part are not 
dependent on discretionary government funds, as community colleges 
enjoy a dedicated source of education funds from the federal and state 
governments.
Four Reasons Community Colleges Make Effective  
Partners in Sustainable Skills Upgrading 
 1. Currently, there are more than 1,000 community colleges 
throughout the United States.
 2. The colleges offer classes in a variety of skills: literacy 
(English language training for native speakers), English as a 
second language, and vocational. They enable workers to take 
courses at night or on weekends to increase their skills, and at 
little or no cost.
 3. The colleges are expanding their reach in career ladders 
through “contract education” with employers. Having a 
contract links training more closely to skill needs identiﬁed by 
employers, and at times links it to immediate wage gains.
 4. The next step in sustainability is expanding the colleges’ 
entrepreneurism in contract education to provide additional 
workplace-based skills upgrading in concert with local 
workforce boards, employers and multiemployer associations, 
and joint labor-management funds. 
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However, in practice the community colleges have been limited in 
the impact they have on skills upgrading by both the limits of their re-
sources and their location outside of the workplace. Most community 
colleges have set up employer advisory committees that review cur-
ricula and suggest job leads. Despite that, the training, as it has been 
supported by federal and state education funds, has not been tailored to 
individual employers or to speciﬁc job advancements. 
Workplace-centered “contract education”
Community college districts throughout the country, in an attempt 
both to ﬁnd new sources of revenue for themselves and to increase their 
reach in skills upgrading, are becoming more entrepreneurial, market-
ing workplace-centered “contract education” to employers. Under this 
method, the colleges contract with one or more employers to provide 
skills upgrading that is tailored to workplace needs. The training in-
cludes both language and literacy training and speciﬁc technical train-
ing. The training can take place at the workplace or at the college.
David Gruber, a specialist in incumbent workforce training, was 
hired by several community college districts to develop contract ed-
ucation projects. In one project he developed, Mira Costa College in 
San Diego contracted with Beckman Coulter, a Fullerton, California, 
manufacturer of biomedical testing equipment, to train the company’s 
lower-level manufacturing workers. The 100 hours of training, custom-
designed for the employer, included laboratory safety and clean-room 
procedures, math and chemistry skills, and principles of ﬁltration. Upon 
completion, the trainees were guaranteed a wage increase from the 
$11–$12 an hour they were earning to $13 an hour. The employer paid 
wages for about two-thirds of the training, and the workers contributed 
their own time for the other one-third. Workforce funds were used to 
pay training costs.2
The workforce practitioner can ﬁnd in the community colleges a 
partner in designing and funding additional workplace-centered skills 
upgrading. Each skills upgrading project is likely to have a different 
mix of funding from the local workforce board, the local community 
college district, the employer, and, if applicable, the joint labor-man-
agement trust fund. In the case of Mira Costa College and Beckman 
Coulter, the community college district was paid for the training. In 
other cases, though, workforce practitioners should expect the commu-
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nity college to use its own resources for skills or remedial training as 
part of the funding partnership.
Restructuring education around career ladders
Community college districts already are looking at fulﬁlling a greater 
role in ongoing career education for workers—a role that goes beyond 
contract education for speciﬁc classes. For example, in 2000, the Cali-
fornia state community college board held hearings on the workforce of 
the future, which led to a July 2001 report titled Ladders of Opportu-
nity: A Board of Governors’ Initiative for Developing California’s New 
Workforce. The report argued that California community colleges were 
based in the “old economy,” which trained workers for speciﬁc techni-
cal skills. The colleges needed to structure their educational services 
around the concept of career ladders, deﬁned as “long-term career pro-
gression pathways to help individuals to advance.” To accomplish this, 
the colleges needed 1) to join with employers to identify the problem 
solving skills, critical thinking skills, literacy and language skills, and 
technical skills that would enable workers to be most productive; and 
2) to join their ﬁnancial resources with government workforce funds 
and employer funds (Board of Governors 2001).
The report’s recommendation of a $50 million “Career Ladders In-
novation Fund,” ﬁnanced by the state government, died when state bud-
get fortunes turned sharply downward in 2001. Still, the report’s vision 
of ongoing career education for a wide variety of workers continues to 
inform the colleges’ career ladder planning in the state. It has led the 
state college board to consider devoting a greater share of its dedicated 
funding to career ladders—especially in cases where other resources 
from workforce boards, employers, and joint labor-management trust 
funds are present. 
Labor-Management Trust Funds
While community colleges have been the main public sector institu-
tion for career ladders, a main private sector vehicle has been the joint 
labor-management trust fund for training. The trust fund is established 
by one or more employers and unions through a collective bargaining 
agreement, under the provisions of the Taft-Hartley Act of 1947. The 
employer contributes a percentage of gross payroll or hourly wages for 
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training. The employers and unions jointly decide on the use of the 
training funds. 
The building trades for decades have sponsored the most extensive 
trust funds for training, as part of their extensive apprenticeship pro-
grams. Other major trust funds for training exist in unionized manufac-
turing ﬁrms, notably in the automobile and aerospace sectors, as well as 
in the major unionized communications ﬁrms.
Nancy Mills, head of the AFL-CIO’s Working for America Institute, 
the union’s center for skills upgrading and career advancement, notes 
that the trust funds have taken several forms. In sectors such as steel, 
autos, and communications, where employment has declined, trust 
funds have been generously funded by large employers to assist work-
ers in retraining for other sectors, as well as in advancing within the 
Joint Labor-Management Training Trust Funds  
as a Partner In Sustainable Skills Upgrading
 1. Currently, the joint labor-management training trust fund, by 
which one or more employers agree to contribute a percentage 
of payroll or an amount per hour worked to a training fund, 
has been a main private sector vehicle for funding career 
ladders. Major trust funds have been negotiated over the past 
half century by the large unions in several sectors, including 
the construction building trades, steel and automobile 
manufacturing, communications, hospitality, and health care.
 2. The trust funds support various kinds of training, such as 
tuition reimbursement at four-year colleges and community 
colleges, career counseling, and targeted skills upgrading. 
 3. The trust funds do compete for and receive workforce training 
funds on speciﬁc projects.
 4. The next step in sustainability is to build on the trust funds’ 
resources, sector knowledge, and existing links with workforce 
funds and community colleges, for a wider skills upgrading 
reach.
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sector. To give two examples, the Communications Workers of America 
created the Alliance for Worker Education, and the United Steelworkers 
of America created the Institute for Career Development. Both offer a 
broad variety of career training for members.3
In health care, major trust funds have been established for training 
by the giant health care unions, Service Employees International Union 
(SEIU) Local 1199 in New York (under whose plan health employers 
contribute 0.5 percent of gross payroll) and the American Federation of 
State, County, and Municipal Employees (AFSCME) District 1199 in 
Philadelphia (whose health employers contribute 1.5 percent of gross 
payroll). The trust funds offer general career advancement opportuni-
ties through tuition reimbursement at colleges and community colleges. 
They also offer targeted trainings for technical skills to advance within 
the workplace.
The challenge of expanding training trust funds
Expanding trust funds for training to additional ﬁrms and sectors of-
fers opportunity for sustainable skills upgrading, at least among union-
ized employers. But even among these employers, expansion will not 
be easy, given the other demands on employers and unions. Even in the 
fastest growing sector, health care, the trust funds of SEIU Local 1199 
in New York and AFSCME District 1199 in Philadelphia are excep-
tions. These funds reﬂect both the inﬂuence of these two mature unions 
and the prevalence of public sector health facilities in their jurisdic-
tions. Their replication is difﬁcult.
In northern California, the main union for low-wage health workers, 
SEIU Local 250, researched training trust funds in 2004 and announced 
it was making the trust fund a part of its upcoming contract negotia-
tions with its largest employer, Kaiser Permanente. At the time of the 
announcement, Ed Chiera, Local 250’s training advisor, pointed to the 
medical assistant and acute care nurse assistant training that Kaiser and 
Local 250 collaborated on as showing that “a company’s investment in 
upgrading can be justiﬁed ﬁnancially in reduced recruitment costs and 
increased retention.”4
However, Kaiser already maintains extensive tuition-reimburse-
ment programs for employees and has invested over $2 million of its 
own money in recent career ladder projects with government, so the 
trust fund becomes an additional training expense. The union in turn 
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indicated that the trust fund may be a lower priority in bargaining than 
maintaining low-cost health care beneﬁts for the union membership and 
other dollars-and-cents issues. 
Yet, especially with globalization intensifying the competitive en-
vironment for nearly all unionized sectors, a greater reach for training 
trust funds need not be the sole responsibility of employers and unions. 
Unions and training trust funds today apply for and win government 
and foundation training funds, and partnerships with the workforce sys-
tem are nothing new.5 For the workforce practitioner, the challenge is to 
pull together the trust funds, community colleges, and workforce funds 
in ways that encourage all partners to contribute. At the same time, as 
employers and unions see their training trust-fund monies leveraged in 
the workforce system, they have incentive to expand the number and 
size of these funds. 
PART 2: INFLUENCING THE STRUCTURE OF JOBS, NOT 
JUST THE SKILLS OF WORKERS
As practitioners are able to build ﬁnancing partnerships for ongo-
ing skills upgrading, they build greater mobility into the ﬁrm or indus-
try. Mobility increases as training becomes a beneﬁt offered to a wider 
range of workers and as skills upgrading and promotion become an 
industry practice. 
However, practitioners also have the opportunity, by utilizing train-
ing resources, to more directly affect the structure of jobs and mobility. 
This is not a role that practitioners traditionally have played: we tradi-
tionally have focused on the skills of workers. However, in a couple 
of major sectors, health care and day care, government reimbursement 
structures could be shaped to reward skills upgrading. In a wider num-
ber of sectors, practitioners could strategically utilize job training re-
sources to spur advancement through creating additional paraprofes-
sional opportunities.
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An Approach Taken in the Nursing Home Industry
Let me illustrate with an example from the long-term health sector. 
As described in the previous chapter, nursing homes became a cen-
ter for career ladder efforts in California because of the enthusiasm of 
the industry association, the California Association of Health Facili-
ties (CAHF). CAHF started with a program to increase the mobility of 
CNAs to LVNs, and it linked funds from community colleges, employ-
ers, and government job training to pay for it.
However, CAHF soon recognized the limits of this approach. While 
its projects by late 2001 represented an expansion of CNA-to-LVN 
training, they still reached only a small number of CNAs in Califor-
nia—around 300–400 participants, or less than 1 percent of the CNAs 
in long-term care. 
Beyond the limited numbers, though, there were other limitations 
to the CNA-LVN job ladder. Many CNAs were not good candidates for 
classroom training, either because they were recent immigrants without 
basic English skills or because (whether from learning disabilities or 
learning style) they did not succeed in classroom settings. But just as 
importantly, many CNAs were quite competent in direct patient care 
and brought a personal commitment and skill to their jobs. “What sense 
does it make to take these workers out of direct care?” Bob Marr often 
asked in career ladder discussions at EDD. “Wouldn’t they—and nurs-
ing home patients—be better off if they remained in direct care, with 
higher pay and increased responsibility?”
So, in 2001, CAHF joined with EDD and the Paraprofessional 
Healthcare Institute (PHI), a Bronx-based group specializing in train-
ing for the healthcare workforce, on an alternate strategy: creating new, 
intermediate job categories between CNA and LVN. These would be 
positions of higher pay and responsibility than CNA, but still within di-
rect care. Three intermediate job categories were identiﬁed, as shown in 
Figure 7.1: senior nursing assistant (SNA), restorative nursing assistant 
(RNA), and certiﬁed memory impairment specialist (CMIS).
Instituting the senior nursing assistant
The SNA became the ﬁrst paraprofessional position we targeted for 
employer recognition. As PHI’s president, Steven Dawson, explained, 
the SNA was to be an experienced and trained CNA whose job was to 
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Figure 7.1  Five Steps in Forming New Intermediate Job Categories  
between CNA and LVN
 1. Create intermediate career steps recognized by the long-term care 
industry.
 2. Expand capabilities and responsibilities for CNAs, making the 
positions more attractive.
 3. Provide an hourly wage differential for experienced CNAs.
 4. Provide added value to employers and care recipients.
 5. Enable employers to identify CNAs with high potential to advance to 
LVN positions, and enable CNAs to recognize their capacity to train 
and advance.
SOURCE: Unpublished diagram from California Association of Health Facilities.
Licensed vocational nurse
Certiﬁed memory 
impairment specialist
Senior nursing 
assistant
Restorative nursing 
assistant
Nursing assistant
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mentor other CNAs.6 For employers, the SNA could reduce the turn-
over among CNAs and increase employee morale. For CNAs, the SNA 
represented an opportunity to advance in responsibility and pay.
Establishing a new paraprofessional position like SNA required one 
of two actions. First, the state could recognize the SNA in its reim-
bursement structure and reimburse employers at a higher rate for SNAs. 
This proved not to be feasible in the short run, since California’s reim-
bursement structure was not open for alteration by the governor and 
legislature until 2004. Alternatively, CAHF could advocate the SNA as 
a good practice, and state government could promote the position by 
underwriting certain training costs.
We followed the latter course, and CAHF developed a model 80-
hour training curriculum for the SNA: 40 hours of classroom training, 
followed by 40 hours of on-the-job training—primarily leadership and 
mentoring skills. Employers were offered training funds to cover the 
80 hours if they agreed to a wage increase of at least $1 upon training 
completion.7 
The ﬁrst project off the ground involved Life Care Centers, a na-
tional nursing home operator with several facilities in the San Diego 
area. In early 2002, Life Care received nearly $400,000 in state ETP 
funds 1) to train 105 housekeeping, laundry, and dietary aide staff to 
become CNAs; and 2) to train 140 CNAs to become SNAs. The 140 
SNAs would be trained over a period of years.8 
Results of adding SNAs
The ﬁrst class of ﬁve SNAs completed training in late 2002, and 
three months later the employer expressed satisfaction with their ini-
tial performance. Life Care’s head of operations, Tom Skiba, described 
the SNAs as showing value in promoting teamwork and in sharply re-
ducing absenteeism, thus saving money for Life Care on registry use 
(The registry was an expensive option for Life Care: it cost $23 an 
hour for a registry CNA compared to slightly more than $12 an hour 
for an employee). Skiba also claimed that the SNA signiﬁcantly aided 
his recruitment. “Word of mouth about an employer spreads quickly,” 
he explained, “and the SNA is a good selling point to recruit and retain. 
Workers see it as a goal they can work for.”9 The SNAs at Life Care 
received an immediate $1 an hour increase, with incremental increases 
up to an additional $1 over the next year.10
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CAHF did its own examination of Life Care’s SNA program and 
conﬁrmed a decline in registry use, reduced absenteeism, and improved 
morale among CNAs. In early 2003, CAHF allocated $600,000 of Work-
force Investment Act (WIA) funds—the money came from a larger WIA 
grant from EDD—to fund other employers in creating paraprofessional 
positions and training CNAs for these positions. Table 7.1 summarizes 
the training, which included SNA and two additional paraprofessional 
job categories: restorative nurse assistant (RNA), representing skills in 
physical therapy, and certiﬁed memory impairment specialist (CMIS), 
representing skills in the treatment of patients with Alzheimer’s and 
other memory disorders.11
In return for training funds, employers agreed to pay wages during 
training time, promote the CNAs upon training completion, and provide 
an immediate pay increase of $0.75–$1.25 an hour.12 The employer re-
sponse was strong, with 70 employers volunteering for the training of a 
total of 250 SNAs, and about an equal number of employers volunteer-
ing for the training of 124 RNAs and 300 CMIS workers.13 
The creation of these new job ladders in long-term care has been 
accompanied by questions concerning the next steps for CNAs pro-
moted to the new paraprofessional positions (the LVN remains a big 
jump), and has been hampered at times by the lukewarm support of 
some health care unions.14 Still, these new paraprofessional positions 
are showing some staying power. CAHF reports that employers are 
continuing to recognize the new advanced positions and train for them, 
even as government training funds have run out.  
Efforts in Other Industries
Our efforts to create new intermediate positions in other industries 
met with mixed results. We spent a lot of time investigating opportuni-
ties for new job ladders in child care, given the high turnover among 
child care workers and the absence of wage mobility for the workers 
who stayed. However, in California the industry’s economics were such 
that employers, faced with small proﬁt margins and an inelastic price 
structure, had little incentive or ability to create new positions that of-
fered higher pay.
Still, even in child care a few projects got off the ground, by which 
training was linked to new promotional opportunities for low-paid child 
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Table 7.1  Purposes and Results of CAHF Skills Upgrading
Job category Duties and characteristics Career ladder pilot/model
Senior nursing 
assistant (SNA)
• Stable, longer-service CNAs 
recognized with $1/hr. wage 
differential, special duties.
• SNAs serve as peer leaders and 
mentors for newer CNAs.
• SNAs relieve some of the workload 
from licensed nurses.
In 2002, a pilot SNA career ladder project with Life 
Care Centers trains 140 SNAs, achieving lower 
turnover and reduced need for temporary registry 
workers. A second multiemployer SNA training 
program conducted by Santa Monica College reports 
similar results.
In 2003, CAHF allocates funds to 70 member 
facilities to train 250 SNAs.
Restorative nursing 
assistant (RNA)
• CAHF provides CNAs with additional 
training and $0.75/hr. wage increase.
• Employers and residents beneﬁt from 
improved restorative care services.
• CAHF provides industry-recognized 
certiﬁcation. 
In 2003, CAHF member facilities train and upgrade 
124 CNAs to be RNAs in a ﬁrst phase of RNA 
training.
By late 2003, additional RNA training is to be fully 
funded by member facilities, including Country Villa 
Health Care and Life Care.
Certiﬁed memory 
impairment specialist 
(CMIS)
• Training focuses on providing 
improved care for residents and on 
delaying the onset of Alzheimer’s. 
• CNAs who complete course receive 
$0.25/hr. wage increase.
In 2003, CAHF member facilities train 300 CMIS 
workers statewide.
SOURCE: Author’s compilation of unpublished material from California Association of Health Facilities.
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care workers. The San Bernardino Workforce Investment Board had 
been training low-income individuals to become entry child care work-
ers through a 12-week class at San Bernardino Valley College. It added 
a child care career ladder by which employers who agreed to recognize 
promotional positions, including associate teacher and master teach-
er, received funds to pay for training and the workers’ wages during 
training (Marr 2003). The North Bay Employment Connection tried 
a similar link of training funds to promotional child care positions.15 
The largest effort was by California’s Children and Families Commis-
sion, administrator of the state’s tobacco tax fund. In an attempt to cre-
ate higher-paid paraprofessional positions, the commission committed 
$18 million a year for challenge grants to counties. To receive funds, 
the counties agreed to augment the wages of child care workers who 
completed additional course work at community colleges.16 
In the hospitality industry sector, the interface of training and job 
structure took the form of increasing horizontal mobility. Among the 
larger, mainly unionized hotels, the job structure is closely set by the 
collective bargaining agreement between the hotel and the union, and 
there is little ﬂexibility for the employer to create new positions.17 
Among the smaller, mainly nonunion hotels, the divisions, such as food 
service and front desk, are not large enough to accommodate a variety 
of positions. However, most lower-level hotel workers, in both union 
and nonunion facilities, can increase their hours as they cross-train, and 
as hotels increase ﬂexibility to move among divisions. 
This is what occurred after September 11, 2001, and the resultant 
downturn in the hospitality sector in California. The lower-level work-
ers in hotels saw their hours cut sharply. The employers, unions, and 
workforce practitioners shifted career ladder efforts away from verti-
cal mobility and toward expanding the structure of horizontal mobil-
ity. The government funded training for workers in vocational English 
language; it also funded opportunities for work hours in various hotel 
divisions. The employers and unions relaxed policies blocking move-
ment among divisions. 
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PART 3: THE PROFESSIONALIZATION OF THE LOW-WAGE 
WORKFORCE
At the core of any sustainable system will be a change in how the 
low-wage workforce is viewed. In a sustainable system, low-wage 
workers do not view themselves, nor are they viewed by employers, as 
an unstable, transitory workforce, interchangeable and without skills. 
Rather, they are part of a profession. Like other professionals, they per-
form their tasks with an emphasis on quality and craft. In this regard, 
career ladders are not only about improving the wages of low-wage 
workers; they are equally about instilling a high quality of service in 
nursing homes, child care centers, and hotels. 
Increased mobility and career ladder structures contribute to this 
professionalization. Advancement opportunities and accompanying 
training are a motivation for a worker not only to stay in a job but to per-
form tasks with effort and care. Further, professionalization requires an 
understanding of the craft inherent in all jobs. This includes the craft in 
jobs like CNA or child care worker, often described as low skilled. It is 
this craft that the better training organizations recognize and promote.
The Culinary Training Academy
The Culinary Training Academy in Las Vegas was established in 
1992 by the Las Vegas–area HERE union, Culinary Union Local 226, 
and by the major Las Vegas hotels. By 2002, it had an annual budget 
of over $2 million and was training more than 2,000 workers a year. 
Around 60 percent of the trainees were new workers in the industry, and 
40 percent were incumbent workers.18
The academy promotes artisanship and craft in the entry-level hos-
pitality jobs of room attendant and steward as much as it aims to help 
the workers in these jobs advance. Its ethos of craft is similar to that 
expressed by the waitress who said in Studs Terkel’s Working (1972, 
p. xii), “When I put the plate down, you don’t hear a sound. When I 
pick up a glass, I want it to be just right. When someone says, ‘How 
come you’re just a waitress?’ I say, ‘Don’t you think you deserve being 
served by me?’”
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Steven Horsford, president of the Culinary Training Academy, grew 
up in the industry—his mother worked in a casino. “Some people see 
the jobs as steward or porter or housekeeper as unskilled,” he says, “but 
people who know the industry know that these jobs require a craftsman-
ship, and that’s what we promote at the academy.”19
The craft of housekeeping
The academy is an example of an organization that fosters both craft 
and mobility. It concentrates its training on housekeepers, stewards and 
porters, and food and beverage workers. The housekeeper training is 
50 hours in length and results in an academy certiﬁcation. Though no 
trainees are paid during training, they do have incentive. As Horsford 
notes, “The hotels generally require experience, especially the better 
hotels. So, if someone without experience applies, the hotels often will 
refer them to the culinary academy, or if someone goes to the union to 
apply, he or she will be referred to the academy. Since we work closely 
with the large hotels, completion of the housekeeping training almost 
always results in a job.”20
The housekeeper training is held in ﬁve apartments at a west Las 
Vegas public housing site. The ﬁve apartments have been converted to 
look like high-priced hotel rooms, with dark wood furniture, chrome, 
and mirrors. The instructors are Bernice Thomas, who worked ﬁrst as a 
housekeeper and then as assistant executive housekeeper at the Dunes 
for more than 20 years, and Hattie Canty, a longtime housekeeping su-
pervisor at the Thunderbird.
Both Thomas and Canty speak of the craft of housekeeping: mak-
ing beds with the proper corners, correctly dusting the furniture, safely 
handling cleaning materials. “Each hotel has a different way of making 
a bed, and the trainees learn these different ways,” Thomas explains as 
a trainee, a 35-year-old woman, is preparing a bed. “The hotels also are 
very strict about coming to work on time, so we emphasize that. I had 
a trainee come in 15 minutes late today, and he said that he overslept, 
so I sent him home and told him to come back tomorrow because at the 
hotels you have to be on time.”21
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Wages and acquiring the requisite skills
The academy’s emphasis on craft is bolstered by the relatively high 
wages paid to unionized housekeepers and food service workers in Las 
Vegas. Housekeepers in Las Vegas can earn around $24,000 a year, 
which goes much further in Las Vegas than in other major cities. As 
Horsford notes, “John Wilhelm, the international head of the HERE 
union, who got his start in Las Vegas, says that Las Vegas is the last 
place a maid can own a home and drive a nice car.”22
For the food and beverage workers—both aspiring and incum-
bent—training is held at a former casino and Chinese restaurant at Sev-
enth and Fremont, near downtown. The training is part of a restaurant 
and catering business that is managed by the union. New workers are 
trained as cook’s helpers, and new and incumbent workers are trained 
as prep cooks and fry cooks.
The cook’s helper is the entry-level position in food service, and 
pay starts at $11.07 an hour with full beneﬁts. The training is for six 
weeks, or 210 hours. As in housekeeping, trainees receive no pay dur-
ing training. Given the demand for cook’s helpers in Las Vegas hotels, 
a job placement is almost guaranteed.
The prep cook and fry cook trainings are 400 hours and are aimed 
at incumbent workers in the cook’s helper and other entry-level posi-
tions as well as at new workers. Through the union, cook’s helpers in 
the hotels are encouraged to take the upgrade training, and hundreds do 
so on their own time.
Indeed, in all job categories incumbent workers are encouraged to 
obtain additional skills. On a morning in December 2002, four workers 
from Caesar’s Palace were at the academy. “These workers previously 
worked at one of the hotel restaurants, the Magical Forest,” Horsford 
says. “But it closed, and the hotel is now converting it from a buffet-
style restaurant to a ﬁne dining restaurant, so these workers are training 
with us to be competitive in the new ﬁne dining restaurant.”23 In other 
words, no jobs are guaranteed—the workers will have to acquire the 
requisite skills if they want to apply for a job at the new restaurant.
The Culinary Training Academy receives government training 
funds from time to time, but it is not dependent on government funds. It 
has its own joint union-management trust fund, ﬁnanced by employers, 
who contribute three cents for each hour worked by an employee.
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The Paraprofessional Healthcare Institute
A second example of how training organizations promote craft as 
well as mobility in low-wage jobs can be found in the training of the 
Paraprofessional Healthcare Institute (PHI). PHI is the policy arm of 
Cooperative Home Care Associates, a worker-owned cooperative of 
more than 500 home health workers, in operation since 1985 and head-
quartered in the South Bronx. PHI works with local and state govern-
ments and foundations on practices to improve both the in-home health 
care and nursing home workforces.24
In a 2001 article for Generations magazine, “Direct-Care Health 
Workers: You Get What You Pay For,” Steve Dawson, PHI’s president, 
and Rick Surpin, president of Independence Care System, maintain that 
“only by improving the quality of direct-care positions relative to the 
rest of the labor market can health care employers hope to recruit and 
then retain a stable paraprofessional staff.” Dawson and Surpin (2001a) 
list ﬁve job characteristics that will stabilize the paraprofessional work-
force. “A family wage” and “health insurance and beneﬁts” are the ﬁrst 
two characteristics, but the other three are nonmonetary: “opportunities 
for advancement and professional development,” “higher training stan-
dards,” and “workplace responsibility.”25
“A lot of women who go into long-term care really like the work,” 
Dawson said in my 2001 interview with him. “It’s true that many don’t 
have a lot of other options, but they like the one-to-one care, so money 
is not the only thing. Work issues are a big part of job satisfaction and 
stability. Like other workers, CNAs want autonomy and recognition in 
their jobs, and opportunities to advance.”
Bridging the gulf in education and skills
Dawson and PHI are involved in several career ladder projects that 
create levels of increasing pay and responsibility within the CNA cat-
egory.26 In these projects (some of which involve facilities owned by 
religious institutions) the CNA job is presented as a way of providing 
service to others. To be a CNA is to be part of a profession that serves 
others and that undertakes tasks with care and quality.27
An additional note relating to sustainability might be added on the 
extent of mobility paths, particularly on whether there are opportunities 
for low-wage workers to advance beyond initial, and relatively limited, 
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gains. In the long-term health care ﬁeld, career ladder efforts in Cali-
fornia and elsewhere have succeeded in creating additional paraprofes-
sional positions beyond CNA, which increase wages by a few dollars an 
hour. Beyond these paraprofessional positions, though, it is a big step 
in education and skills to the next step of LVN, which is not realistic 
for most direct care workers. Similarly, in the acute care settings, career 
ladder programs have taken low-wage workers to paraprofessional po-
sitions such as pharmacy technician and laboratory technician. But be-
yond these paraprofessional positions lies a gulf in terms of the educa-
tion and skills needed to become a pharmacist or a laboratory scientist.
Up to now, career ladder projects have not bridged the gap in many 
subsectors between paraprofessional positions and higher-skilled, high-
er-paid jobs. Yet just as we saw in Chapter 4 that there is no set number 
of jobs in the economy—that the number of jobs will increase as the 
skills and motivation of workers increase—so too there is no set num-
ber of mobility paths. Only as we build sustainable, sector-based career 
ladder systems will we be able to determine the extent to which the 
workforce system can increase mobility across the economy. 
Notes
 1. Professionalization of the low-wage workforce is an important concept in how 
we address low-wage jobs, though it is also a difﬁcult concept to deﬁne in a sen-
tence. Many of the low-wage workforces today—in nursing homes, child care 
centers, retail stores, and restaurants—are characterized both by high turnover 
and, at times, by low quality of service. The jobs are seen as throwaway jobs that 
not only pay low wages but have little status and are not perceived by the work-
ers who hold them (or by those whom these workers interact with) as being real 
careers. We would all beneﬁt if these jobs were regarded as worthy and important 
and the workers approached them with an emphasis on quality of service and 
long-term commitment, as do workers in what we regard as the professions, such 
as law, medicine, and civil service. Clearly, raising pay in these jobs would go 
a long way toward achieving these goals. However, other characteristics of the 
jobs are important, particularly the opportunities for advancement. This is why 
professionalization is so tied to mobility.
 2. David Gruber, interview with the author, January 2005.
 3. Nancy Mills, interview with the author, November 2004.
 4. Ed Chiera, interview with the author, May 2004.
 5.  There are examples today of training trust funds that have established ongoing 
partnerships to ﬁnance skills upgrading with one or more of the potential career 
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ladder design and funding partners: community colleges, employers, and private 
or public workforce funds. These sector-based partnerships are distinguished not 
only by the large number of workers in forms of training and the combination of 
funders, but also by how the partnerships have institutionalized mobility more 
fully into the job structure. Examples include the Culinary Union Training Cen-
ter in Las Vegas, the Garment Industry Development Corporation in New York, 
the Wisconsin Regional Training Partnership in Greater Milwaukee, and the two 
large health care trust funds, Hospital and Health Care Workers Union 1199C in 
Philadelphia and SEIU Local 1199 in New York.
 6.  “Currently the nurses are the supervisors of CNAs, and many nurses don’t know 
how to be supervisors,” Dawson says. “They can be autocratic, and this style will 
drive CNAs from their jobs. An experienced SNA can build teamwork among 
CNAs and help CNAs address the job’s physical and psychological challenges.” 
Interview with the author, May 3, 2001, New York.
 7.  EDD staff Anita McDaniel and Glen Varner contacted California’s major nursing 
home employers, including Beverly, Mariner, SunBridge, Life Care Centers, and 
Country Villa, to sell the SNA concept. “We met with management at each of 
the major nursing home employers and described how the SNA could help them 
reduce turnover, both by giving their CNAs a chance to move up and [by] having 
an experienced CNA in supervision,” Varner recalled in a 2002 interview with 
the author.
 8. California Employment Training Panel, “One-Step Agreement for Life Care Cen-
ter of Escondido,” meeting of the panel, March 27, 2002, Sacramento, California.
 9. EDD’s Anita McDaniel attended a ceremony for the ﬁrst SNA class and sent 
the following report: “Five SNAs completed the course and were pinned. 
On average, they have 8.5 years of service in nursing, and most of them 
have spent their careers at Life Care.  Their participation has stirred inter-
est with other long-term employees. Glen and I asked for feedback on the 
course itself from participants. All had positive remarks and recommended 
that other staff, particularly ﬂoor nurses, should participate in the process. 
 “The Executive Director, Tom Skiba, was exceptionally pleased with the out-
come. He indicated that the Career Ladder concept already has yielded beneﬁts 
in recruitment and retention. Just weeks before it advertised the availability of 
career ladders, Life Care was cited for stafﬁng shortages by the Department of 
Health Services. However, after the advertisement, the employer had such an 
inﬂux of applications that [Life Care] has ﬁlled all of [Skiba’s] vacancies, and 
has surplus applications. Further, since it was able to ﬁll those positions, its daily 
overtime cost has been cut by nearly [67] percent, going from 33.0 hours per 
day to just 12 hours per day. Life Care is saving a lot of money by not using any 
registry staff.” Anita McDaniel, e-mail message to the author titled “Life Care 
Center SNA Recognition Ceremony,” June 25, 2002.
10.  CNAs at Life Care after 90 days on the job earned between $9.70 and $10.95 an 
hour. The SNA range was $10.64–$11.70 an hour to start, rising to $12.05 after 
one year. 
 11. Ken Merchant, “Memorandum of Staff Recommendation for CNA Career Lad-
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ders Implementation and Training Slot Allocation,” January 7, 2003.
12.  EDD and CAHF hoped for a greater wage increase but found employers unwill-
ing to pay more, given the existing state reimbursement structure. Merchant, 
discussion with the author, 2003. 
13.  The 70 facilities received $640 per SNA for training: $600 to reimburse the em-
ployer for the cost of registry and the cost of overtime required to replace the 
trainee during training, and up to $40 to reimburse the employer for the cost of 
providing manuals and training materials. Employers agreed to pay the CNAs 
their regular wages while they attended the 80 hours of training. Merchant, dis-
cussion with the author, 2003.
14.  The health care unions in California have been divided in their views on career 
ladders. While some of their members support the approach, other unionists take 
the position that the answer to low-wage CNAs is not job ladders but raising the 
wages of all CNAs. Thus, they believe that their efforts should go into raising 
wages for CNAs rather than creating new advanced positions. 
 15. North Bay Employment Connection (NBEC), “NBEC Career Ladder Project 
Concept Paper,” 2002.
 16. Jane Henderson and Michael Bernick, memo to local WIB administrators 
titled “Second Round of Funds Available for Job Retention and Advance-
ment Incentives for Child Care Providers,” May 18, 2001. Child care has 
been a focus of career ladders throughout the nation, but the dysfunctional in-
dustry economics in California are present elsewhere. The U.S. Department 
of Labor tried to establish registered apprenticeships for child care workers 
in more than 30 states, including California. In California, child care work-
ers could obtain a child development associate certiﬁcation by completing 
2,000 hours of supervised on-the-job training and 108 hours of supplemental 
instruction. With this certiﬁcation, they would receive higher wages from em-
ployers who needed a skilled workforce and recognized the apprenticeship. 
Employers, though, had little incentive to recognize the apprenticeship. In 
contrast to the highly unionized building-trades sector, where apprentice-
ships were widely recognized and were required for public sector jobs, in the 
thinly unionized child care sector employers were under no such requirement. 
Throughout California, employers agreed that the wages paid, $16,000–$30,000 
for child care workers, made retention difﬁcult, and that additional training in 
preschool education and development would improve child care quality. But 
even if employers had funds to cover training costs, and even if workers gained 
additional skills, employers did not believe they could increase child care worker 
pay, given the unwillingness or inability of parents to pay more for the service. It 
is important to note that there is an informal job ladder that exists for child care 
workers today, by which they move into the public education system as teacher’s 
aides. The teacher’s aide position pays slightly higher wages, starting at $12–$13 
an hour, with beneﬁts, at most urban school districts in California. For a teacher’s 
aide there is upward movement possible to the position of teacher, though this 
requires a college degree. This informal job ladder does not work badly, though it 
takes persons out of the child care ﬁeld rather than strengthens the workforce.
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 17.  For example, among bartenders in San Francisco union hotels, there is the “regu-
lar bartender,” the “service bartender,” the “head bartender,” the “banquet bar-
tender,” the “bar helper,” and the “beer tender.” Information on the structure of 
jobs under the collective bargaining agreement is from Marilyn Sweet and John 
Carrese, memorandum titled “Career Ladders Grant (A Plan to Institutionalize 
an Education Culture in the Hospitality Industry),” January 3, 2001; and Labor 
Market Information Division, unpublished report to the governor’s ofﬁce titled, 
“Career Ladders in the Hospitality Industry,” December 2001.
18. Steven Horsford, interview with the author, December 5, 2002, Las Vegas.
19. Horsford, interview.
 20. Horsford, interview. 
 21. Bernice Thomas, discussion with the author during site visit, December 5, 
2002.
 22. Horsford, follow-up interview with the author, December 11, 2002.
 23.  The hospitality workforce in Las Vegas, as in California, has turned in the past 
decade from one with a high representation of African Americans at most posi-
tions to one dominated by immigrant Latinos. Thus, VESL training has become 
a part of all of the academy’s programs.
 24.  The cooperative recruits primarily unemployed women, the majority on welfare, 
and trains and hires them to be in-home health workers. It pays workers wages 
at the higher end of the in-home health care scale in New York—around $6.50 
an hour to start, advancing to $8.00 an hour—with health care and retirement 
beneﬁts.
 25.  For other publications on CNA professionalization, see Dawson and Surpin 
(2001b) and Paraprofessional Healthcare Institute (PHI) (2001).
 26.  In Memphis, a Catholic-sponsored nursing home created three CNA levels (with 
training in patient specializations and pay increases of $0.50–$1.50 an hour). The 
home’s administrator claims that CNA turnover has decreased from nearly 100 
percent annually to 60 percent. In Philadelphia, Home Care Associates provides 
additional training for CNAs who ﬁnish six months of employment with positive 
supervisory evaluations. See Catholic Health Association of the United States 
(CHA) and Paraprofessional Healthcare Institute (PHI) (2003).
27.  In Business as a Calling: Work and the Examined Life, Catholic theologian Mi-
chael Novak (1996) writes of a career in business as a spiritual mission and a 
way of service to others. To Novak this means undertaking tasks with care and 
quality—not taking shortcuts. Novak is not focused on low-wage workers, but 
the principles of craft and service are the same.
127
8
Principle Six: Welfare Reform
Build on the Success of Welfare Reform 
with Targeted Postemployment Strategies
In California, the drop in the welfare rolls has been dramatic—over 
40 percent in the eight years from 1995 to 2003. Moreover, studies 
tracking welfare leavers in California during this time have shown rela-
tively high employment rates, as well as gains in household income.
Part 1 of this chapter examines the impacts of welfare reform in 
California: the many positive impacts, as well as the negative impacts 
that present the next challenge. Though the great majority of welfare 
leavers in California ﬁnd jobs, their attachment to and hold on these 
jobs is tenuous. Further, for a signiﬁcant number, their wages do not put 
them very far above the poverty line.
Part 2 examines government-funded efforts to increase the reten-
tion and even the wages of former welfare recipients. Among these 
are projects that involve intensive case management, computer-based 
learning from home, family learning centers, and more traditional class-
room training at community colleges. From these efforts we can iden-
tify guidelines for structuring postemployment services to maximize 
the reach of public and private funds and to build on the employment 
successes of welfare recipients over time. 
PART 1: HOW THE 1996 WELFARE REFORM CHANGED 
WELFARE IN CALIFORNIA
Figure 8.1 shows both the number of households on the welfare 
rolls in California and the state unemployment rate for the 31-year pe-
riod from 1974 to 2005. The welfare rolls reached a high of more than 
900,000 cases by July 1996 before starting a steady drop over the next 
eight years to fewer than 500,000 cases by July 2004.1
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The strong economy of the late 1990s was a factor in this welfare 
reduction. However, the economy alone cannot explain the continua-
tion of the decline after 2000. While the state’s unemployment rate did 
go down for most of the period from mid-1995 through early 2001, 
welfare rolls continued to decline in California even as unemployment 
was climbing from 2001 through 2003.
Further, in the 1980s, a strong economy did not lead to reduced wel-
fare rolls. The state’s unemployment rate fell from 11 percent in July 
1983 to under 5 percent in July 1990. During the same time, the welfare 
rolls increased continually, from more than 500,000 in July 1983 to 
more than 650,000 in July 1990.
More than the economy, the Personal Responsibility and Work Op-
portunity Reconciliation Act, the 1996 federal welfare reform, altered 
the dynamics of welfare in California—not only reducing the rolls but 
also increasing employment and earnings of welfare recipients. Imple-
mented through the establishment of CalWORKs in January 1998, 
welfare reform brought dramatic changes to the state’s welfare system, 
including the requirement that most adult welfare recipients be engaged 
in work or work-search activities, and the establishment of time limits.
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More importantly, welfare reform altered the orientation of county 
welfare departments and welfare caseworkers throughout California. 
Whereas previously welfare caseworkers looked at welfare recipients 
and asked, “How can we take care of these people?” after the imple-
mentation of CalWORKs the caseworkers began to ask, “How can we 
build on the strengths these people possess and help them become self-
sufﬁcient?”
In Los Angeles County, elected and appointed ofﬁcials for years 
had opposed work requirements and work-ﬁrst approaches. Yet by 1999 
the county welfare department had adopted the slogan, “A job, a better 
job, a career,” indicating a commitment to immediate work placements 
as well as mobility. Similarly, San Francisco County, long an opponent 
of any welfare restrictions, has adopted aggressive work placement 
goals for welfare caseworkers. Bruce Wagstaff is the longtime manager 
of welfare programs at the state’s Department of Social Services. As he 
puts it, “Welfare staff went from facilitators of public assistance to job 
developers and employment facilitators.”2
Several studies have been commissioned since 1998 by California 
government and private foundations to study welfare leavers.3 These 
studies show that beyond the drop in welfare rolls, the past few years 
have seen welfare leavers returning to welfare at lower rates than in 
the past and achieving higher employment rates and gains in house-
hold income. Four of the main ﬁndings of these reports are summarized 
below.
1.  Welfare leavers under CalWORKs show lower rates of re-
turn to welfare than welfare leavers in the past. In 2000, research-
ers Charles Lieberman and David Mancuso of the SPHERE Institute 
tracked welfare recipients who had left CalWORKs in 1998 and com-
pared their welfare rates of return (recidivism) to the rates of return of 
welfare leavers in two previous years: 1988, when the unemployment 
rate was running near 5 percent, and 1993, when the unemployment rate 
had risen to over 9 percent.
Figure 8.2 tracks return rates of single-parent families during the 
18 months after leaving. Only 17 percent of the 1998 welfare leavers 
returned to aid within a year, compared to 27 percent of 1993 leavers 
and 24 percent of 1988 leavers.4
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2.  Welfare leavers under CalWORKs achieve increased house-
hold earnings and income. A second, larger study of welfare leavers 
was conducted by a team with the Public Policy Institute of California 
(PPIC), led by Stanford economists Thomas MaCurdy, Grecia Marrufo, 
and Margaret O’Brien-Strain. This study, titled What Happens to Fami-
lies When They Leave Welfare, used EDD’s base wage ﬁle and other 
administrative data, as well as telephone surveys, to track 1,400 former 
welfare recipients in six Bay Area counties from 5 to 16 months after 
they departed the rolls. The study looked at several measures, including 
both household income and employment of welfare leavers.
Table 8.1 shows the average monthly earnings of welfare leavers. 
For one-parent families—the focus of welfare reform in California—the 
mean earnings are around $1,800 in the ﬁrst surveys at 5–10 months, 
climbing to $2,160 in the second surveys at 11–16 months.
The PPIC researchers also examined monthly income (earnings plus 
other income) and reported average monthly income of $2,411 for one-
One Parent Leavers: Percentage on Cash Aid by Month from Exit
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18
Months after exit
1988 Leavers 1993 Leavers 1998 Leavers
Figure 8.2  One-Parent Leavers: Percentage on Cash Aid by Month  
from Exit
NOTE: Statistics start with second month after exit because it is common for welfare 
recipients to be removed administratively for a month merely for not ﬁling the proper 
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Earnings and 
employment
Time after leaving CalWORKs
One parent Two parents
5–10 months 11–16 months 5–10 months 11–16 months
Percentage working 88 90 94 93
Distribution of 
monthly earnings ($)
Mean 1,799 2,160 1,947 2,160
Percentiles
10th 600 750 775 50
25th 1,000 1,100 1,200 1,150
50th 1,500 1,600 1,700 1,800
75th 2,200 2,500 2,700 2,750
90th 3,500 3,400 3,200 4,200
SOURCE: MaCurdy, Marrufo, and O’Brien-Strain (2003).
Table 8.1  Family Earnings and Employment of CalWORKs Leavers 
from 2003 Survey
parent leavers. This was sufﬁ cient to bring 71 percent of the one-parent 
leavers above the poverty line. The average monthly income of leavers 
in two-parent households, $2,275, raised 58 percent of them above the 
poverty line (MaCurdy, Marrufo, and O’Brien-Strain 2003, p. vii).
3.  Welfare leavers under CalWORKs show high employment 
levels. Table 8.1 also shows self-reported employment levels among 
welfare leavers. In the PPIC telephone surveys, 90 percent of the one-
parent households and 93 percent of the two-parent households report-
ed an employed adult at 11–16 months after leaving. A separate PPIC 
study of the EDD base wage ﬁ le yielded employed percentages of 77 
percent for one-parent families and 59 percent for two-parent families 
(MaCurdy, Marrufo, and O’Brien-Strain 2003, p. vii).
Both of these sets of employment numbers are above the employ-
ment rates found by other studies nationwide. The Manpower Demon-
stration Research Corporation (MDRC) reviewed leaver surveys from 
several states and concluded that 70 percent of leavers worked at some 
point in the year following their exit from welfare, though only 31–
47 percent worked in all four quarters of the year (Bloom et al. 2002, 
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p. 3). The Urban Institute reported that within two years of leaving wel-
fare, slightly less than 50 percent of welfare leavers were employed 
(with another 15 percent reporting either having worked recently or 
having a spouse employed). As MaCurdy, Marrufo, and O’Brien-Strain 
(2003) note, the various studies are difﬁcult to compare as they employ 
different deﬁnitions of welfare leavers and also different deﬁnitions of 
employment. However, even the lower ﬁgures show employment to be 
common among leaver households and well above employment rates 
among welfare recipients.5 
In Fiscal Year 1995 (July 1994–June 1995), the state’s Department 
of Social Services reported that 85,000 welfare recipients found em-
ployment. In Fiscal Year 1999, following welfare reform, that number 
jumped to 142,000. The economic gains of former welfare recipients 
cannot be overemphasized, given that even in early 2004 critics of wel-
fare reform in California continued to deny its positive impacts. Wel-
fare reform did not end poverty. But it did reorient a broken system of 
dependency in California. In doing so it reoriented welfare caseworkers 
to see the strengths, not merely the weaknesses, of welfare recipients.
4.  Limits of CalWORKs: Many welfare leavers, even when em-
ployed, are not far above the poverty line. The California studies, 
while identifying the many positive impacts of welfare reform, have also 
identiﬁed its limits: many recent welfare leavers, even those employed, 
ﬁnd it difﬁcult to rise very far above the poverty line, and a segment of 
the welfare leavers remains well below the poverty line. The PPIC study 
found that only 29 percent of the one-parent leavers that were still off 
welfare after 11 months (and 20 percent of the two-parent leavers) had 
income sufﬁcient to be above the low-income guidelines for Medi-Cal, 
and that 11 percent of these longer-term leavers had an income below 
70 percent of the poverty threshold. Income gains between the ﬁrst and 
second PPIC survey periods were modest, averaging $60–$70 a month. 
The SPHERE study found that one in three of the 1998 leavers had an 
income below the poverty level a year after exit, and that 14 percent had 
an income below 70 percent of the poverty threshold.
Moreover, several state studies have found that welfare recipients 
have a tenuous hold on jobs and considerable job turnover. These stud-
ies have found that between one-third and one-half of welfare recipients 
placed in a job no longer hold it after one year. Though the majority, 
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after losing a job, will go on to other jobs, the instability is healthy 
for neither employee nor employer. A recent MDRC summary of these 
state studies notes that while more than 70 percent of leavers work after 
they leave welfare, less than 50 percent show earnings in all four quar-
ters of the year.
PART 2: DESIGNING POSTEMPLOYMENT SERVICES TO 
INCREASE JOB RETENTION AND SKILLS
“Are there ways of increasing the stability of employment and even 
the wages of former welfare recipients?” 
Bob Marr posed this question at one of EDD’s ﬁrst meetings with 
the department’s workforce development branch in May 1999. Our 
welfare program at EDD from 1999 through 2004 sought to build on 
the successes of welfare reform, maintaining the job gains of welfare 
recipients while trying to improve skills and wages.
In designing a system of postemployment services for welfare re-
cipients, we found it helpful to build on the ﬁndings from three previous 
training initiatives for welfare recipients:
1)  National Supported Work Demonstration (“Supported Work”)
2)  National Evaluation of Welfare-to-Work Strategies (NEWWS)
3)  Post-Employment Services Demonstration (PESD)
These initiatives were distinguished by the large number of participants, 
the close tracking of employment and wages, and the use of a control 
group of similarly situated participants. Their chief ﬁndings are sum-
marized below.
Supported Work. The four-volume set on the National Supported 
Work Demonstration is the ﬁrst research study I placed on my book-
shelves in Sacramento in April 1999 (having carried it around in various 
ofﬁces for 15 years), for its ﬁndings are still fresh and relevant. Operat-
ing between March 1975 and December 1978, Supported Work focused 
on job placement and retention of the groups found by practitioners at 
the time to be hardest to reach: long-term welfare recipients (those on 
AFDC for 30 of the last 36 months), ex-offenders, ex-addicts (nearly 
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all heroin addicts), and youth (primarily youth with a criminal record). 
Among the Supported Work ﬁndings: the one group that showed ma-
jor gains was the long-term welfare recipients. The welfare population, 
especially women between 36 and 44 at the time of enrollment, proved 
good candidates for job training assistance, responding positively to 
this assistance in ways that the other groups did not.
NEWWS. The National Evaluation of Welfare-to-Work Strategies 
also showed the particular success of welfare recipients in job training 
programs, as well as elements of effective program design. NEWWS 
built on the Family Support Act of 1988 (FSA), the predecessor to the 
welfare reform of 1996. FSA set work search requirements for most 
welfare recipients and directed states to channel additional resources to 
employment and employability. NEWWS collected data from 11 man-
datory welfare-to-work programs, operating in seven sites, and collect-
ed data on more than 40,000 single-parent families (Hamilton 2002). 
The welfare recipients who participated in job training showed higher 
employment rates than the control group as well as higher earnings and 
lower welfare receipt rates.
NEWWS addresses a central debate among practitioners: whether 
welfare recipients gain more from training programs that aim to get per-
sons in jobs rapidly or whether they gain more from training programs 
that emphasize longer-term education, such as adult education and com-
munity college classes. Is work experience the best means of gaining 
skills and mobility in the labor force? Or, are welfare recipients better 
off improving their education and skills before trying to get jobs?
The surprising NEWWS ﬁndings: even over a ﬁve-year period, the 
direct placement approach resulted in higher employment and earnings 
than the education approach. Three of the four employment-focused 
programs produced larger gains in earnings over the ﬁve years than 
did any of the seven education-focused programs. The employment- 
focused programs also led to a greater reduction in welfare payments.6
PESD. The Post-Employment Services Demonstration measured 
the impact of providing postemployment services, primarily case man-
agement services, to assist welfare recipients to better retain jobs or 
regain employment quickly after a job loss. Between Spring 1994 and 
Fall 1996, four sites (Chicago; Portland, Oregon; Riverside, California; 
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and San Antonio) operated postemployment projects, enrolling welfare 
recipients who recently had found jobs. Counselors contacted these 
welfare recipients and provided individual counseling in dealing with 
job-related problems and in referrals for health care or child care pro-
viders, beneﬁt eligibility, or money management. More than 4,500 for-
mer or ongoing welfare recipients were enrolled among the four sites, 
with one-third to one-half at each site receiving program services and 
the others serving as the control group.
Overall, program participants did not show either signiﬁcantly in-
creased earnings or more steady employment than the control group. 
Among the control group, employment was fairly high, with 40 percent 
of the control group continuously employed in the same job during the 
ﬁrst year after enrollment and another nearly 20 percent continuously 
employed even though they had switched jobs. Only 21 percent had 
stopped working after losing their ﬁrst job.
New Postemployment Service Projects
In designing postemployment services, we cast a wide net, asking 
for proposals from private sector companies, local WIBs, and commu-
nity-based groups. The project ideas we received varied widely in ap-
proach and cost. Some of the ideas we rejected as too expensive; others 
as piling services on to services without requiring investment by the re-
cipients. Still others we rejected because they lacked clear performance 
outcomes.7 Between 1999 and 2004, we did fund 24 projects involving 
retention and skills upgrading for welfare recipients. 
What did we learn from these projects? Once more let me bring in 
Bob Marr, who joined me in compiling the following guidelines for 
structuring postemployment services. Bob studied our projects and oth-
er recent postemployment projects throughout the nation. The box on 
the next two pages summarizes the top ﬁve guidelines we culled from 
those projects.
To illustrate these guidelines, three projects are discussed in greater 
detail: 1) EDD’s “Welfare-to-Work Job Retention and Skills Upgrad-
ing,” 2) Riverside County’s “Employment Retention and Advance-
ment,” and 3) Goodwill’s “Go the Distance.”
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Bob Marr’s Guidelines in Structuring 
Postemployment Services for Welfare Recipients
1.  Retention is a top priority. As the Post-Employment Re-
tention Demonstration (PESD) showed, many welfare recipients 
are staying in jobs without government post-employment ser-
vices. Still, retention is a challenge for 30–40 percent of welfare 
recipients placed in jobs, and it is the top priority of post-employ-
ment services.
2.  It’s worth continuing to test whether retention can be 
increased by a low-cost, targeted case management focused 
on not losing a job or on rapid reemployment. Although PESD 
found little difference when case management services were pres-
ent, many practitioners in California believe that case manage-
ment has a role in the ﬁrst year or two for welfare recipients that 
lack signiﬁcant labor force participation. It’s worth continuing to 
test whether this is the case. With retention services not needed 
by many welfare recipients, case workers might carry large case-
loads yet focus their efforts on that small segment that can beneﬁt 
from assistance in keeping jobs or in rapidly getting another job.
3.  Skills upgrading is difﬁcult given the family responsibil-
ities and, often, the low basic skills of most welfare recipients, 
but take-up rates when skills upgrading is offered shows a 
willingness to participate among employed welfare recipients. 
When skills upgrading has been offered in California projects, 
30–40 percent of employed welfare recipients have taken up the 
training opportunities—a higher percentage than project adminis-
trators expected. While skills upgrading should not be pushed on 
all participants, welfare recipients might be made aware of low-
cost opportunities that they can pursue while employed.
4.  Experiences with skills upgrading so far suggest that 
it works best when it builds on employment, is individually 
based, and takes advantage of low-cost community college or 
adult education classes. The current Employment Retention and 
Advancement demonstration operating in California and through-
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1. EDD’s Welfare-to-Work Job Retention and Skills Upgrading 
Congratulations on completing the CalWORKs job club and on 
getting your new job! At this time, I would like to invite you to 
participate in EDD’s new Job Retention and Skills Upgrade Pro-
gram. We want to make sure you have what you need to keep your 
job, improve your skills, and later [get] promote[d] to a better job, 
either where you are now working or elsewhere. If you are inter-
ested, please call me, Dollie Hamilton, Case Manager, Employ-
ment Development Department.
This announcement went out in December 1999 to former Cal-
WORKs participants in the central Sacramento area who had found 
employment. Sacramento was one of two locations in the state—Oak-
land was the other—to test EDD’s Job Retention and Skills Upgrading, 
a pilot project to reduce job turnover and increase job skills among 
former welfare recipients. The project started in October 1999 with two 
employment counselors in Oakland and in March 2000 added two in 
Sacramento.
out the nation will help us to better understand skills upgrading 
for employed welfare recipients. Our experiences so far suggest 
that the type of training—literacy skills or vocational skills—will 
differ among participants, as will the amount of time a trainee 
can commit to training. Except in rare cases, training should not 
substitute for employment and should take advantage of low-cost 
community college or adult education classes.
5.  To achieve any sort of scale in post-employment servic-
es, welfare departments and related government-based em-
ployment services need to reorient their operations. Since the 
1996 welfare reform, welfare departments have effectively moved 
from facilitating income maintenance to facilitating employment. 
The next phase will be to institutionalize postemployment as part 
of the welfare staff mission, as is being done in Riverside County. 
Postemployment services will never reach a signiﬁcant scale if 
they are left only to nonproﬁts or community-based agencies.
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For years, both before and after CalWORKs, EDD’s Job Service 
branch has provided job preparation and placement services to welfare 
recipients. These services, geared for unemployed welfare recipients, 
usually ended within 30–90 days of job placement. But in Fall 1999, 
the Job Service proposed that it provide longer-term services—for at 
least two years—to consolidate and build on employment gains under 
CalWORKs.
As the Job Service’s proposal explains, “As EDD staff we see wel-
fare recipients and former welfare recipients often in unstable employ-
ment situations. We will use case management techniques to intervene 
to resolve employment-related problems and non-employment-related 
problems that threaten loss of job. If a welfare recipient loses a job, we 
will work with them to immediately ﬁnd another job. We will work 
with welfare recipients to build their skills, with emphasis on lower-
cost community college training.”8
Dollie Hamilton is one of the case managers in Sacramento. Her 
ﬂyer, sent to 200 former welfare recipients, brings a higher-than-ex-
pected result: more than 50 people contact her, of whom around two-
thirds enroll. “They want more money and know that they need greater 
skills,” Hamilton says. The participants are nearly all single parents in 
jobs paying less than $12 an hour.9
Hamilton or another counselor meets with each participant and 
writes a career development plan, identifying the skills, background, 
and interests of the participant, and training options for that person. 
The counselor identiﬁes resources for skills upgrading, especially the 
low-cost training options at the community colleges and adult educa-
tion centers. Small amounts of money—under $500 in most cases—are 
available for transportation or child care to help out a participant who 
can show a need for training.
In Oakland, the two counselors ﬁnd themselves focusing on job 
retention and reemployment; training is a secondary activity. October 
Vance is the Oakland site manager; a few months into the program she 
describes her ﬁrst seven participants and their tenuous hold in the job 
world:
“Three would like to get new jobs as soon as possible: One has a 
very rude employer, one is working [as a] temporary, on call; and one 
would prefer a different type of work. One likes her job but wants to 
look for a different work [location] when she has completed six months 
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on the job, because she has a very long commute. The other three are 
happy so far with their jobs, but are still in probationary status and want 
to keep their options open.”10
In Sacramento, though, training is a central program element and 
all participants are encouraged to improve their skills. A third or so of 
the participants do pursue some form of training, ranging from a once-
a-week GED or computer class to three-day-a-week community college 
classes for medical assistant or computer operator. Some examples of 
the individualized skills upgrade plans (with ﬁrst initials of participants 
used) are as follows: 
1)  J. (dispatcher, earning $5.75/hr.): “Take computer classes at adult 
education center and community college courses to become ad-
ministrative assistant.” 
2)  H. (receptionist, $7.00/hr.): “Enrolled in GED class, then take 
computer classes, prepare for ofﬁce assistant with the State, men-
tor to retain job.” 
3)  W. (seasonal clerk, $7.35/hr., on call): “Wants full-time job with 
the state, go to community college, take computer classes to en-
hance skills, mentor to retain full-time job.” 
4)  E. (chore worker, $6.50/hr., 30 hrs./wk.): “Wants to be resident 
care nurse, needs to get CNA certiﬁcate, refer to adult education 
and City College, keep motivated and continue mentoring.”11
The staff tracks participant employment and wages through regu-
lar telephone contacts and through use of EDD’s base wage ﬁle. Carol 
Grable, Sacramento site manager, keeps an eight-page chart listing each 
participant, his or her Social Security number, current job, and wage 
change since enrollment. Outcomes for a cross section of participants 
are described in the box on pp. 141–142; the histories depict a number 
of participants dropping out, despite the assistance, and others retaining 
their jobs or advancing in them.
When the federal government sharply reduces funds for EDD’s Job 
Service in 2003, the Job Retention and Skills Upgrading program, as 
one of the service’s nonmandated programs, is considered for closing. 
The following internal discussion ensues in October:12
Diego Haro, Job Service branch deputy director: “With limited 
staff resources, is this a better use of counseling staff than ﬁnding jobs 
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for unemployed welfare recipients or veterans or our other target unem-
ployed groups?”
Carol Grable, Sacramento site manager: “We have tracked par-
ticipant jobs, wages, and training. Of the 476 participants, 375 are em-
ployed and still in program contact as of October 2003, with 42 out 
of work. The remainder have moved or [have] lost contact. 216 have 
received a wage increase since enrollment, and nearly a third have en-
rolled in some form of training.”
Bob Marr, Director’s Ofﬁce: “Evaluating these numbers is difﬁ-
cult since there is no control group. Remember, PESD found that around 
60 percent of former welfare recipients in the control group maintained 
continuous or steady employment over at least a year, so it’s not as if 
without services the participants likely would be unemployed. At the 
same time, the program costs are small, with use being made of the 
community colleges, and the program staff believes the program is of 
value, which is important.”
Carol Grable: “I’ve been at EDD for over 30 years, and this is one 
of the best programs I’ve seen. We do keep expenditures low. About a 
third of the participants are taking classes, particularly to be medical 
technicians or assistants, or to learn computer programs, or to become 
certiﬁed for higher-paying security jobs. Nearly all of the training is 
done through the community college. The total cost of the supportive 
services for all 476 participants has been less than $100,000.”
It is decided to keep the project going for another year, adding a 
control group of welfare recipients in Sacramento recently placed in 
jobs. To pay for the two counselors, Carol Grable agrees to cut two 
staff positions elsewhere. The community colleges and low-cost adult 
education classes become the training vehicles, and the few proprietary 
school enrollments end.
2. Riverside County’s Employment Retention and  
Advancement (ERA) 
In 1999, Riverside County, active in several major welfare demon-
strations in California over the past two decades, launches an extensive 
skills upgrading effort for employed welfare recipients. Chief among 
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Participants in the Sacramento Welfare-to-Work Skills 
Upgrading: Case Files on Enrollment Goals and Results13
1. Bridget M. Enrollment case ﬁle: “A single parent, 25 years 
old with 4 children, is currently working 32 hours per week at 
K-Mart. Her hourly wage is $6.75 an hour. Her current goal is to 
remain employed while she pursues her GED. A long-term goal is 
a career in the food service industry. She has catering and baking 
experience.”
Update, November 2003: “Obtained a GED, and in April 2001 
moved to a full-time job with full beneﬁts at Golden 1 Credit 
Union, earning $11.77 an hour. Still employed by Golden 1 in 
November 2003.”
2. Natasha B. Enrollment case ﬁle, May 2000: “A 24-year-
old single parent with 3 children. She is employed 30 hours per 
week at $6.50 an hour as a shipping clerk. Her goal is permanent 
employment in the clerical ﬁeld, but she has extremely limited 
computer skills and must take computer classes to gain clerical 
employment. Client’s hours of work preclude her from taking 
classes during the hours she has child care available.” A subse-
quent entry notes, “In early fall client found work as a bartender at 
$12.50 an hour. She is excited about this job because work hours 
will enable her to take computer classes she needs while children 
are in school.”
Update, November 2003: “Left her bartending job to enroll in 
an ofﬁce assistant/receptionist course at a proprietary school. Quit 
after a few weeks, obtained a job as a marketing representative at 
$12/hr. and was laid off after 6 months. Currently, no contact with 
program.”
3. Sheila D. Enrollment case ﬁle: “A 31 year old single parent 
with 5 minor children. She had been working 30 hours per week at 
Mailboxes Etc. for 6 months and has just received a pay increase 
to $7.50 an hour. She is interested in training because she does not 
feel she has the skills to advance further.”
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the issues the county addresses: whether welfare recipients can upgrade 
their skills while employed, and whether the skills upgrading can trans-
late to increased wages.
The Riverside County project is part of MDRC’s most recent welfare 
demonstration, the Employment Retention and Advancement (ERA) ef-
fort. As the MDRC researchers note in their ERA project description,
While a great deal is known about how to help welfare recipients 
prepare for and ﬁnd jobs, there is little hard evidence about what 
works to promote employment retention and advancement . . . The 
Employment Retention and Advancement (ERA) evaluation is the 
most comprehensive attempt thus far to understand which program 
models are most effective in promoting stable employment and 
career progression for welfare recipients. (Bloom et al. 2002)
By Fall 2001, 15 ERA demonstration projects are operating in nine 
states: four focused on retention for “hard to employ” groups of wel-
fare recipients, and the others focused on skills upgrading. Riverside is 
Update, November 2003: “Worked at Mailboxes Etc. and 
progressed to $10/hr. Left in March 2003, and 6 months later is 
not working. Ms. Hamilton, her counselor, writes, ‘Sheila was 
earning a good salary, but her hours were cut back to 25, and 
she did not receive a management position that she thought she 
deserved. I encouraged her to stay at Mailboxes and emphasized 
to her how fortunate she was to be at Mailboxes, but she left to 
get another job.’”
4. Nicole H. Enrollment case ﬁle: “Nicole was 16 years old 
when she got pregnant, dropped out of high school, and went on 
public assistance. Upon enrollment, she had a job as a seasonal 
clerk for the Department of Motor Vehicles earning $6.00 an hour. 
She states an interest in obtaining her GED, and advancing in an 
administrative position.”
Update, November 2003: “Found a job shortly after enrolling 
in June 2000 at Airborne Express, earning $9.00 per hour, and by 
November 2003 is still working at Airborne earning $14.55/hr. 
and had completed her GED.”
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one of the largest sites, with 3,600 welfare recipients enrolled between 
January 2001 and October 2003. To qualify, a welfare recipient must 
recently have found a job and be working at least 20 hours a week.
The welfare recipients in Riverside are randomly assigned to one of 
three approaches. The approaches reﬂect varied ideas of how welfare 
recipients can best achieve self-sufﬁciency, as described in the follow-
ing paragraphs.
“Work Plus” group. A participant assigned to this group is encour-
aged to participate in education and training. A case manager meets 
with the participant and identiﬁes career goals and training opportuni-
ties feasible for a participant who is employed full time or nearly full 
time. Some ﬁnancial assistance is available to offset costs of child care 
and transportation related to attending classes. This is the largest group, 
with around 1,800 participants.
“Training Focused” group. A participant assigned to this group is 
not only encouraged to participate in training but also is given the op-
tion of reducing work hours below the 32 hours required by Riverside 
County to receive welfare services or payments without losing these 
beneﬁts. Participants receive the same counseling and supportive ser-
vices as the Work Plus group but can take training in lieu of working. 
Around 900 welfare recipients are assigned to this group.
“Work Focused” group. A participant assigned to this group is 
encouraged to continue in jobs and advance through investing in high-
quality work on the job. Participants are not encouraged to take train-
ing, though they can enroll voluntarily in training or education. Mem-
bers of this group receive the basic counseling and supportive services 
that the county offers to all welfare recipients to help them maintain 
employment.
EDD provides $250,000 in governor’s discretionary Welfare-to-
Work funds to support the Riverside effort (which mainly is funded 
through the county’s own share of federal Welfare-to-Work dollars). 
The tie to MDRC and the random-assignment approach make the pro-
gram attractive to EDD, as does the large size of the sample.
The ﬁrst preliminary results are gathered by MDRC in Decem-
ber 2003. The Work Plus and Training Focused groups are enrolling 
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in training at similar rates: around 35 percent of participants for each 
group. In some cases the training is an adult education basic literacy 
class that meets a few hours a week. In other cases involving the Train-
ing Focused group, the training can be a full-time vocational course. 
Generally, the Training Focused group is aimed at short-term vocational 
training, and the more popular jobs are those of certiﬁed nurse assistant, 
ofﬁce assistant, and to a lesser extent truck driver.
The ﬁrst two sets of tracking data show mixed results—none of 
the three groups makes major wage gains over the ﬁrst 9–15 months. 
One set of data, summarized in Table 8.2, tracks 1,200 single parents 
randomly assigned in 2001 for a period of one year from assignment. 
The Training Focused group scores slightly lower on all economic mea-
sures than the other groups, reﬂecting in part the ability of this group 
to reduce work hours for training and not lose Temporary Assistance 
for Needy Families (TANF) beneﬁts. Average yearly earnings range 
from $7,463 for the Training Focused group to $7,935 for the Work 
Focused group. The Training Focused group also shows the highest rate 
of TANF receipt (an average of $3,351 for the year compared to $3,117 
for the Work Plus group) and the lowest percentage employed for four 
consecutive quarters (45 percent of the Training Focused group com-
pared to 52 percent of the Work Focused group).
A second set of data tracks earnings for 520 participants who were 
randomly assigned between January and June of 2002. For the third 
quarter after enrollment, earnings range in amount from $1,769 for the 
Work Focused group to $2,200 for the Work Plus group. In contrast to 
the ﬁrst data set, the Work Plus group shows not only the highest earn-
ings but also the lowest percentage of TANF recipients (66 percent).
MDRC plans to track earnings, employment, and TANF receipt 
levels for a three-to-ﬁve year period. This longer-term data will give 
us a better idea of impacts and what combination of employment and 
training succeeds for employed welfare recipients. It’s noteworthy that 
even the Training Focused group utilizes only short-term training (from 
one to six months, depending on whether the training is full time or part 
time). The consensus among welfare practitioners has shifted to getting 
welfare recipients into the work world and then complementing the job 
with skills upgrading.
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Table 8.2  Riverside Employment Retention and Advancement Project: Impacts on Quarter 3 Earnings, Employment, 
TANF, and Food Stamps among Those Randomly Assigned, January–June 2002
Average outcome levels
Work Plus vs. 
Work Focused
Training Focused 
vs. Work Focused
Work Plus vs. 
Training Focused
Outcome
DPSS Work 
Plus Group
EDA Training 
Focused Group
DPSS Work 
Focused Group
Impacts of E&Ta
services incl. work 
hours requirement
Impacts of E&T 
services w/o a 
work requirement
Added impacts 
of work 
requirement
Total earnings ($) 2,220 2,063 1,769 451** 294 158
Ever employed (%) 76.5 74.0 69.9 6.5 4.0 2.5
Amount of TANF 
received ($)
776 847 811 −36 36 −72
Ever received 
TANF (%)
65.9 69.0 69.5 −63.6 −0.4 −3.2
Amount of Food 
Stamps received ($)
318 352 322 −4 30 −34
Ever received Food 
Stamps (%)
61.2 67.4 57.0 4.3 10.5* −6.2
Sample size 236 113 113
NOTES: Estimates are regression-adjusted using ordinary least squares, controlling for sample member characteristics. *signiﬁ cant at 
the 0.10 level (two-tailed test); **signiﬁ cant at the 0.05 level (two-tailed test).
a E&T = employment and training.
SOURCE: Manpower Demonstration Research Corporation (MDRC) calculations from California administrative records.
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3. Goodwill Industries’ “Go the Distance”
Goodwill Industries proposes in early 2000 an at-home, computer-
based skills upgrading for welfare recipients that it calls “Go the Dis-
tance.” The rationale: most welfare recipients have not succeeded in 
traditional classroom settings, and computer-based learning represents 
an alternative approach. Also, with so many families now having a 
computer in the home, single parents can take training at home and at 
the time most convenient for them.
Goodwill’s ﬂyer promoting “Go the Distance” solicits former wel-
fare recipients who want to obtain better jobs. “Are you struggling to 
get a raise or promotion at your job due to lack of training or educa-
tion?” the ﬂyer asks. “Are you unable to increase your skills because 
you don’t have the time or money to go back to school? Are you in-
terested in taking university-accredited classes on the Internet from a 
computer in your own home?” The ﬂyer pictures 14 smiling graduate 
candidates for 2002 and urges, “Apply now!!”
These 14 candidates come from 24 participants who enrolled be-
tween January and June 2001. All are former welfare recipients. Most 
are in clerical jobs that pay between $8 and $10 an hour. They include a 
general accounting clerk, an administrative assistant, a direct bank asso-
ciate, and several proof operators. Each participant receives a computer 
in the home (which is owned by Goodwill but which the participant can 
earn by completing training) and an Internet connection.
Goodwill also maintains a part-time computer technician to make 
repairs. In other computer learning projects for welfare recipients, the 
computers often were abandoned by participants who were unable to 
address a software or hardware problem.
Jennifer Tucker, the program manager, meets with each partici-
pant to map an individualized employment plan and a distance learn-
ing class. The classes chosen by participants teach skills that can help 
them advance with their current employers, such as bookkeeping and 
accounting, and skills that might assist them in new work ﬁelds, such as 
assisting in a medical ofﬁce or working in child care management or as 
a pharmacist’s technician. The classes last from three to nine months.
EDD’s monitoring report in February identiﬁes participants who are 
in danger of dropping out. One of the participants, the report says, “is 
experiencing domestic violence and is doubtful that she will be able to 
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continue. She has a modem problem that currently hasn’t been resolved. 
Not safe at this point to go to the home and address it.” A second par-
ticipant “has been threatened by the police to remove her eight-year-
old child from the home. Home life currently in an uproar.” The EDD 
monitor goes on to note that “some clients [are] not able to grasp the im-
portance of calling to cancel appointments. Have gone to a few homes 
and no one was there.”
Still, the majority of participants remain and complete their on-line 
classes. According to Goodwill’s internal tracking, from early 2001 to 
December 2002, 17 of the 24 participants complete their classes, 19 
obtain some increase in wages, and 17 are employed one year after 
enrollment. A general accounting clerk earning $8 an hour has her wage 
increased to $8.72 an hour by the end of the year. (“She asserts that her 
supervisor’s knowledge of [her] concurrent enrollment in Bookkeeping, 
in addition to the learned soft skills in the program, complemented her 
demonstrated performance to receive the promotion,” notes a program 
report.) A direct bank associate earning $9.90 an hour is promoted to 
assistant supervisor at $10.66. A proof operator sees her wage increase 
from $8 to $9.69 an hour.
The Goodwill records include testimonials from participants on 
how the participation helped both them and their families. Several par-
ticipants speak of their children becoming more interested in school, 
and of how use of the computer is taken up by others in the household. 
One participant recounts, “My daughter has been learning to identify 
the letters of the alphabet on the computer, and my son has come out 
of depression since I went back to work. I feel for the ﬁrst time in my 
life like I can face my children, because they can call me Mom and be 
proud to say it.”
By early 2004, Goodwill ofﬁcials are touting the distance learning 
approach, and they raise state and local government training funds to 
start a second training cycle of 30 participants in Los Angeles and a 
third cycle of 20 participants in nearby San Bernardino. In both cases, 
though, the funds are short term, and the longer-term future of distance 
learning remains up in the air. 
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ECONOMIC SELF-SUFFICIENCY FOR WELFARE 
RECIPIENTS THROUGH NONTRAINING APPROACHES
The postemployment projects discussed in this chapter, though var-
ied in form, all envision welfare recipients improving their economic 
position through additional training services that are supported by gov-
ernment training funds.
It should be noted that there has been a second line of projects to 
achieve economic self-sufﬁciency for welfare recipients; this line de-
parts from the government service or training model. Some of these 
projects have sought economic self-sufﬁciency for welfare recipients 
through asset accumulation. Such projects have made use of the Indi-
vidual Development Account (IDA), by which low-income families, 
including employed welfare recipients, can accumulate savings and be 
assisted in their savings by matching funds. Other projects have sought 
self-sufﬁciency for low-income families through these families work-
ing together rather than relying on the government. 
An important project aiming at economic self-sufﬁciency that has 
incorporated elements of both approaches is the Family Independence 
Initiative (FII) in Oakland, California, started in 2000 by social entre-
preneur Maurice Lim Miller and Oakland mayor Jerry Brown. FII (or 
“200 Families Out of Poverty,” as it came to be known) utilizes the con-
cept of “afﬁnity groups”: associations of low-income families, initially 
based around a shared ethnicity, that come together for mutual support 
and even possible pooling of resources. The government’s role is not 
counseling or training, but incentivizing economic behaviors that will 
lead to economic self-sufﬁciency. Chapter 11 examines this project in 
greater detail. 
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Notes
 1.  Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) was replaced in California 
in January 1998 by California Work Opportunities and Responsibility to Kids 
(CalWORKs), the state’s implementation of the 1996 federal welfare reform.
 2. Bruce Wagstaff, interview with the author, 2002.
 3. As part of the implementation of CalWORKs, the state legislature established 
the Welfare Policy Research Project at the University of California campuses 
to study the impacts of welfare reform in California. Among the leaver studies 
in California supported by the project were Lieberman and Mancuso (2001); 
MaCurdy, Marrufo, and O’Brien-Strain (2003); Cox and Klerman (2003); and 
California Department of Social Services (2000).
 4.  In contrast, the researchers found that in “child only” cases, in which adults 
do not participate in CalWORKs employment services (the family receives aid 
only for the child), the return rate of leavers in 1998 was similar to the rate in 
1988. The researchers conclude, “Our hypothesis that CalWORKs had an effect 
in reducing recidivism is consistent with the ﬁndings that recidivism dropped for 
families subject to the CalWORKs employment service requirements and did not 
drop for cases not participating in these employment services” (Lieberman and 
Mancuso 2001).
 5.  The higher employment rates in the PPIC study are due in part to the study’s 
focus on welfare leavers who have been off welfare for at least 11–16 months. 
The study thus omits those welfare leavers who return to welfare within a matter 
of months. The PPIC study found that among 3,905 leavers, 22 percent returned 
to CalWORKs before month 7.
 6.  The greatest income gains came in the Portland, Oregon, program, where earn-
ings gains of participants averaged more than $5,000 above those of the control 
group over the ﬁve-year period. The Portland program possessed certain contex-
tual advantages—a welfare caseload with fewer barriers and a state with a rela-
tively high minimum wage. Mainly, it had a strong employment focus, assigning 
the majority of participants to job search and sending others to short-term train-
ing of less than six months.
 7.  Goodwill Industries, for example, proposed a “Career Advancement Center,” 
by which former welfare recipients could take classes at night to improve their 
skills. The center would provide child care and even dinner and homework as-
sistance to children to make it easier for former welfare recipients to attend. Part 
of the EDD staff criticism involves how unrealistic the approach seems—“Will a 
single parent, after working all day, want to take her family out at night? I don’t 
think so.” Another part involves the costs of these supportive services. The larg-
est part, though, involves the lack of clear performance goals: Goodwill does not 
have clear outcomes in job retention or wage gains for participants.
   A variant proposal for funding adult education centers came from the San 
Francisco welfare department. Since welfare reform, this department had ad-
opted a much stronger work orientation. Its proposal for adult education centers, 
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though, piles on the services (even offering to pay cab fare for welfare recipients 
to come to the center) and lacks a clear strategy for job or income gains.
 8. Fred Fischer, manager of EDD’s Fiscal Programs Division, in a memorandum to 
the EDD Director’s Ofﬁce, November 4, 1999.
 9. Dollie Hamilton, interview with the author, 2000.
 10. October Vance, “Oakland Skills Upgrade Monthly Report, 12-31-99.”
 11. Sacramento Job Service Ofﬁce, “Sacramento Ofﬁce Skills Upgrade Report,” 
June 30, 2000.
 12. Meeting at EDD headquarters in Sacramento about the Sacramento Welfare-to-
Work Skills Upgrading Program.
 13. Sacramento Job Service Ofﬁce, “Update on Welfare-to-Work Skills Upgrading 
Clients,” November 2003.
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Principle Seven: Workers 
with Disabilities
A New World of Employment Exists
In January 2003, more than 980,000 California working-age adults 
are unemployed and living primarily on Supplemental Security Income 
(SSI) and Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI), the main gov-
ernment payments to persons with disabilities. 
A number of these workers have physical disabilities—they have 
limited sight or hearing or limited use of their arms or legs. A greater 
number have either developmental disabilities (autism, severe dyslexia, 
mental retardation) or mental health issues. Their combined number in 
California is larger than the size of the labor force of most states.
The SSI and SSDI population has not received the attention that the 
welfare population has in recent years, or the push to employment. But 
that is beginning to change, and for good reasons. Some of these reasons 
involve the costs to federal and state government of such a large (and 
growing) number of workers on long-term SSI or SSDI. Other reasons 
are more positive, involving the promise of workers with disabilities in 
today’s highly complex and specialized labor market.
Part I of this chapter discusses why today’s workers with disabili-
ties have such a high unemployment rate and are increasingly reliant on 
SSI. Part II identiﬁes policies and practices designed to boost the em-
ployment of workers with disabilities: going beyond the shallow One-
Stop system; building selected employment projects that understand 
workers with disabilities; restructuring the current incentive structure 
of SSI, which discourages work; and building on the projects for young 
people originated by Workability, an EDD program aimed at providing 
work experience for young people and reducing the number of them 
who sign up for SSI.
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PART 1: THE HIGH UNEMPLOYMENT AND SSI USE 
AMONG WORKERS WITH DISABILITIES TODAY
There has been a sea change in attitudes toward workers with dis-
abilities, especially nonphysical disabilities, over the past 40 years. Still, 
even in the early twenty-ﬁrst century, in California as in the United 
States as a whole, the majority of workers with disabilities are outside 
of the workforce, living primarily on government transfer payments. 
Over the past two decades, considerable research has been undertaken 
to understand the work behavior of America’s workers with disabilities. 
The research has not been easy to conduct, since neither state nor fed-
eral agencies generally track workers with disabilities, and many devel-
opmental disabilities or mental health issues are not easily identiﬁed. 
Researchers, though, have been able to utilize two main data sources, 
the Current Population Survey (CPS) and the National Health Interview 
Survey (NHIS).
The CPS is a monthly household survey of 50,000 U.S. households 
(around 150,000 noninstitutionalized civilians), administered by the 
Census Bureau. The CPS asks a variety of questions on work behavior, 
including a question about whether any adults in the household have a 
health problem or disability that might limit the kind or amount of work 
they can do. The CPS also goes into more detail for a subsample of the 
households surveyed and asks the work limitation question in two con-
secutive years. This allows leading researchers to construct a matched 
CPS sample that ﬁlters out some disabilities that might be temporary.
Figure 9.1 shows the CPS and CPS-match data on employment 
among working-age men and women with disabilities over the past two 
decades. It also shows the data from the NHIS, a survey of 100,000 
civilians conducted by the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Pre-
vention from 1983 to 1996 that includes questions on work and work 
disabilities. Data for the ﬁgure were compiled by Cornell professor 
Richard Burkhauser and Federal Reserve Bank economist Mary Daly, 
leading researchers in the ﬁeld, with two colleagues (Burkhauser et al. 
2002).
Though the three data sets yielded different rates of employment, 
none yielded a work rate for men and women combined that was above 
50 percent for any year. For most years, the employment rate for work-
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Figure 9.1  Trends in Employment among Working Age Men and Women 
with Work Limitation–Based Disabilities 
NOTE: NHIS = National Health Interview Survey. CPS = Current Population Survey. 
Gaps in CPS-Match line represent years for which there are no data.
SOURCE: Burkhauser et al. (2002), from calculations using the NHIS, 1983–1996, 
and CPS, 1981–2000.
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ers with disabilities as estimated by the surveys has been in the 30–40 
percent range. The CPS, because it consists of the largest continuous 
sample, is the most widely cited survey by disability groups, and it has 
shown an employment rate for men below 40 percent since the early 
1990s, and a rate for women below 30 percent in most years. The U.S. 
Department of Labor’s Web site, citing the CPS, estimated in 2002 that 
“around 30 percent of working-age adults with severe disabilities are 
working”; a similar ﬁgure is used by groups for the disabled, including 
the Able to Work Consortium. The employment numbers yielded by the 
CPS-match are even lower—combined men’s and women’s rates in the 
low 20s in most years.
The NHIS numbers are higher, in the range of 40–50 percent for 
men and 30–40 percent for women. In 1996, the ﬁnal year of the NHIS, 
Burkhauser and Daly used the NHIS to estimate a 44 percent employ-
ment rate for working-age men with disabilities and a 38 percent em-
ployment rate for working-age women with disabilities. Burkhauser 
and Daly attribute the higher employment ﬁgures registered by NHIS 
to a more detailed questioning of the nature and type of impairment.1
As striking as the low rates of employment—whether the NHIS or 
the CPS numbers—is the negative employment trend among workers 
with disabilities since the mid-1990s. The conventional wisdom among 
policymakers is that since the passage of the Americans with Disabili-
ties Act in 1990 the employment rate for workers with disabilities has 
increased. But in fact, both the CPS and the NHIS data show that the 
employment rate has been static or even that it decreased in the late 
1990s, at the same time that disability beneﬁt rolls and expenditures 
grew (Stapleton and Burkhauser 2003). Figure 9.2, compiled from the 
CPS by Daly and by Andrew Houtenville of Cornell, shows employ-
ment rates for workers with disabilities declining during the 1990s. The 
decline continued even during the boom years of 1996–2000, when 
employment rates for workers without disabilities markedly increased 
(Houtenville and Daly 2003). 
The current SSI system was enacted in 1972 and began paying 
beneﬁts in 1974. It replaced a series of state-run entitlement programs 
created under the Social Security Act of 1935 (two were Old-Age As-
sistance and Aid to the Permanently and Totally Disabled), setting mini-
mum beneﬁt standards, uniform eligibility criteria, and relatively low 
beneﬁt reduction rates on labor earnings (Daly and Burkhauser 2003). 
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SSI was intended by Congress to be for individuals unable to work 
because of being aged, blind, or disabled. Additionally, an SSI recipi-
ent must be able to show very limited income (below $500 for a single 
adult) and very limited assets (assets, excluding home and car, of less 
than $2,000 for a single adult).
While the program requirements for the aged (65 or older) and blind 
are straightforward, to qualify as disabled requires going through a more 
detailed eligibility process. Disability is deﬁned as a “physical or mental 
impairment that keeps a person from performing any substantial work 
and is expected to last 12 months or result in death.” The qualiﬁcation 
process can take anywhere from several months to more than a year 
and involves application to the federal Social Security Administration, 
an initial determination by the state agency, and several layers of ap-
peals. A signiﬁcant number of applications are turned down: allowance 
rates (initial acceptances to initial applications) range from 28 percent in 
Louisiana to 48 percent in Delaware (California’s rate is 37 percent).
SSI has exploded in size since 1974, becoming the largest federal 
means-tested beneﬁt program in the nation. An average of 6.3 million 
people received SSI in 1999 at a cost of $34 billion to the federal and 
Figure 9.2  Employment Rates for Workers with Disabilities,  
1980–2000 (%) 
SOURCE: Houtenville and Daly (2003), from calculations using the March Current 
Population Survey, 1981–2001.
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state governments. As shown in Figure 9.3, between 1974 and 1982 SSI 
growth was minor. Total SSI recipients stood at 3.9 million in 1982. By 
1996, this number had grown to 6.6 million. The big growth, in terms 
of raw numbers, has been in the number of disabled adults between the 
ages of 18 and 64. Aged recipients peaked at 2.5 million in 1975 and 
by 1998 were down to 2 million. Blind and disabled children grew from 
185,000 in 1989 to 887,000 in 1998. Blind and disabled adults 18–64 
grew from 2 million in 1982 to 3.6 million in 1998. Figure 9.4 shows 
the relationship between the growth of SSI and the employment rates 
of working-age men and women. As SSI expenditures rise during the 
1990s, employment declines, especially among working-age men.
Five Steps for Increasing Employment 
among Workers with Disabilities
1. Over the past 40 years, attitudes have changed toward workers 
with disabilities, including nonphysical disabilities. Inclusion 
in mainstream employment has replaced separate workplaces 
as the goal.
2. The One-Stop system, despite the claims of proponents, is not 
a good vehicle for serving workers with disabilities. More in-
tensive and specialized efforts are needed.
3. Intensive employment efforts, such as Jobs for All, will play a 
role, as they are able to supply expertise on workplace inclu-
sion, one-to-one job search assistance, and retention services 
following placement. As these efforts ﬁnd, employers often 
describe workers with disabilities as bringing greater skills 
and commitment to the job than other employees.
4. The most widespread impact on increasing employment will 
come from the restructuring of the SSI system. The main effort 
to restructure SSI, the Clinton administration’s Ticket to Work 
program, has achieved a very minor impact in its ﬁrst years.
5. Along with restructuring SSI, a major effort should be made to 
keep young people from signing up for SSI in the ﬁrst place. 
Once on the rolls, few workers move off.
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Figure 9.3  SSI Caseloads by Age Group, 1974–2001 
SOURCE: Daly and Burkhauser (2003).
PART 2: DESIGNING EMPLOYMENT PROGRAMS FOR 
WORKERS WITH DISABILITIES
Attempts at increasing the employment of workers with disabilities 
draw on a mix of targeted employment efforts and the reshaping of the 
SSI system. The box on the previous page summarizes the ﬁve major 
guidelines, which are discussed in greater detail below. Two of my for-
mer EDD colleagues joined me in compiling these guidelines: Catherine 
Baird, executive director of the Governor’s Committee on Employment 
of People with Disabilities, and Max Forman, a 25-year veteran of dis-
ability programs and the head of EDD’s Jobs for All project.
1. The change in attitudes over the past 40 years, and the growth 
of the inclusion ethos. 
In any examination of how to increase employment of workers with 
disabilities, it is valuable to recap how attitudes have changed over the 
past 40 years, even among employment professionals. In the 1950s and 
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1960s, EDD sponsored several initiatives to “Hire the Handicapped.” 
Since “handicapped” during these years meant workers with physical 
disabilities, the initiatives largely aimed at convincing employers that 
these workers were “no different” (in the words of the initiatives) from 
other workers. Workers with neurological disabilities or mental illness-
es were not even part of the picture.
In 1955, EDD sponsored the Governor’s Committee for the Employ-
ment of the Physically Handicapped, and in October of that year, EDD 
participated in “National Employ the Physically Handicapped Week.” 
The statewide EDD newsletter that month encouraged Job Service staff 
not to ignore the physically handicapped, since “denying employment 
to persons with physical disabilities who are able and willing to work 
is a glaring example of the ineffective use of manpower.” Before World 
Figure 9.4  Disability Beneﬁt Rolls and Employment Rates among 
Working-Age Men and Women with Disabilities
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Paul Orfalea, Inclusion Advocate
Paul Orfalea was one of many parents and philanthropists 
around the state who came to Sacramento during the Davis ad-
ministration to advocate inclusion in the workplace. Orfalea start-
ed Kinko’s copying in 1970 in Santa Barbara, grew it into a na-
tionwide chain, and sold it in 2000, which made him very wealthy. 
In 2001, when he was coming to Sacramento to lobby, he was 
dividing time between his business investments and his private 
foundation, which focuses on kids with learning disabilities—or, 
as he insists on calling them, “learning differences.”
Paul is dyslexic, which was a big inﬂuence on his life grow-
ing up in Southern California. He was a terrible student and was 
in and out of schools and special education programs and tutoring 
programs. His main support was his parents, who told him he was 
not stupid or a failure. Now he spends time speaking to parents 
and teachers who work with kids with dyslexia or autism or other 
“learning differences.” His main message: “These kids have a 
great deal of talent. They just have different learning styles. Don’t 
let them be beat down by the school system.”
“The high school counselor urged my mother to get rid of 
her unrealistic expectations and enroll me in a trade school to 
become a carpet layer,” Orfalea recalls. “But my mom told the 
counselor, ‘I just know he can do more than lay carpet.’ Workers 
with learning differences can do a lot more than they’re usually 
given credit for.
“In the movie Rainman, Raymond did have a severe disability 
and couldn’t do a lot of jobs. But also he had unusual skills. Was 
his choice only between being institutionalized [and] living with 
his brother? Couldn’t he have found a job using some of his amaz-
ing skills of calculation, for example as an actuary?”2
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War II, the newsletter noted, disabled workers in the labor force were a 
rarity, but the past decade “has witnessed a gradual but nevertheless re-
markable change in the picture.” Of the 750 members of the Paralyzed 
Veterans’ Association in Southern California, nearly half were “gain-
fully employed,” the article said. The newsletter singled out the case 
of a blind man repairing PBX switchboards at the Port Hueneme Naval 
Supply Depot, and the case of another blind man “expertly wrapping 
packages for export” at the Friden Calculator Company. It concluded 
that “the handicapped are performing commendably in practically ev-
ery type of job or profession” (California Department of Employment 
1955).
By 1957, EDD had adopted the slogan, “It’s ability—not disabil-
ity—that counts,” and had recorded 19,622 placements of physically 
handicapped persons in California during the year. The examples given 
in the EDD newsletters of 1957 chronicle the experiences of workers 
with physical disabilities such as John R., “a public charge for a period 
following a hunting accident which caused the amputation of a leg.” 
John was given “counseling to the end of providing him motivation to 
rejoin the labor force, and help in ﬁnding a job as an attendant in an ani-
mal hospital.” Another example told the story of Mary B. The woman, 
“crippled by polio, learned typing and shorthand, and she is working as 
an executive secretary in a busy insurance brokerage. ‘Though she will 
be in a wheelchair for the rest of her life,’ her employer says, ‘somehow 
we have forgotten that she has any handicap at all’” (California Depart-
ment of Employment 1957).
It was in the 1960s that EDD broadened its job placement effort to 
include workers with other types of disabilities (nonphysical ones), in-
cluding neurological disabilities, mental retardation, and mental illness. 
Workers with these disabilities, though, were often seen as only ﬁt for 
sheltered workshops—distinct workplaces outside of the employment 
mainstream that undertook low-skilled repetitive tasks.
Inclusion of these workers into the employment mainstream grew 
in the 1970s and 1980s because of a combination of factors such as 
the passage of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 and the emergence of 
the disability rights movement. Among government agencies like EDD, 
workers with disabilities were now to be included in mainstream work-
places, and funds became available for aides, such as Job Coaches, to 
help them make the transition. Additionally, a network arose of commu-
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Table 9.1  Department of Rehabilitation “Jobs for All” Consumers, May 2000–March 2003
May 00–
June 00a
July 00–
June 01
July 01–
June 02
July 02–
March 03b
Total since 
inception
SSI-only recipients 11 69 232 280 619
SSDI-only recipients 14 54 77 75 220
Dual SSI/SSDI recipients 7 17 27 23 74
Public assistance (other 
than SSI or SSDI)
9 68 214 165 456
No public assistance 36 204 305 495 1,040
Total consumers served 77 439 855 1,038 2,409
% SSI or SSDI 14 22 27 27 26
% SSDI only 18 12 9 7 9
% dual SSI-SSDI 9 4 3 2 3
% other public assistance 12 15 25 16 19
% no public assistance 47 46 36 48 43
a Program began May 2000.
b Table compiled April 2003.
SOURCE: Unpublished data from California Department of Rehabilitation.
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nity-based organizations that specialized in placement of the disabled. 
Today, inclusion is the main theme of placement of the disabled. Work-
ers with disabilities—except in rare cases—are no longer relegated to 
separate workshops or to public assistance. The box on the following 
page illustrates the potential of such workers through the story of one 
man who overcame his disability.
2. The One-Stop system is not a good vehicle for serving work-
ers with disabilities.
 The One-Stop system in theory is meant to serve workers with dis-
abilities as part of its comprehensive services. However, the experience 
of the One-Stops over the past few years shows that the system does not 
possess the expertise or the intensive services needed by many workers 
with disabilities. Within the Davis administration, Catherine Campisi, 
director of the California Department of Rehabilitation (DOR), cham-
pioned the inclusion of workers with disabilities in the One-Stops. She 
headed a project to improve physical accessibility at One-Stops, and a 
second project to train One-Stop staff to serve workers with disabilities.
The job search assistance provided at the One-Stops is primarily 
through job search workshops or use of the automated labor exchanges. 
A portion of the One-Stop clients are to get “intensive services,” but 
these services are uneven among One-Stops. Usually these clients also 
receive short-term counseling. Even with training, One-Stop staff, as 
generalists, will not be able to gain the expertise needed to most effec-
tively serve workers with disabilities.3
3. Intensive employment efforts, such as Jobs for All, will play 
a role as they supply the necessary expertise and patience to those 
with disabilities and as they produce employer satisfaction with the 
skills and loyalty of workers with disabilities.
 In 2000, EDD launched Jobs for All (JFA) to test whether employ-
ment could be increased through an intense job placement and retention 
effort. Jobs for All is worth discussing in some detail as it shows the 
value of intensive employment efforts, the satisfaction of employers, 
and, of course, the limits of even one-to-one efforts. 
JFA started in May 2000 and by 2002 had grown to nine pilot proj-
ects in the state, including projects at Santa Rosa, San Diego, Oakland, 
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JFA Case Notes Indicating the Role 
of Intensive Job Search Services
• “Client #1, a woman with signiﬁcant back problems and depres-
sion, who had not worked for several years, received training 
from DOR for Web Page Design. EDD staff helped her iden-
tify job openings, prepare for the job interview by studying the 
company, and follow up with the employer after she was hired 
as a ‘Web Designer/HTML Programmer’ for $35,000 a year.”
• “Client #2, a woman with an inconsistent work history, due 
to orthopedic problems and depression, wanted to work in the 
health ﬁeld. After completing a medical assistant certiﬁcation 
class, she went on 15 job interviews without success. The en-
couragement and assistance from EDD enabled her to perse-
vere with her search. She eventually was hired at a hospital as 
a lab technician, earning $12.35, and two years later had been 
promoted to Clinical Lab Assistant earning $13.11.”
• “Client #3, a man with a degree in accounting[,] had been out of 
the labor market for some years, due to a physical disability af-
fecting mobility and accompanying depression. Over 6 weeks, 
he was referred to 5 different interviews and sent out over 40 
resumes, with no success. JFA staff continued to assist his job 
search and contact employers, until he was hired as an account-
ing clerk at $35,000 a year.”
• “Client #4, a 34 year old man with very limited sight, had been 
out of work for 7 years after receiving a computer trade school 
degree. The JFA counselor, after more than 20 job searches, 
was able to place him in an $8 an hour job performing tele-
phone research on foreclosures and inputting data at the Real 
Estate Transaction Network.”
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and Fresno. JFA operates in three phases. In Phase 1, DOR identiﬁes 
workers with disabilities who registered with the department but were 
not placed in jobs. In Phase 2, EDD job placement specialists, serving 
as marketers, motivators, go-betweens, and coaches, seek to place these 
workers in jobs. And in Phase 3, EDD specialists follow their place-
ments for at least a two-year period to assist in retention or replace-
ment.
This intensive case management, once common to EDD, had been 
abandoned over the previous decade as EDD’s federal funds shrank. 
JFA represented a return to a time when EDD job counselors had time 
and mandate to develop close working relationships with employers 
and workers.
Older EDD workers recall being hired by the department in the 
1960s as a “manpower development specialist” or an “employment se-
curity ofﬁcer,” positions that involved getting to know both job seekers 
and local employers and making appropriate matches. “I started in the 
early 1970s as an employment security ofﬁcer,” Faye King, the head of 
EDD’s midtown Sacramento Job Service ofﬁce, told me in 2002. “We 
had the time to get to know employers and to know the job seekers. We 
were careful not to sell employers on workers who were not good ﬁts, 
since we would then lose our relationship with the employer.”
This intense one-to-one arrangement was gradually eliminated in 
the 1990s as EDD’s federal funds dwindled and the One-Stop employ-
ment delivery system emerged. EDD staff shifted to developing and 
operating the state’s automated labor exchange. The remaining one-to-
one job counseling represented a signiﬁcant scaling back and involved 
groups for which EDD received targeted funds: veterans, welfare re-
cipients, parolees. For the JFA staff, the return to intensive one-to-one 
relationships was a welcome one. Several JFA staff commented, “This 
is the work I came to EDD to do.”
Between May 2000 and April 2003, 2,487 participants enrolled in 
JFA. As is in line with the broadened focus of disability policy, the 
physically handicapped constitute only a percentage of this number. 
The majority are workers with developmental or learning disabilities or 
mental health issues. For example, among 36 JFA participants placed in 
jobs in March 2001, only 10 listed physical disabilities. Sixteen listed 
developmental disabilities (“learning disability,” “mental retardation,” 
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“seizure disorder”), and 10 listed mental health issues (“depression,” 
“schizophrenia,” “substance abuse”). 
A majority of participants come to JFA on forms of public assis-
tance, as shown in Table 9.1. Nearly 42 percent are receiving SSI or 
SSDI or a combination at the time of enrollment. Another 12 percent 
are receiving other forms of public assistance, principally TANF and 
General Assistance. A snapshot of the participants, culled from EDD 
and DOR records in April 2003, shows that of the 2,487 enrolled up to 
that time, 1,106 had found work and 563 had been employed at least 
90 days. Of the 1,381 who had not found work, around 400 had been 
dropped from the active rolls as no longer looking for work. The re-
mainder, around 1,000, were listed as still looking for work.
An illustration of a local JFA program can be taken from Santa 
Rosa. Laurie Work is a JFA counselor in Santa Rosa and an advocate 
for intensive job assistance. The fortuitously named Work has been with 
EDD for 14 years, and, before joining JFA in 2000, she was stationed at 
the county welfare ofﬁce, placing local welfare recipients into jobs. Her 
JFA caseload is nearly all made up of clients from DOR (her JFA col-
league in Santa Rosa handles the non-DOR cases), and more than half 
are persons with what she calls “invisible disabilities”—developmental 
disabilities or mental health issues.
Work describes her job as one of relationships—with the partici-
pants, and with employers. “With the participants, it’s a lot of problem 
solving: ‘How do I get to a job without a car?’ ‘How do I present myself 
to employers?’ and so on,” she says. “With the employers, it’s getting 
to know their needs and not sending them any bad employees, because 
[then] they won’t trust you.”4
A picture of two JFA clients
What follows is a pair of descriptions, taken from my interview with 
Work, of JFA clients whom she has sought to help. The ﬁrst is a man; 
the second a woman. The cases provide an insight into the kinds of de-
terminations she must make in dealing with clients, the work attributes 
that workers with disabilities can bring to the job, and the importance 
of having close working relationships with employers.
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First client. “One of my current JFA clients is a man in his early 
forties with a diagnosis of severe learning disabilities, and also with a 
criminal record and no valid driver’s license,” Work says. “So I called 
an employer [whom] I’ve formed a relationship with over the past ﬁve 
years. I told the employer that my client, despite his problems, was de-
pendable, that he had been on time for all of his appointments with me, 
and [asked] did the employer have any jobs? And the employer said, 
‘Laurie, I trust you.’ So because I had this employer relationship, the 
employer was willing to give my client a chance. Now the job was not 
a great job: It was $7.50 an hour, using a leaf blower to help clean park-
ing lots at night. In fact, what most people would call a crap job. But 
my client was thrilled. He called me after he was hired a few weeks ago 
. . . he couldn’t wait to get started. When I checked with the employer 
yesterday, the employer described my client as a ﬁne employee.”
Second client. “Another of my JFA clients is a woman, also in her 
40s, with a form of mental retardation,” Work says. “She worked in a 
supported employment setting for years, sewing American ﬂags, before 
being laid off. She’s another one who’s done everything I’ve asked her 
to do, including taking classes on basic ofﬁce skills at the local adult 
education center. I’ve marketed her to employers, and I’m now cross-
ing my ﬁngers that she will get an ofﬁce job that just became available 
at $6.75 an hour. I don’t think she would get it without the marketing 
assistance we’re giving her.”
Work says that this intensive one-to-one assistance is essential to 
getting her clients into jobs. “Realistically, if there isn’t this intense ef-
fort, these folks are not going to work,” she says. “They need someone 
to navigate them through the work system.” But Work acknowledges 
that at least a third of her clients are not going to get jobs, and another 
third are not going to last 90 days. “There are some of my clients for 
whom no amount of counseling is going to ensure success,” she says. 
“For some, the boss frowns at them and they decide to quit.”5
Work and other JFA counselors are expected to keep case notes, 
tracking their job placement efforts. A review of these notes indicates 
the value of an intensive job search, beyond what DOR and the One-
Stop system provide for, as shown in the box on the next page.
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One Case in Which Intensive Services Did Not Succeed
One of the participants in JFA, whom we will call James, was 
a relative of a prominent political ﬁgure, who called EDD in 2002 
asking for our advice. James, 41, lived in San Diego and had been on 
SSDI for four years. He had had a spotty work history over the past 
two decades, primarily as a cook. His last job was in 1998. He was 
receiving $938 a month on SSDI.
The politician called me one day to say that she had just visited 
Pride Industries in Roseville, a sheltered workshop, was impressed by 
its facilities, and thought that perhaps her brother could work there. I 
urged her to give JFA a chance, to see if we could place James in a more 
mainstream job. She spoke with James, and he agreed to give it a try.
James appeared on time for the ﬁrst interview with Hazel Brown, 
his JFA counselor. He did not drive or own a car, but he had a good 
working knowledge of the regional bus system. Geneva Robinson, 
then manager of EDD’s Job Service in San Diego, was also in atten-
dance and wrote in case notes, “Despite his reliance on public trans-
portation, he was early for his appointment (this is a good sign). He 
is a very agreeable individual, and places few restrictions on himself 
with respect to work location and environment. His appearance is very 
neat and, while it takes him a little time to get his thoughts together, he 
seems to function well.”
James’s stated goal was to ﬁnd a job as a prep cook or line cook—
or, failing that, to update his culinary skills through training and then 
obtain full-time employment in cooking so that he could get off SSDI. 
He also would accept janitorial work if nothing in restaurant work 
was available, he said.
Hazel had relationships with several restaurant employers in the 
area and arranged for James to interview for a cook position that paid 
$13 an hour. James did arrive on time for the interview, but in the 
course of the interview he questioned whether he was qualiﬁed, since 
he did not have experience cooking breakfast. Hazel wrote in her case 
notes, “I was so disappointed that he didn’t indicate he could do the 
job, since he did have some experience cooking breakfast, and prob-
ably could have learned quickly on the job.” 
To combat this objection, Hazel suggested—and James agreed 
to take—a six-week cooking course at the adult education program. 
168 Bernick
Because he was on SSDI, he was able to get the costs of his books and 
tuition paid (though they amounted to less than $100). He told Hazel 
he planned to start classes on August 30.
But he never showed up for classes. Hazel continued to monitor 
local cooking jobs and sent James’s resume to three employers, each 
of whom had jobs paying $9–$13 an hour. One of them contacted 
James for an interview, but James did not respond. Hazel suggested 
that James might volunteer at a restaurant to learn breakfast skills; he 
agreed, but he never did.
By October, James had dropped out of sight. He did not return 
calls from Hazel, and he indicated that he wanted to “take a break” 
from the job search. Hazel was disappointed but thought that maybe 
we had all pushed James in a direction he wasn’t really interested in: 
“James might not really want to go to work, at least for now, or want 
to work on a regular basis, no matter what he says,” she wrote. “Cer-
tainly he receives one of the higher amounts, being on SSDI, and he 
lives very inexpensively.”
James’s failed job search brought the following reactions in Sac-
ramento:
Max Forman (JFA statewide coordinator): “On one level he 
wants to work, but I think he has a lot of anxiety about work and about 
losing beneﬁts.”
Michael Krisman (EDD assistant director): “I hear this from 
our persons working on the AIDS/HIV project in Los Angeles, which 
serves a lot of workers on SSI/SSDI. Clients come in and say that they 
want a job, but as it comes close they begin to back off. They may not 
have a perfect life, but they have a certain comfort level with beneﬁts 
and some income.”
Forman: “I agree. A number of years ago I worked at a state 
mental facility in New York. Patients said they wanted to get out but 
as the time came to leave they would become reluctant. They had 
grown secure in the system.”
Geneva Robinson: “James says he wants to work, but Hazel 
reports that ﬁnancially SSDI is working pretty well [for him]. She 
calls him and hears soft music playing in the background. Now, if 
something changed, that might have some impact. But as long as the 
SSI/SSDI exists as it is, he keeps putting up obstacles.”
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The JFA case ﬁles indicate the satisfaction of employers with JFA 
placements. Employers describe JFA participants as bringing a greater 
commitment and sometimes even greater work skills to the job than 
other workers. Sonia Jackson, a woman with mental retardation, was 
placed as a clerk at a Safeway grocery store in Hayward and then pro-
moted to a general merchandise clerk, a union classiﬁcation complete 
with beneﬁts. In May 2001, George Raine, a business writer for the San 
Francisco Chronicle who had been tracking Jackson’s employment, 
wrote,
Overlooked in the recent ﬂurry of grim economic reports was this 
important development: Sonia Jackson, the veteran courtesy clerk 
with the dazzling smile at a Hayward Safeway store, has been 
promoted to the position of general merchandising clerk. This is 
signiﬁcant not only because Sonia’s hard work was rewarded, but 
because one more developmentally disabled worker has become a 
self-sufﬁcient, taxpaying contributor to the economy. (Raine 2003)
A Safeway spokeswoman noted that the developmentally disabled 
workers the company hired usually delivered superior customer service 
and maintained better attendance records: “There is a dedication, reli-
ability, and loyalty to Safeway with these workers,” the spokeswoman, 
Debra Lambert, said. “Their time and attendance records tell the story. 
Their numbers are far superior compared to those of employees who 
are not disabled. You can count on them. They’re hard working and 
they deliver incredible customer service.” Raine contacted other major 
retailers, Home Depot and Longs Drug Stores, who agreed with this 
assessment (Raine 2003).
During 2000–2003, at the same time EDD was piloting JFA, the 
Department of Rehabilitation piloted an even more intensive job as-
sistance for workers with disabilities, the Individual Self-Sufﬁciency 
Planning (ISSP) project. ISSP, with sites in Kern and San Mateo coun-
ties, provided for each participant a beneﬁts planner as well as a job 
counselor. It succeeded in placing around 60 percent of the 228 partici-
pants into jobs, while showing signiﬁcant reductions in cash beneﬁts 
and in mental health outlays.
ISSP was funded during its pilot phase by the Social Security Ad-
ministration, and when the $500,000 yearly grant ended, the project 
ended. Indeed, both JFA and ISSP are labor-intensive and expensive, 
and it is not realistic to think that even with expansion they would reach 
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any more than a small proportion of the nearly 1 million adults on SSI 
and SSDI—or the additional workers with disabilities who do not re-
ceive SSI or SSDI.
4. The most widespread impact on increasing employment 
among workers with disabilities will come from restructuring the 
SSI system. 
To JFA counselors, the main obstacle to fuller employment of work-
ers with disabilities lies in the SSI/SSDI system. Lana Fraser, the JFA 
coordinator at DOR, summarizes the views of JFA staff as follows: 
“The SSI/SSDI system is not structured to encourage workers to leave. 
Some of these workers have spent over a year getting on [to the rolls], 
and they don’t want to risk going through the process again. Further, 
in the great majority of cases in which workers are not going to earn 
high salaries, they are not ﬁnancially better off through work. SSI/SSDI 
is far more than monetary beneﬁts—it can include housing beneﬁts, 
health beneﬁts, Food Stamps, in-home supportive services. Why take a 
chance of losing these?”6
James Lorenz was the ﬁrst EDD director under Governor Jerry 
Brown. Lorenz helped found the California Rural Legal Assistance and 
was one of the public interest lawyers whom Brown brought to Sacra-
mento in 1975. Today Lorenz’s law practice focuses on helping potential 
SSI recipients go through the government approval process. I suggested 
he might be interested in the governor’s drive to get SSI recipients into 
jobs. He didn’t see much promise. “Most of the SSI recipients I know 
aren’t looking to work,” he said. “There are a lot of factors inﬂuencing 
their decisions, though a main one is [reluctance about] giving up the 
SSI check and health beneﬁts.”7
The cumulative marginal tax rates for individuals who decide to 
leave SSI and go to work can be from 50 percent to over 89 percent 
(Daly and Burkhauser 2003, pp. 20–22). The 50-cent loss in SSI bene-
ﬁts per dollar of earnings is only the starting point of income loss; these 
recipients also lose Food Stamps and can lose health beneﬁts. Although 
the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) reduces the work disincentives 
by offsetting the taxes that fall on SSI recipients who go to work, it does 
not mitigate the loss of Food Stamps (which half of SSI beneﬁciaries 
receive) or the loss of health beneﬁts.
Principle Seven: Workers with Disabilities   171
In the 1980s, the Social Security Administration tried two large-
scale demonstrations to encourage SSI recipients to go to work: Project 
Network, between 1982 and 1985, and the Transitional Employment 
Training Demonstration, between 1985 and 1987. The latter focused 
only on recipients with mental retardation, whereas the former included 
recipients with a variety of disabilities. SSI recipients were invited to 
participate, and volunteers were randomly assigned to treatment and 
control groups (the treatment groups were provided with employment 
services). In both programs, only a small percentage, around 5 percent, 
of SSI recipients volunteered to participate.8
Research in the early 1990s estimated that fewer than 1 percent 
of working-age SSI recipients each year left the rolls to take a job 
(LaPlante et al. 1996). The U.S. General Accounting Ofﬁce, undertak-
ing its own study, has estimated more recently that less than 3 percent 
of SSI recipients leave the rolls each year and that one-third of these 
people return within three years.
Over the past decade, academic experts and government ofﬁcials 
have been very much aware of the disincentive impacts of SSI/SSDI 
and have proposed various structures to reduce these impacts—princi-
pally, allowing SSI/SSDI recipients to keep health (and other) beneﬁts 
for longer periods of time after they go to work. In December 1999, 
President Clinton signed the “Ticket to Work and Work Incentives Im-
provement Act,” which allowed recipients to continue to receive health 
beneﬁts after going to work. 
The act also established the Ticket to Work program, aimed at dra-
matically increasing the employment services to SSI/SSDI recipients. 
Through Ticket to Work, all SSI/SSDI recipients are offered a voucher 
(“ticket”) enabling them to receive free employment services. For the 
ﬁrst time, private job placement services as well as public employment 
services are given a ﬁnancial incentive to place these recipients. The act 
allows the services to receive a percentage of workers’ SSI/SSDI grants 
upon their successful placement and retention.
Ticket to Work represents the best research to date on SSI/SSDI 
and work, and on the need to address work disincentives. In 2003 it 
was still too early to make judgments, since implementation of Ticket 
to Work had only started in February 2002 (and only in selected states). 
Yet the early implementation results are not promising. Fewer than 
1 percent of SSI/SSDI recipients are even taking up the offer of place-
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ment assistance by taking their vouchers to placement services. Further, 
few private job placement agencies are participating, since they receive 
payment over a period of years instead of in a lump sum, and only for as 
long as the recipient stays in the job. More widespread reduction of the 
SSI adult caseload will require changes in the incentive structure of SSI 
that are similar to the changes made in the incentive structure of welfare 
by the welfare reform of 1996.
As described in Chapter 2, in the three decades prior to the 1996 
welfare reform, welfare recipients enrolled in job training and place-
ment programs and were placed in jobs. In fact, welfare recipients were 
the most successful of all job training participants. However, the wel-
fare rolls did not signiﬁcantly decline until welfare reform of 1996 in-
troduced a combination of work expectations and heightened employ-
ment services.
Ticket to Work is an attempt to move in this direction of work ex-
pectations and services, but at present it is entirely voluntary for SSI 
recipients. At least in the early stages, this voluntary approach is yield-
ing little participation. Ticket to Work needs to explore some greater 
participation requirement to overcome the inertia or hopelessness of at 
least part of the recipient population.
5. Along with restructuring SSI to encourage work, a major ef-
fort should be made to keep young people from signing up for SSI 
in the ﬁrst place. Once on the rolls, few workers move off. 
As noted above, currently less than 3 percent of SSI recipients leave 
the rolls each year. In other words, once someone is on the rolls, it has 
proved very difﬁcult to assist him or her to move off. Young persons 
applying for the ﬁrst time to be on SSI, either as they leave high school 
or after an unsuccessful stint in the labor force, should be the focus of 
job search efforts.
Along with JFA, beginning in 2001 EDD operated a companion 
project, “Workability,” focused on high school students with disabil-
ities. It sought part-time jobs for them to gain job experience while 
they were still at school, and full-time employment upon graduation 
if the student did not intend to go on to further schooling. We started 
pilot Workability projects in San Francisco and Los Angeles. The San 
Francisco project was discontinued after nine months because of poor 
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results. The Los Angeles project appeared to go better; it grew to ﬁve 
high schools.
One of the participating high schools in Los Angeles was Fairfax 
High, which I attended between 1967 and 1970. A Fairfax classmate of 
mine, Lillian Grosz (now Lillian Wolk), was now on the special educa-
tion faculty at the school, which had more than 100 special education 
students, mostly in mainstream classes. 
“You know, when we were at Fairfax, I don’t remember any special 
ed programs,” I said to Lillian. “Where were these students?”
“When we were at Fairfax,” she replied, “most of these students 
were either in separate schools or were not going to school. Or, [they 
were] drifting through and quietly dropped out of Fairfax.”9
Lillian urged us to expand Workability. “We see parents giving up 
on their children early,” she said. “As soon as the child turns 18, they 
sign him up for SSI. What we want to do is intervene, show both the 
students and parents that they can function in the world of work, [and] 
get them before they get on SSI.”
In Spring 2003, the governor did expand Workability to 20 sites 
throughout the state. In the majority of sites, young people with dis-
abilities were hired at a small wage to assist the JFA counselors, thus 
expanding the program’s reach. For Fiscal Year 2003–2004, Max For-
man set a target of 2,000 youths enrolled in Workability and instituted a 
several-year tracking system to measure the program’s impacts on SSI 
enrollment.
EDD’s Workability is part of a larger Workability effort through the 
California Department of Education; the larger program may number 
up to 30,000 participants. Still, compared to the number of high school 
students in special education in California (more than 300,000), the 
total Workability effort probably reaches less than a tenth of students 
with disabilities. Since there will never be enough money to signiﬁ-
cantly change this percentage, an intensive job search for youth with 
disabilities to keep them off SSI must have its place as part of the SSI 
mandate.
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PART 3: THE ROLE OF FAMILY AND FRIENDS IN 
INCLUSION
I have noted above how the inclusion of workers with disabilities in 
mainstream employment has replaced separate workshops as the goal. 
However, the shift in the thinking of employers, public and private, 
about employment of the disabled still is in an early stage. For a model 
of a more fully developed inclusion ethos, we can look at the shift in 
inclusion in the public schools over the past three decades. Thirty years 
ago, most children with disabilities, physical and developmental, were 
largely in separate schools or settings. The inclusion model in schools 
has brought children with disabilities into mainstream schooling. Fur-
ther, it has introduced a new inclusion ethos into the schools: Kids with 
disabilities increasingly are seen as adding skills and perspectives to the 
schools—not as charity cases. 
But inclusion in the workplace will be more difﬁcult to achieve than 
in the schools. Employers, especially private sector employers, must 
see value being added from all of their employees. Ultimately, if work-
ers with disabilities are to be integrated into employment, it must stem 
from more than a charity angle. Their integration must be tied to the 
skills and strengths these workers bring to jobs—strengths that were 
recognized by the Safeway spokeswoman quoted previously. Further, 
inclusion in the workplace, like inclusion in the schools, will require 
the active participation of the worker’s family and friends. Family and 
friends, whenever possible, must take responsibility for supporting 
workforce inclusion.
The oldest of our four children, William, born in 1989, has been 
part of the inclusion program in the San Francisco public schools from 
kindergarten through his present ninth grade. William is a high-func-
tioning autistic—or, more speciﬁcally, he has a form of autism known 
as Asperger’s syndrome. He combines high intelligence in some areas 
with strange preservative behaviors, awkwardness in social interactions 
and speech, and big gaps in academic abilities. 
For him, inclusion in a regular public elementary and middle school 
has been far better than being in a separate class or school—as he would 
have been 30 years ago. In the early 1960s, when I was William’s age, 
forms of autism and other neurodevelopmental disorders went largely 
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undiagnosed. The kids afﬂicted with them were considered strange or 
weird or “out of it.” They had little interaction with other kids, or were 
teased or bullied. Today, I continue to be amazed at how many of Wil-
liam’s classmates encourage him and support him.
Yet, to make school inclusion succeed, my wife, Donna, and I invest 
a lot of time in monitoring his school participation and homework. The 
school staff, pulled in many directions, cannot be expected to do so. 
William is now in his ﬁrst year at a large, comprehensive public high 
school, with a dedicated inclusion-minded teacher overseeing the inclu-
sion process, and classroom aides to help. Yet even with these supports, 
without extensive family assistance William would struggle and prob-
ably fall far behind other students, until he dropped out. 
Similarly, workforce inclusion will beneﬁt from families or asso-
ciations of families of workers with disabilities providing support for 
their employment. In the Bay Area, I and several others are looking into 
creating a volunteer effort by which we can support a broad variety of 
workers with disabilities. This support will include identifying job op-
portunities and monitoring the workers, as appropriate, to ensure that 
their employment is succeeding. The public workforce system will ben-
eﬁt as it is augmented by family and volunteer networks. 
Further, the system will beneﬁt from the practice of workers with 
disabilities and their families of honestly chronicling their work efforts, 
which will help them to see things steady and see them whole. In 1972, 
Josh Greenfeld, a Los Angeles–based novelist and screenwriter (he 
wrote the 1974 Paul Mazursky–directed ﬁlm “Harry and Tonto,” for 
which Art Carney won an Oscar), published a book about his 6-year-
old son, Noah, an autistic with very little speech or involvement in the 
world. (“His main activities,” Greenfeld [1972, p. 14] writes, “are lint-
catching, thread-pulling, blanket-sucking, spontaneous giggling, inex-
plicable crying, eye-squinting, door-closing, and incoherent babbling.”) 
This book, A Child Called Noah, was followed by two others, A Place 
for Noah (Greenfeld 1978) and A Client Called Noah (Greenfeld 1986). 
The trilogy follows Noah and the Greenfelds (dad Josh, mom Foumi, 
and brother Karl) as the family tries to carve out a life for Noah. 
The Greenfelds try various schools, including establishing their 
own school with other parents of autistic children. They try develop-
mental therapists, nutritional therapists, physical therapists, and Dr. 
Ivar Lovaas’ autism clinic in Los Angeles. In the end, none of these 
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yields signiﬁcant results, and Josh and Foumi look at a group home or a 
state facility in which to place an almost-adult Noah.
In the years since, hundreds of other books have been published 
on autism, including more than 20 by parents of autistic or autistic-
spectrum children. None of these books even begins to approach the 
Greenfeld books in insight, honesty, humor, or anger. The other books 
by parents are largely sentimental feel-good stories of triumph against 
adversity. In contrast, Josh Greenfeld doesn’t sugarcoat Noah or him-
self or the therapists, or minimize the disconnect between Noah and the 
education and work world.
In 2000, as we at EDD were developing our employment initiatives 
for workers with disabilities, I contacted Greenfeld, who continues to 
live in Paciﬁc Palisades with Foumi. Noah, for the past 12 years, has 
been at the state facility for the developmentally disabled in nearby 
Fairview, California—a placement Josh regards as superior to any of 
the group homes. I explained the governor’s interest in workers with 
disabilities and said that we’d welcome his participation. He responded 
that he was not a joiner, and that most organized autism efforts amount-
ed to parents pursuing their own narrow interests. Nevertheless, he said 
he’d be willing to do anything he could to help with the initiatives, since 
he agreed that a job for a developmentally disabled adult could be very 
important.
Over the next few years, we never did connect Greenfeld to our em-
ployment efforts. Looking back, I’m not sure it was an idea that made 
sense. On some level, probably, I was hoping that Greenfeld would be-
come involved and do a chronicling, in the tradition of the Noah trilogy, 
that would capture the world of workers with disabilities for a wider 
audience. 
Such a chronicling would not be a feel-good story. It would describe 
the social and behavioral dysfunctions that usually undermine both job 
searches and placements. It would describe the difﬁculties that anyone 
with a disability has in competing against other workers in a highly 
competitive work world. At the same time, it would describe the times 
when workers with disabilities truly are able to ﬁt into the work world.
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Notes
 1.  In an e-mail to the author dated May 5, 2003, Burkhauser explained the differ-
ences among the data sets as follows: “It is difﬁcult to prove why these levels 
are different. We believe it goes back to how the populations were deﬁned. The 
easiest one to explain is the lower employment level for 2 period CPS than for 
1 period CPS data. Those who report having a work limitation in two periods 
are much more likely to have long-term and more serious impairments than the 
population who reports having a work limitation in 1 period. So, it is not sur-
prising that this similar and more long-term impaired population also has lower 
employment rates than the larger and less long-term impaired 1 period popula-
tion. The differences between the NHIS and the CPS 1 period population em-
ployment rates are less clear cut but similar in inference[:], because the NHIS 
is a health survey a greater percentage of folks say they have a work limitation 
and they may be less severely work limited and hence have high employment 
rates. That story is consistent with the facts. Hence, we have three populations 
deﬁned by two deﬁnitions across the data sets. There is no obvious right one to 
use to determine levels. The more severely impaired the population is the lower 
their employment rates will be . . . But whichever you choose, we show that the 
trends are the same: Employment of working age folks with disabilities fell in the 
1990s.”
   See also Burkhauser, Houtenville, and Wittenburg (2003).
 2. Paul Orfalea, interview with the author, 2001.
 3.  The Los Angeles Workforce Investment Board funded an “employability” con-
sortium for the staffs of the 40 or so One-Stops to provide training on serving 
workers with disabilities. The training was short-term and did not alter the One-
Stop job placement services, which in Los Angeles, as elsewhere, are primarily 
aimed at reaching a large number of workers, rather than providing an intensive 
service.
 4. Laurie Work, interview with the author, April 21, 2003.
 5. Work, interview.
 6. Lana Fraser, interviews with the author, different occasions, 2002–2003.
 7. James Lorenz, discussion with the author, 1999.
 8.  Those participants who received employment services did show employment 
gains over the control group, though by the third year the gains had declined to 
nearly zero. See Daly and Burkhauser (2003, pp. 40–41); Kornfeld and Rupp 
(2000).
 9.  Visiting Fairfax with Lillian Wolk on September 13, 2000, was the ﬁrst time I 
had been back to the school since graduation in 1970. The gating and fences im-
mediately stand out, as do the additional security guards. “The security is a lot 
different than when we were here,” Lillian comments, as we tour classes in the 
“New Building,” the three-story structure that opened when we were juniors, and 
which stood out then as drab concrete against the older, graceful colonial build-
ings. One of the classes we visit is for severely autistic students. The teacher is 
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sitting with the four students, while off to the side sit four women who are read-
ing the paper and knitting. These are the “para’s.” Each serves as an aide to a 
student, though at least at this time they don’t have much to do. As I leave, one 
of the boys comes up to button the open second button on my suit coat. “He has 
an obsession with buttoning everything he sees,” Lillian explains. “These are not 
the special ed. students for Workability: they’re not high-functioning enough, 
though leaving them to a life on SSI does not seem right.”
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Principle Eight: Technology Jobs
The Emerging “New Technician” Jobs 
Provide an Important Niche Training Market
The ﬁrst months of the Davis administration in 1999 coincided with 
the beginning of the dot-com boom in California and in the nation. Dur-
ing 1999 and the ﬁrst quarter of 2000, tens of billions of dollars were 
invested through venture capital ﬁrms and stock offerings in companies 
promising commercial uses of the Internet. This unprecedented infusion 
of money into new companies was accompanied by declarations of a 
“New Economy” for America and the world. The New Economy would 
revolutionize not only the way business was conducted but also the 
workplace and the jobs workers held (Cassidy 2002; Cramer 2002).
At EDD, we focused on the jobs being created by the dot-com ﬁrms 
springing up in California. How many were there? How much did they 
pay? What skills were necessary to get them? What career mobility ex-
isted? We traveled to Cisco, eBay, Yahoo, Oracle, and other New Econ-
omy ﬁrms. We met with ofﬁcials at major technology ﬁrms—Hewlett-
Packard, Advanced Micro Devices, Silicon Graphics—as well as at the 
dot-coms and at three tech industry associations: The Computing Tech-
nology Industry Association (CompTIA), the Information Technology 
Association of America (ITAA), and Joint Venture: Silicon Valley.
What we found was both a phantom tech jobs boom and a real one. 
The phantom boom involved the thousands of dot-com ﬁrms that rose 
quickly in California, did a signiﬁcant amount of hiring, and then col-
lapsed within two years. These ﬁrms did leave some impact on the state’s 
employment in terms of jobs that survived. Far more important, though, 
was the growth of what we came to call “new technician” jobs—jobs 
as network administrator, ﬁeld service technician, telecommunica-
tions technician, and customer service technician in the Old Economy 
ﬁrms—the banks, the insurance companies, the law and engineering 
ﬁrms. Today, these new-technician jobs provide a new middle level of 
jobs (in a way, they are replacing the unionized manufacturing jobs that 
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California continues to lose) and a signiﬁcant job training niche for 
practitioners.
PART 1: THE DOT-COM EMPLOYMENT BOOM AND BUST
We can get an illustration of the amazing dot-com employment 
boom and bust if we compare notes on two time periods, two years 
apart: November 1999 and December 2001.
November 1999: Bob Marr, EDD technology analyst Harold Velas-
quez, and I travel to the Cisco Systems campus in San Jose. Founded 
in 1984, Cisco has grown in 15 years to be the worldwide leader in the 
piping for the Internet: the routers, LAN switches, dial-up access ser-
vices, and network management software. Cisco’s current workforce 
is 24,000 worldwide, though the Cisco spokesperson tells us that the 
company expects to double this workforce in two years and to reach 
70,000 employees in ﬁve years.
“We have existing and projected hiring needs for a range of work-
ers—in marketing and sales, in administration and secretarial support, 
as well as more directly in information technology,” the Cisco repre-
sentative tells us. The main IT needs are for highly skilled software 
engineers and programmers. However, Cisco also has positions open-
ing for IT workers with less sophisticated skills, particularly as network 
technicians installing and repairing the router systems.1
Cisco sees a big enough job market in these technician positions 
that it has gone into the business of training them for careers with Cisco. 
Cisco Networking Academies are being set up throughout California 
(and around the world) to train workers to be Cisco Certiﬁed Network 
Associates (280 hours of training). No college degree is needed, only a 
high school degree. Upon training completion, a worker can step into a 
job as a network associate that can pay as much as $38,000 per year.2 
The job explosion at Cisco is repeated at other companies we visit 
on this day: eBay, Yahoo, Oracle. At eBay, the hiring is active, with 
over 100 workers hired since 1995. We meet in a small conference room 
with the “human resources department”—four women and men in their 
twenties, none of whom have been with the ﬁrm more than a few years. 
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At Yahoo, the hiring is almost frantic—1,200 employees in the Valley 
hired in four years. 
On another trip to San Jose around the same time, we meet with a 
number of the other tech establishment ﬁrms: IBM, Selectron, Advanced 
Micro Devices. All project a healthy level of job expansion. At IBM, 
the manufacturing workforce continues to be reduced as manufacturing 
activity goes overseas. But IBM is adding more jobs in research, test-
ing, and development and cannot ﬁnd enough qualiﬁed workers, espe-
cially high-skilled programmers.3
Further, hiring is off the charts at dot-coms we contact in San Francis-
co and Oakland, notably Webvan. In the middle of 1999, Webvan, an on-
line grocer, obtains $275 million in venture capital funding—the biggest 
venture capital deal of the year. Webvan boasts an impressive investment 
team, headed by founder and CEO Louis Borders, founder of the Bor-
ders bookstore chain, and it promises to “reengineer the way people shop 
for groceries.” By November 1999, after its stock goes public, Webvan 
has a market value of $7.9 billion. It also has more than 400 employees 
and is advertising for dozens of others, both in tech jobs (such as IT 
systems administrator, Windows IT engineer, and Unix engineer) and in 
nontech jobs (such as manager of station operations and merchandising 
assistant—the latter to handle the sorting, packing, and delivery of gro-
ceries). On its website, webvan.com, Webvan states that it is “commit-
ted to injecting vibrancy into its respective local market economies,” 
and in Oakland, the hub of its Bay Area operation, it already is one of 
the city’s largest employers.
The San Francisco Bay Area is ground zero in 1999 for the dot-
com boom, and its employment ﬁgures reﬂect this. By December 1999, 
unemployment in San Francisco County, with a labor force of around 
426,000 workers, is down to 10,300 people, or 2.4 percent. Throughout 
2000, it continues to stay low—its average for the year is 2.8 percent, 
and in December it is still at 2.5 percent. Santa Clara County, the cen-
ter of the tech establishment, sees even more dramatic unemployment 
declines. Santa Clara County has the largest workforce in the Bay Area, 
with nearly 1 million workers. In December 1999, county unemploy-
ment stands at an unprecedented low of 2.2 percent (24,900 persons 
unemployed out of a workforce of 981,200). Throughout 2000, the un-
employment rate continues to stay low and even to decline. By May, it 
has reached 2.0 percent, and by November 1.5 percent. At the end of 
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December 2000, the county unemployment rate stands at 1.3 percent, 
with only 13,500 persons unemployed out of a labor force of 1.02 mil-
lion.4
December 2001: By December 2001, the unemployment picture in 
Santa Clara County has shifted dramatically. The unemployment rate 
stands at 6.3 percent, having risen steadily through the year: 3.4 percent 
in May, 5.8 percent in August, and 6.9 percent in November. Unem-
ployment in San Francisco County, too, has risen steadily, reaching 4.6 
percent in May, 6.1 percent in August, and 6.6 percent in November.5
On July 10, 2001, two years after its record venture capital invest-
ment, Webvan closes down. It ran through around $1.2 billion in invest-
ment and laid off nearly all of its workforce, which had grown in 2000 
to more than 500. Webvan’s demise followed closely that of other on-
line retailing ﬁrms in California and throughout the nation. On March 7, 
eToys, a Santa Monica–based retailer once valued at $10 billion, went 
out of business. San Francisco–based Pets.com, a ﬁrm selling pet food 
and other pet goods on-line, closed in late 2000, after losing more than 
$147 million and letting go its employees. Another of the major dot-
coms in the Silicon Valley, Excite@Home, laid off 250 workers early in 
2001—having lost $10 billion since 1995—and by 2002, the company 
was no longer in existence.
The job cuts spread to other technology ﬁrms, including technology 
ﬁrms that in 1999 and 2000 seemed impervious to layoffs. On March 
10, 2001, mighty Cisco Systems announced it was laying off 11 percent 
of its workforce. A year before, Cisco stock had been worth $446.5 
billion, and on March 10, 2001, it was valued at $164.2 billion. Cisco 
had 16,000 employees in Silicon Valley in January 2001, and by De-
cember 2001 that number had declined to not quite 12,000. Other major 
technology ﬁrms in Silicon Valley announced big job layoffs in 2001, 
including 3Com, 1,300 workers laid off; Agilent, 2,200 workers; Ap-
plied Materials, 700 workers; Compaq, 340 workers; Flextronics, 580 
workers; Maxtor, 900 workers; and Selectron, 3,000 workers.6
By late 2000, when the dot-com bust was complete, many of the 
workers who had come to Silicon Valley and to the San Francisco Bay 
Area for dot-com jobs had departed. The labor forces of both counties 
actually declined in 2001–2002. The labor force of Santa Clara Coun-
ty, which had stood at 1.26 million in December 2000, was down to 
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991,400 in September 2002. The labor force of San Francisco County, 
440,000 in December 2000, was down to 429,600 in September 2002.
Unemployment continued through 2002 at the high levels of 2001. 
The unemployment rate in Santa Clara remained above 7.5 percent 
for most of 2002, climbing to 7.9 percent in October. Similarly, in San 
Francisco, the unemployment rate throughout 2002 remained above 6.7 
percent. Figure 10.1 shows the sharp drop in unemployment in the tech-
nology counties of Santa Clara and San Francisco in 1999 and 2000 and 
the sharp rise in unemployment in 2001–2002.7
Yet even with the bust, the technology sector remained, in Silicon 
Valley and throughout the state, a major source of jobs. Moreover, it 
was ahead of its pre-1999 employment numbers. Among Valley tech-
nology ﬁrms, there were several, particularly the successful dot-coms, 
that grew considerably between 1999 and 2002. Others, although they 
Figure 10.1  Monthly Unemployment Rates in California and the  
Santa Clara and San Francisco MSAs, January 1997– 
February 2003 (%)
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did experience major job cutbacks in 2000, actually saw their total em-
ployment grow between early 1999 and the start of 2002.
Table 10.1, compiled by the North Valley (NOVA) Job Training 
Consortium staff, shows employment at selected Silicon Valley ﬁrms 
between 1999 and 2002. Among the big gainers were eBay, which re-
ported 138 employees at the end of 1999 and had increased to 2,560 
employees by the end of 2001, and Yahoo, which had 803 employees 
in 1999 and 3,000 at the end of 2001. Cisco and Oracle, which imple-
mented major cutbacks in 2001, still showed a gain in employees be-
tween 1999 and 2002.
In 1997, Santa Clara County had 926,600 total jobs and approxi-
mately 185,000 jobs in the technology sector. In 2002, the technology 
sector had 193,400 jobs, down from the 1999 and 2000 totals of more 
than 200,000 jobs but still above the pre-boom 1997 total. Further, the 
projections pointed to increased growth in these sectors. Mike Curran, 
executive director of NOVA, which oversees government job training 
and job placement programs for most of Santa Clara County, says that 
Table 10.1  Employment at Selected Silicon Valley Technology Firms, 
1999 and 2002
Employer
Year  
founded
1999  
employment
2002  
employment
eBay 1995 138 2,560
Cisco 1984 31,000 36,000
Silicon Graphics 1982 9,300 4,443
Quantum 1980 6,200 3,100
Adobe Systems Inc. 1982 2,800 3,029
Webvan 1996 414 4,201a
Juniper Networks Inc. 1996 335a 1,227
Excite@Home 1994 693 0
Yahoo Inc. 1995 803 3,000
Palm 1999 652 1,171
3Com 1979 12,920 4,615
Oracle 1977 43,000 42,006
a In 2000.
SOURCE: Unpublished data from North Valley Job Training Consortium.
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the boom-turned-bust obsured the steady growth of technology em-
ployment over those years. “There were the employment ups and then 
the employment downs of the period between 1999 and 2002,” Curran 
says, “but when the dust settled, tech employment was ahead of where 
it was at the start, with projections for continued growth.”
But if there was steady underlying growth, why was the tech market 
so volatile? “What goes up at Internet speed, can go down at Internet 
speed,” notes Curran. “The job growth we experienced in the late 1990s 
was explosive and proved to be nonsustainable. However, even with the 
massive job and city revenue losses we experienced, the ‘straight-line’ 
plotting of job growth and employment would have a pretty constant 
increase from 1993 to 2003.”8
PART 2: THE FUTURE OF TECHNOLOGY JOBS, 
ESPECIALLY IN NON-IT FIRMS, AND THE PLACE OF 
TECHNOLOGY JOBS AS A TRAINING NICHE
To speak today of technology jobs (or, as they are often referred to, 
Information Technology or IT jobs) is to speak of a wide variety of jobs 
in a wide variety of ﬁrms. A good number of these jobs are in informa-
tion technology ﬁrms, such as Cisco or Silicon Graphics or Intel, whose 
major business is conducted in sectors characterized by EDD’s Labor 
Market Information Division as “high tech”—computer-related ser-
vices, communications equipment, high-tech manufacturing (computer 
and ofﬁce equipment, communications equipment, electronic compo-
nents), and engineering/research and testing services. Projections for 
employment in these sectors are strong. As shown in Table 10.2, Cali-
fornia had 1.4 million workers in these ﬁelds in 2000, and 1.88 million 
are projected for 2010.9
Even greater growth is projected, though, for IT jobs in non-IT 
ﬁrms. The majority of IT jobs today are in nontechnology ﬁrms. They 
are in banks or insurance companies or government agencies. These 
jobs develop and maintain the system software and hardware; that is, 
the jobs develop and maintain the company’s internal and external net-
works, or on-line services, or Web sites, or hundreds of other company 
activities related to computerized activities or the Internet. The projec-
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Table 10.2  Technology Employment in California, 2002 and 2010 (projected)
Industry SIC 2002 2010 Changea
Percent 
changea
High tech manufacturing
   Computer and ofﬁce equipment 357 96,300 105,100 8,800 9.1
   Communications equipment 366 43,500 46,300 2,800 6.4
   Electronic components 367 164,500 177,500 13,000 7.9
   Search and navigation equipment 381 48,600 53,900 5,300 10.9
   Measuring and control devices 382 68,500 71,700 3,200 4.7
Communication services
   Communications 48 194,300 207,100 12,800 6.6
   Telephone communications 481 131,188 139,800 8,612 6.6
   Telegraph and other communications 482 1,602 1,707 105 6.6
   Radio and television broadcasting 483 30,757 32,776 2,019 6.6
   Cable and other pay TV services 484 26,347 28,076 1,729 6.6
   Communications services, NEC 489 4,406 4,696 290 6.6
Computer-related services
   Computer and data processing services 737 373,300 692,700 319,400 85.6
Other professional services
   Engineering and architectural services 871 123,006 163,919 40,913 33.3
   Research and testing services 873 113,434 159,732 46,298 40.8
a Projected.
SOURCE: Unpublished data from California Employment Development Department.
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tions for growth in these jobs are even greater than in the technology 
sectors—an estimated three to four times the demand for IT workers in 
IT companies.
Each April, the Information Technology Association of America 
(ITAA), the industry association, oversees a survey of hiring managers 
at major companies throughout the country and makes a broad estimate 
of job openings in IT. In April 2000, the ITAA trumpeted a forecast that 
there would be a demand for 1.6 million new IT workers in the upcom-
ing year. By April 2001, this number had dropped to 840,000, but in 
April 2002 the projection was back up to 1.1 million (ITAA 2002).10
In its 2000 report, ITAA noted the growth of IT jobs in non-IT ﬁrms 
and estimated that by the end of 2000, around 60 percent of all IT jobs 
would be in non-IT ﬁrms. Within four years, though, this percentage 
had jumped dramatically. In its September 2004 report, ITAA estimated 
that non-IT companies represented fully 79 percent of employment for 
IT workers. ITAA explained that “despite popular fears over job loss 
to outsourcing and globalization, companies in industries like bank-
ing, ﬁnance, manufacturing, food service and transportation continue to 
provide the lion’s share of employment of IT workers.” ITAA estimated 
that 89 percent of the new IT jobs added in 2004 were added by non-IT 
companies (ITAA 2004, p. 7).
Among the IT jobs, one subset is most relevant to employment of-
ﬁcials, as it consists of decent paying jobs available to workers without 
college degrees. At EDD, as noted in Chapter 2, we came to call these 
jobs the new-technician jobs. They include the positions of ﬁeld service 
technician, telecommunications technician, customer service techni-
cian, and multimedia technician. These jobs have three key character-
istics:
• They pay decent wages. Most start at $12 to $14 an hour and 
have grades of advancement to $17 or $18 an hour.
• They rarely require a college degree, or, in fact, any college 
training. Instead they require skills that can be taught in targeted 
courses ranging from four to nine months or learned on the job.
• They are within the reach of workers with ninth grade math and 
reading levels.
David Gruber, a workforce training specialist, has been a leader in 
training for these new-technician jobs. He characterizes these jobs as 
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being a promising area for job training given “their open entry, training 
that is relatively short term, and opportunities for career mobility for 
some.”11
According to both EDD and USDOL estimates, the support jobs 
are among the fastest growing IT jobs.12 EDD projections, shown in 
Table 10.3, are for the position of computer support specialist to grow 
by 74,800 jobs between 2000 and 2010, the largest growth next to that 
of computer software engineers/applications, which is projected to 
grow by 80,200 jobs. The related job of network and computer sys-
tems administrator is projected to grow by 30,900 jobs. We came to 
think of these new-technician jobs as a successor to the disappearing 
union manufacturing jobs in California. These manufacturing jobs had 
provided the middle level of jobs that enabled Californians without ad-
vanced degrees to earn a middle-income life.
In early 2000, the governor launched Techforce, an initiative de-
signed to provide funds for new-technician training. Techforce sought 
out training projects with a good understanding of the IT industry (or 
subsectors of it), a close working relationship with employers, and an 
eye for how the IT industry is rapidly changing and what impact it is 
having on the demand side of the labor market. 
The Experience of Two “Boutique” Training Agencies
Among the better new-technician trainings Techforce funded in 
the ﬁrst two years were several smaller scale or “boutique” training 
agencies, including Invercity in Oakland-Emeryville and the Bay Area 
Video Coalition (BAVC) in San Francisco, both of which specialized in 
subsectors of the IT job market. 
Invercity focused on customer service or call center technicians—
the workers operating primarily out of call centers who answer the 
phone when a business or an individual cannot get a computer to func-
tion. The jobs usually start at $11–$12 an hour and have grades of ad-
vancement to $13–$15 an hour. The Invercity training is 250 hours over 
an eight-week period, providing a mix of classroom and hands-on, of 
computer fundamentals, digital theory, hardware and software architec-
tures. The trainees are low-income adults who qualify for government 
training funds, including welfare recipients.
P
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Table 10.3  Selected Technology Jobs in California, 2002 and 2010 (projected)
Occupational title 2002 2010
Numerical 
increase
Percent 
increase
Openings due 
to separations
Computer programmer 78,600 92,700 14,100 17.9 18,000
Computer software engineer, application 72,600 152,800 80,200 110.5 7,500
Computer software engineer,  
   systems software
52,300 100,700 48,400 92.5 5,100
Computer support specialist 68,600 143,400 74,800 109.0 4,500
Computer systems analyst 51,600 82,800 31,200 60.5 5,900
Database administrator 14,400 24,800 10,400 72.2 800
Network and computer systems    
   administrator
32,200 63,100 30,900 96.0 2,000
Network systems and  
   data communications analyst
15,300 29,300 14,000 91.5 900
Computer specialist, all other 19,700 30,200 10,500 53.3 2,200
SOURCE: Unpublished data from California Employment Development Department.
Annual average
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Invercity’s founders, Gordon Lavigne and Kern Schireson, both 
men in their twenties with backgrounds in IT ﬁrms, have developed 
close working relations with East Bay companies—such as Mindpsring 
Enterprises, NonStopNet, and Etinuum Inc.—that contract to handle 
computer maintenance and troubleshooting. Lavigne and Schireson 
have developed a niche market with these companies; they understand 
the skills needed by employees, and they tailor training to acquire these 
skills.
In September 2000, the call center business is very good, and Lavi-
gne comes to EDD seeking additional Techforce funds. “We now train 
around 125 persons a year, but we could train easily ﬁve or six times 
this amount,” he claims, citing the growth of this industry model of sub-
contracting maintenance. Lavigne and Schireson also propose to EDD 
the development of an Invercity call center that can serve as a training 
ground for apprentice call center technicians while generating revenue 
to support the training.13
By 2002, Invercity has discontinued operations, and Lavigne and 
Schireson are back with private sector technology ﬁrms. The frustra-
tions of dealing with government and chasing government funds, com-
bined with opportunities elsewhere, drove them out of the ﬁeld. The call 
center market has declined, but there is still demand for the technician 
positions, and the call center training has been taken up by a consor-
tium of training agencies in Oakland that combine to do new-technician 
training.
BAVC focuses on the jobs of Web designer, Web technician, and 
assistant Webmaster. Located on the corner of Mariposa and Bryant 
streets in San Francisco’s South of Market area, BAVC in 1999 and 
2000 targeted job placements in the nearby dot-com ﬁrms, including 
Quokka.com (a ﬁrm streaming video of sports events and selling sports 
goods on-line), Macromedia, Pets.com, and Dotcomix. The BAVC 
training lasts for 480 hours over 16 weeks and involves the major soft-
ware applications—HTML, JavaScript, CGI—used in Web design and 
maintenance. During 1999 and 2000, BAVC placed around 200 adults 
in Web-related and “new media” jobs.
By 2002, many of the employers who had taken BAVC trainees are 
out of business—Quokka.com, Pets.com, Dotcomix, and Kitchen Me-
dia have all shut down. BAVC training continues, but its job placements 
have shifted to Web maintenance and information jobs in media com-
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panies and nontech Old Economy ﬁrms. According to Tamara Gould, 
BAVC’s executive director,
Job placements are more difﬁcult today than in 2000, as our gradu-
ates are competing with tech professionals who have a lot more 
experience and are willing to take technician jobs. However, we’re 
still able to make placements, and there’s still a market for digital 
media skills, mainly in media companies, such as video production 
and editing companies, and in Web management in non-IT ﬁrms. 
Some of our recent placements are in Web design at Paciﬁc Gas 
and Electric, in tech writing at Abgenix, a biotech ﬁrm, and at Gap 
Online. We still do placements in dot-coms that did survive, like 
Macromedia, eTrade, and CNET, but [placements in non-IT ﬁrms] 
are the majority of jobs.14
Regional IT Career Ladder Consortia
Beyond the boutiques of Invercity and BAVC are three more ex-
tensive new-technician training projects in California, created by Da-
vid Gruber and his colleagues at the Workforce Strategy Center in San 
Francisco. The projects, known as the Regional IT Career Ladder Con-
sortia, are located in the East Bay (Oakland), San Francisco, and Los 
Angeles. They offer job seekers the option of training in a number of 
the new-technician positions such as call center tech or computer sup-
port tech, as well as options for remedial math and reading if the job 
seeker is below the ninth grade level. They also offer upgrade training 
for workers who have been performing well in the technician jobs and 
want to advance.
The projects all follow a similar model, set out in Figure 10.2, which 
diagrams the Los Angeles consortium. The model has ﬁve components: 
1) assessment of skills; 2) 100–150 hours of math and literacy training 
for workers between the sixth and ninth grade levels; 3) 300 hours of 
training in A+ certiﬁcation, customer service, and employability skills; 
4) placement into new-technician jobs; and 5) upgrade training for 
workers in technician positions. The Los Angeles training is open to 
workers who are unemployed or are earning less than 200 percent of 
the poverty level.
The Los Angeles consortium is focusing on new-technician jobs in 
Old Economy ﬁrms, particularly those at banks, at large retail ﬁrms, 
and in government, including the Los Angeles Uniﬁed School District 
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Figure 10.2  The Los Angeles Regional IT Career Ladder System
Government/schools
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14 weeks (300 hours)
NET+ CERTIFICATION
Introduction to entertainment/
aerospace/retail/ﬁnance/legal/
insurance/health industries
Internships/employment
$14–23 per hour
1–3 months paid work experience Full-time employment
Cisco certiﬁed network administrator
(300 hours)
Microsoft certiﬁed system 
administrator/engineer
(300 hours)
Database specialist
SQL platform/database applications
(300 hours)
UNIX
(300 hours)
Full-time employment
$40K+ per year
Full-time employment
Full-time employment
$50K+ per year
Systems network administrator
(300 hours)
Database administrator
(300 hours)
PARTNERS
Workforce Strategy Center | L.A. County Dept. of Public and Social Services | L.A. Workforce Investment Board | 
Mt. San Antonio College | Compton College | Chrysalis | CTECH | Goodwill Industries
Preparation
Entry-level 
training
Upgrade 
training
Advance 
training
SOURCE: Unpublished diagram provided by David Gruber, Workforce Strategy Center, San Francisco.
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(LAUSD) and the Los Angeles Department of Water and Power (DWP). 
Caz Pereira of the Workforce Strategy Center notes that DWP has an 
estimated 270 computer technician jobs and LAUSD around 400 com-
puter technician jobs, reﬂecting their workforces’ growing computer 
use and need for troubleshooting. “The school district estimates a need 
of one technician for each 250–350 computers to keep up, or around 
400 technician jobs, personal computer technicians, and network tech-
nicians,” Pereira says. “LAUSD provides a larger new-technician job 
base than most technology ﬁrms.”
Job training for computer tech jobs is sometimes oversold as a 
remedy for joblessness. Only a small fraction of the low-skilled, low- 
income unemployed—less than 3 percent—can be trained at any one 
time for new-technician jobs. Combined government training funds, in-
cluding federal Workforce Investment Act funds and Welfare-to-Work 
funds, trained around 4,000 Californians for new-technician positions 
in 2002—not a large part of the more than 1 million unemployed on 
any given day in California, and not even a large part of the low-income 
unemployed.
At the same time, new-technician training represents a signiﬁcant 
niche for practitioners. The training can be done in a period of less than 
six to nine months, entry does not require advanced math or science, 
and the jobs pay a decent wage. While technology employment will 
have periods of boom and bust in the future, as it has in the recent past, 
these new-technician jobs will continue to experience steady growth. 
Notes
 1.  Michael McNeal, director of corporate employment at Cisco, complained to 
ABC Television in October 1999 of the difﬁculty of ﬁnding workers and the 
need to “think outside the box” to attract qualiﬁed employees. Cisco had gone so 
far as to recruit at the Santa Clara Home and Garden Show, using that event as a 
location to meet qualiﬁed workers.
 2.  Throughout the 1990s, Cisco set up an extensive network of Cisco Academies 
at community colleges, adult education programs, and school districts as well as 
at nonproﬁt training agencies. By November 2002, there were more than 9,000 
Cisco Academies across the United States and worldwide—484 in California 
alone. In the San Francisco Bay Area, Mission College started a Cisco Academy 
in 1999 and enrolled 1,200 students that year, 2,300 in 2001, and 2,200 in 2002. 
Of the 2,300 students enrolled in 2001, 550 graduated, having earned a network 
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administrator certiﬁcate. Foothill Community College established a Cisco Acad-
emy in 2002, enrolling 50 students. The skill level of the students varied from in-
dividuals just entering the technology ﬁeld to individuals who were experienced 
and sought to upgrade their skills and knowledge. An estimated 50–60 percent of 
the enrollees were unemployed; the remainder were incumbent workers seeking 
to upgrade skills.
 3. Libby Freeman, IBM representative, meeting with the author, November 2, 
1999.
 4.  Joint Venture: Silicon Valley Network, a research group in Santa Clara, issued 
several well-publicized reports in 1999 and 2000 noting the difﬁculty of tech 
ﬁrms in ﬁnding workers and the thousands of tech jobs going unﬁlled because of 
a shortage of trained tech workers. 
 5. Figures for the previous two paragraphs come from “Selected Monthly Unem-
ployment Rates for California Counties,” by the Labor Market Information Divi-
sion of EDD, 2001.
 6. Silicon Valley Workforce Investment Network, “Santa Clara Monthly Stats Fact 
Sheet,” March 2002.
    The tech job decline was most pronounced in the San Francisco Bay Area but 
occurred throughout the state. Thomas Kupper of the San Diego Union-Tribune 
tracked the value of 38 San Diego companies that went public from 1997 to 
2000, most of them high-tech or biotechnology ﬁrms. Combined, they had raised 
$2.4 billion in initial public offerings. Kupper found that the companies still trad-
ing in 2002 were down an average of 36 percent from their initial prices and 93 
percent from their peak prices.
    In January 2002, the Bay Area Council, an economic development associa-
tion, released “After the Bubble: Sustaining Economic Prosperity.” The report 
noted a net migration into the Bay Area of 200,000 people between 1996 and 
2000 compared to a 35,000 net migration between 1991 and 1995, and an em-
ployment increase of 660,000 jobs between 1996 and 2000 compared to an in-
crease of 120,000 jobs between 1991 and 1995 (Bay Area Council 2002).
 7. EDD, Labor Market Information Division, “Selected Monthly Unemployment 
Rates for California Counties,” 2002.
 8.  Curran notes in a November 27, 2002, e-mail that for tech workers, the job mar-
ket today is a far cry from what it was in 1999: 
Where a tech writer, for example, might have multiple job offers in 1999, 
by 2002 she or he might send out a resume to 40 ﬁrms with only a few 
responses. Hiring is still proceeding, and some unemployed workers have 
no trouble, but the ﬁrms are far more selective. After losing their jobs, more 
Valley workers are looking for the security of employment in the public sec-
tor. As the dreams of immediate wealth through stock options and IPOs have 
disappeared, the reality of a little savings for retirement and long-term health 
care have caused workers to rethink their career strategies. Three years ago if 
we posted a job for an analyst, we would have a handful of applicants; today 
we have hundreds.
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 9.  Though projections were for signiﬁcant tech employment growth, there were dis-
turbing signs in 2002, particularly the movement of programming jobs offshore. 
As Los Angeles Times employment reporters Evelyn Iritani and Marla Dickerson 
noted, for some time California tech companies had been shipping manufactur-
ing jobs offshore, and this trend continued in 2002. Adding to it, though, was the 
exodus of call center jobs and programming jobs. According to Iritani and Dick-
erson, a growing number of ﬁrms, including Dell Computer, General Electric, 
and Citibank, had shifted call centers and other information technology service 
operations overseas, particularly to India, China, and Russia, to cut costs (Iritani 
and Dickerson 2002).
10.  ITAA contracts with Market Decisions Corp. of Portland, Oregon, which con-
ducted telephone interviews with 532 hiring managers selected at random from 
IT and non-IT companies. ITAA (2002) claims that results have a sampling vari-
ance of +/−3.6 percent at the 90 percent conﬁdence level.
 11. David Gruber, interview with the author, San Francisco, 2002.
12.  A research project conducted by David Gruber and Manpower–San Jose found 
that for the week of April 23, 2001, there were 525 unﬁlled entry-level technician 
positions within a 50-mile radius of San Jose, including 190 technicians, 206 
in technical support, 46 at the help desk, 47 in network administration, and 36 
personal computer technicians.
 13. Gordon Lavigne, presentation to EDD, San Francisco, September 2000.
 14. Tamara Gould, interview with the author, San Francisco, 2002.
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Principle Nine: Afﬁnity Groups
The Best Antipoverty Efforts Go 
Beyond Government Programs 
PART 1: THE IDEA BEHIND THE FAMILY INDEPENDENCE 
INITIATIVE AND ITS NONGOVERNMENTAL APPROACH
On a Friday in October 2000, the heads of major California founda-
tions, state departments, and local governments gather in the confer-
ence room of Oakland Mayor Jerry Brown. The subject is a new project 
that Brown is sponsoring, the Family Independence Initiative, or, as it 
comes to be called, 200 Families Out of Poverty. It has typical Jerry 
Brown themes: get rid of bureaucracy, cut out the poverty administra-
tors, and have poor people do things for themselves.
Brown had moved to Oakland in 1995. Soon after his arrival, he 
buys a warehouse near Jack London Square and turns it into a secular 
monastery, headquarters for his We the People organization as well as 
a cluster of spartan living quarters for himself and several others. He 
throws himself into local projects, including starting a food co-op and 
community gardens and organizing to keep Kaiser, the health care gi-
ant, from moving out of Oakland. In 1997, he runs for mayor and is 
elected overwhelmingly.
Antipoverty programs need to change, Brown argues during the 
campaign and upon taking ofﬁce. Too much of the money goes to pro-
gram administrators and staff and too little to poor people. The persons 
who beneﬁt most from antipoverty programs often are those who get 
jobs helping to run the program, not others among the poor.
In early 1999, Brown hears about a youth employment initiative 
of the Clinton administration that has promised to allocate $10 mil-
lion to Oakland. Most of the $10 million, though, is going to hire 129 
program staff and case managers and to provide ofﬁce space for them. 
Brown calls Maurice Lim Miller, then a member of the Private Industry 
198 Bernick
Council of San Francisco, to protest that the youth don’t seem to be 
beneﬁting.1
“He called and asked why I supported using the grant money for 
staff. I said I agreed with him,” Miller recalls. “And further, [I said] 
that over the years I had become increasingly uncomfortable with gov-
ernment programs. I told him about HUD programs in West Oakland 
that bore [a] subsidy of $137,000 per family dwelling, when for half 
that amount, a family could put a down payment on a home. He asked 
whether I had any ideas for getting more of the antipoverty money to 
poor people, and I told him that I would come back with a proposal.”2
Miller, in 1999, is an unlikely critic of government programs. In 
1978, after training as an engineer, Miller goes to work at a small com-
munity-based training agency, Asian Neighborhood Design (AND). 
Over the next two decades, he builds AND into a nationally recognized 
model of effective job training—so well known that he sits in the presi-
dent’s box for Bill Clinton’s State of the Union address in 1999. 
Yet even as he is achieving this recognition, Miller comes to see 
government antipoverty efforts as wrongly structured, both in their 
spending of funds (for administration, case managers, and program 
consultants) and in their view of poor people as needing care. Too often, 
the emphasis is on signing up low-income Californians for this or that 
beneﬁt, and not on developing families’ ability and initiative to solve 
their own problems.
In the months after his conversation with Jerry Brown, Miller de-
signs an antipoverty nonprogram approach that draws heavily on the 
experience of his own family—immigrants from the Philippines and 
Mexico—and that of other immigrant families he grew up with. They 
did not go to government programs. Instead, they usually took low-
wage jobs or engaged in microenterprises to get started economically. 
They pooled resources, not only among members of a family, but also 
among families. Miller dubs this combination of families an afﬁnity 
group—a group linked by shared trust and by mutuality.
Miller envisions poor families in Oakland working together in afﬁn-
ity groups on economic advancement: striving for asset accumulation 
through savings accounts and home ownership, steady employment, 
and education for themselves and their children. The effort would start 
with three or four groups of families and expand over time to additional 
afﬁnity groups. The effectiveness of the effort would be measured not 
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by process items like services rendered but by how many of the families 
were able to move above the poverty line and get off of all government 
subsidy programs.
In 2000, Mayor Brown assembles the gathering described in the 
opening to this chapter, calling it the Family Independence Initiative 
(FII) Commission. Its members’ job is to review Miller’s ideas. Like 
Miller, most of the women and men around the table have been involved 
in the antipoverty ﬁght through government programs for 20 years or 
more and have risen to top positions in government and foundations. As 
we go around the table, though, nearly all confess to being increasingly 
skeptical of the government services approach.
Michael Howe, president of the East Bay Community Foundation, 
cites Marin City, a low-income, largely African American community 
in otherwise-afﬂuent Marin County, as exemplifying the limits of a gov-
ernment services approach. Millions of dollars have been poured into 
Marin City to nonproﬁts providing economic development, employ-
ment, or housing services—an estimated $100,000 per family—and yet 
the families served are not achieving economic self-sufﬁciency. “The 
families received a lot of services, but did not ﬁnd their own pathways 
to self-sufﬁciency,” Howe says.3
PART 2: FII IDENTIFIES FOUR AFFINITY GROUPS BASED 
ON ETHNICITY
Encouraged by the commission’s response, Miller resigns from 
Asian Neighborhood Design after heading it for 22 years and goes to 
work full time for FII as executive director. The goal becomes to get 
200 Oakland families, near or below the poverty line when they en-
rolled, to increase their family income and especially their ﬁnancial as-
sets and get off of all government programs—hence the unofﬁcial name 
200 Families Out of Poverty. 
Miller and other FII staff began recruiting families in 2001. They 
told prospective families that FII was a different type of antipoverty 
effort, one that relied on families working with one another to get out 
of poverty. FII would provide the families with contacts, help them to 
build savings accounts, and offer small bonuses—up to $3,000—to be 
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earned by the families through the actions they took. On their end, the 
families were expected to divulge all of their ﬁnancial information to 
FII and to take concrete steps to change their ﬁnancial situation.
“This became our key criterion: whether a family was committed 
to taking measures toward economic self-sufﬁciency,” Miller explains. 
“Some families or individuals we spoke to were interested in earning 
the $3,000 but were not sufﬁciently committed to economic self-sufﬁ-
ciency; they were not willing or in a position to make the serious effort. 
Other families did not seem sufﬁciently committed to working with 
[their afﬁnity group] families, a key FII component.”4
To identify viable prospects, Miller ﬁrst went to agencies that 
worked with the poor in Oakland. Catholic Worker told him about two 
Salvadoran families that might make good candidates: although they 
were poor, they took an active part in community affairs. Miller visited 
the two families, who recommended four other families—all from the 
same village in El Salvador. These six families became FII’s ﬁrst afﬁn-
ity group.
While at Asian Neighborhood Design, Miller had become acquaint-
ed with members of the Iu Mien community. The Iu Mien had come to 
Oakland from Laos over the past 20 years. In their native Laos, they had 
been peasant farmers for the most part, barely literate in their own lan-
guage. In the United States, these barriers continued: they were set apart 
from other immigrant groups in that they had a high welfare rate—more 
than 60 percent of Iu Mien families remained on welfare. 
In Oakland, much of this Laotian community was involved with 
the Iu Mien Cultural Center, so the pool of families had social ties: al-
though they had not worked together on projects, they knew each other 
from community events. These connections gave rise to a second afﬁn-
ity group, this one consisting of 11 Iu Mien families.
By the end of that year, two African American groups had also 
formed. FII had experienced several false starts with African Ameri-
can groups that did not coalesce, but then its staff assembled one afﬁn-
ity group of six families and another of seven families. These became 
known as the East Oakland group and the West Oakland group accord-
ing to where their members lived, although there had been no attempt 
to organize them by neighborhood. 
The East Oakland group was started by one woman, who brought in 
four families she had met through a drug recovery program they had all 
Principle Nine: Afﬁnity Groups   201
attended. The West Oakland group—similar to the Iu Mien group—re-
volved around an ethnic cultural association: one family that belonged 
to an Afrocentric cultural association recruited others it knew through 
that organization.
Thus, each of the four afﬁnity groups consisted of a single ethnic or 
racial group. “This reﬂects the reality in America today,” Miller says, 
“that though some afﬁnity groups are based around religion or neigh-
borhood or shared background, the great majority are by ethnicity.”5
PART 3: THE AFFINITY GROUPS PURSUE DIFFERENT 
ECONOMIC STRATEGIES
During 2002 and 2003, the four groups take different ﬁnancial 
paths, which are closely tracked by FII researchers. Family behavior 
is followed on ﬁve indices: 1) net worth and savings, 2) income, 3) job 
and job security, 4) education, and 5) home ownership. FII staff meet 
regularly with the families to discuss strategies for economic self-suf-
ﬁciency.
1. The Salvadoran afﬁnity group. The Salvadoran group, the ﬁrst 
formed (in July 2001), is active early on in home ownership. FII links 
the group to the local Habitat for Humanity, which assists families in 
building their own homes. Habitat chooses two Salvadoran families, 
and a third one borrows to put a down payment on a home—FII as-
sists only with preparing the closing documents. More than any other 
factor, seeing these three families purchase homes spurs increased sav-
ings and income among the other families in the group. The Salvadoran 
adults work primarily in jobs as nonunion landscapers, janitors, and 
housecleaners. Over the two years, the family incomes increase mainly 
through the adults working additional hours or second jobs or starting 
a side business. All of the families open Individual Development Ac-
counts (IDAs), and the group organizes several sessions on ﬁnancial 
management.6
2. The Iu Mien afﬁnity group. The Iu Mien, who make up the sec-
ond group formed, have 14 working adults, employed in light industry 
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and janitorial. Upon enrollment, the families meet together and write 
the following objective: “We all share the same goals. We all want to be 
able to buy a home or open a small business, and to save enough money 
for our children’s college tuitions and expenses so that they can pursue 
their educational goals.” According to FII data, all of the families in 
this group open IDAs, and their work hours increase. The group thinks 
intergenerationally and sees the payoffs as occurring in their children’s 
lives. “The adults in this group do not see themselves as advancing in 
education or starting businesses, but want to save money for the next 
generation,” FII researchers note.7
3. The West Oakland African American afﬁnity group. The 
West Oakland group enters FII with considerable personal debt and 
with negative net worth. According to FII notes, “More than any of the 
other groups, the members of this group set personal and group goals of 
cleaning up credit records, debt and liens.”8 Group members individu-
ally set strategies to increase income. One member owes child-support 
payments and other debt. Over time, he is persuaded to stop evading 
the debt and work with a ﬁnancial counselor to address it. His only 
means of support has been a part-time drop-out-prevention project for 
middle school students. In an attempt to expand his ability to generate 
income, he enrolls in a series of community college courses. Another 
member enrolls in a community college course on how to write a busi-
ness plan. She envisions starting a business venture in which she would 
sell beauty products. A third member, who has a job with the county 
health department, tries to earn extra income by doing contract work on 
AIDS prevention. Meanwhile, the group as a whole seeks to develop 
the Ma’arij Urban Day Spa and Community Healing Center as a collec-
tive business venture. 
4. The East Oakland African American afﬁnity group. The East 
Oakland group experiences less economic gain than the others during 
the two years, reﬂecting personal upheavals among the families. Two 
young women with children in this group, who were in their own house-
holds when FII started, move back with their mothers within the year 
and undertake little economic activity. Still, there are some economic 
efforts among the group: a promotion at work, an attempt to formalize 
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and grow a small catering operation, an attempt at expanding a ﬂedg-
ling halfway-house business, a down payment on a house.
PART 4: PRELIMINARY FII IMPACT
In June 2003, it is still too early to reach conclusions about the im-
pact of FII. FII data in Figure 11.1 show families’ increases in net worth 
and savings averaging over 50 percent in the ﬁrst 12–18 months of pro-
gram participation. These sharp gains, though, in part reﬂect the low 
net-worth and savings levels the families had on entering the program. 
They also reﬂect the role of the IDAs in matching participant savings 
with foundation funds. Further, whether these gains, and the income 
gains, are sustainable remains to be determined.
Yet, even if it is difﬁcult to quantify, the project has spurred low-
income individuals and families to a new level of economic activity. A 
lot of that activity, particularly the business development efforts, may 
not succeed. However, other initial impacts are clearer: home owner-
ship among participants is greater than it would have been without FII, 
as are savings rates and work hours. These impacts are brought about 
not by new government services, but by heightened effort on the part 
of the families.
In an April 2003 report to the FII Commission, Miller states that 
“both I and staff feel conﬁdent that 70–80 percent of families now par-
ticipating will become principally self-sufﬁcient within the next two to 
three years. As with any goal, the primary factor is wanting something 
enough, and we think that FII has given the families a realizable hope 
that their vision can come true. FII has given families a sense that they 
can press to make a big change in their lives and it can make a differ-
ence.”
This seems to me to get it right. The antipoverty added-value of 
FII is threefold: improved economic decision making by the families 
through FII referrals; improved economic decision making through vet-
ting ideas among the family group; and, most of all, increased effort by 
participants, both through individual motivation and through the sup-
port of the family group. In his report Miller points out that “incomes, 
savings, [and] new networks had stayed ﬂat for over 80 percent of fami-
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Figure 11.1  Income, Net Worth, and Savings Increases for FII 
Participants for the 12–18 Months Following Program 
Enrollment
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Figure 11.1  (continued)
Average household savings improvement
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Figure 11.1  (continued)
NOTE: Participants enrolled between July 2001 and December 2001. Data, prepared 
by FII, does not distinguish among different lengths of program participation.
SOURCE: Unpublished data provided by Maurice Miller and Marisa Castuera of the 
Family Independence Initiative.
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lies before FII. Our tracking system has data for four months prior to 
families getting their ﬁrst awards; incomes showed no progress, and net 
worth actually went down by 4.8 percent.”
As of mid-2003, FII planned to continue the four family afﬁnity 
groups and, in the fall of 2003, to launch its next phase. This phase was 
to enroll 75 families in Oakland who were receiving welfare payments 
under the state’s welfare system, CalWORKs. Its goal: moving them 
to self-sufﬁciency. The families were to include a mix of the employed 
(working but earning below the poverty line) and the unemployed. The 
families were to self-associate, choosing their own afﬁnity groups. This 
next phase was to prove most telling, as the families would start with 
even fewer assets, less income, and less community involvement.
FII also planned to continue to collect detailed ﬁnancial informa-
tion from new and ongoing families on a regular basis. The informa-
tion gathered so far conﬁrms what other studies on low-income families 
have shown: 1) the resourcefulness of many low-income families, 2) the 
undercounting of ofﬁcial government income ﬁgures (which miss in-
come generated in the informal economy), and 3) the ability of the fam-
ilies to efﬁciently meet child care, housing, and transportation needs at 
far lower cost than government programs.
FII uses the term social capital to describe the networks and social 
connections that enable resourceful FII families to get by in the high-
cost San Francisco Bay Area. Table 11.1 is a case study of an FII family, 
prepared by Miller and his FII colleague Marisa Castuera to illustrate 
the role of social capital. The family has been in the United States for 
11 years and is part of the Salvadoran afﬁnity group. According to The 
Self-Sufﬁciency Standard for California (Pearce and Brooks 2000), 
developed by antipoverty advocacy groups, this family needs at least 
$4,292 a month to live in the San Francisco Bay Area.9 But the family’s 
actual expenses are $2,607—far less than the standard sets out. The 
expenses are reduced through child care provided by a grandmother, 
through the family helping their landlord on house maintenance, and 
through partial government subsidies of health care and transportation 
costs. The family’s ofﬁcial income is $2,050 per month, but its true 
income is $4,600, taking into account off-the-books side jobs in house-
keeping and gardening.
Castuera and Miller write in their case study that “while govern-
ment subsidies are necessary to keep health care and other expenses 
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ernickMonthly expenses
Ofﬁcial cost 
of livinga
Actual 
expenses Difference Explanation of difference
Value of 
social 
capital
Value of 
government 
support
Housing/utilities 1,263 640 +623 Same apartment for 8 years, friends 
with owner
623 0
Child careb 1,587 833 +754 Grandmother provides after-school 
care
754 0
Food 607 400 +207 Offset by government subsidy 0 50
Transportation 98 180 −82 Gas, maintenance, car insurance 0 0
Health care 347 50 +297 Insured through Medi-Cal and 
Healthy Families
0 297
Miscellaneous 390 504 −114 0 0
Total monthly expenses 4,292 2,607 +1,685 1,377 347
Monthly income
Ofﬁcial 
income
Actual 
income
Female: part-time housekeeping 650 650 0
Female: part-time work for cash 0 850 850 Side jobs through personal/
professional connections
850
Male: landscaping and gardening 1,400 1,400 0
Male: part-time work for cash 0 1,000 1,000 Side jobs through personal/
professional connections
1,000
Child support for oldest child 400 400 0
Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) 0 300 300 0 300
Total monthly income 2,450 4,600 2,150 Side jobs through connections 1,850 300
Net balance −1,842 +1,993 Total 3,227 647
Table 11.1  The Economic Value of Social Capital: How an FII Family Achieves Savings with Ofﬁcial Income below 
the Self-Sufﬁciency Standard (all columns in $)
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NOTE: Blank = not applicable.
a Taken from The Self-Sufﬁciency Standard for California, prepared for Californians for Family Economic Self-Sufﬁciency Project 
(Pearce and Brooks 2000).
b Figures come from the Community Child Care Coordinating Council of Alameda County. Calculated using average monthly cost for  
in-home child care within the county.
SOURCE: Unpublished data provided by Maurice Miller and Marisa Castuera, Family Independence Initiative.
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manageable for this family, their social capital is by far the most impor-
tant contributor to their economic survival and future.” The family is 
saving toward the purchase of a home, and most of the undocumented 
income is being saved toward a down payment. The family has saved 
$26,000 to date. “This family’s strategy toward independence is typi-
cal,” Miller and Castuera note.10
Miller and the FII Commission regard FII as a work in progress, 
undergoing periodic reevaluation as to which incentives—IDAs, home 
ownership, direct payments—best achieve the result of economic self-
sufﬁciency. Already there is dispute about the direct payments. As con-
stituted, FII allows families to earn up to $3,000 per year (for two years) 
through a series of small payments for achievements in education ($50 
for enrolling in a skills training program or class), ﬁnances ($50 for 
opening a savings account), and housing, among others. Miller justiﬁes 
these payments as getting money into the hands of participants for their 
asset accumulation efforts, as well as for stimulating economically re-
sponsible behavior. Others on the commission, though, regard the direct 
payments as paying families for actions they should take on their own.
Further, the $3,000 per family comes from private foundation funds. 
But already there is indication that the foundations, which prefer to gen-
erate new approaches but not provide ongoing funds, are looking to 
decrease their participation. For FII’s long-term operation, the commis-
sion must show that participating families are getting off of government 
beneﬁt programs—welfare, Food Stamps, housing subsidies—resulting 
in government savings. A percentage of these savings might then be 
plowed back into FII.
PART 5: FII IN THE CONTEXT OF NEW ECONOMIC SELF-
SUFFICIENCY INITIATIVES NATIONWIDE
FII follows a succession of antipoverty efforts over the past two 
decades that have sought alternatives to the government service model. 
It has elements of previous efforts—inner-city entrepreneurship, asset 
accumulation, and mutual support—even as it differs from these efforts 
in important ways.
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In the late 1970s and the 1980s, many of us in the employment ﬁeld 
were drawn to private sector entrepreneurship as a strategy both for job 
training groups and for low-income individuals. Business ventures for 
job training groups meant an alternative to dependence on government 
funds. Business ventures for low-income individuals meant new jobs 
being created, wider ownership, a stake in the free-market system, and 
economic self-sufﬁciency.
Between 1982 and 1984, San Francisco Renaissance, the job train-
ing agency I headed, started businesses in carpet cleaning, cable assem-
bly, messenger service, and running a convenience store. In the ﬁrst few 
years, we were excited about this approach, and I even wrote an article 
that appeared in the Harvard Business Review advocating it across the 
antipoverty world (Bernick 1984b). But over the next years, as the busi-
nesses did not create many jobs, and as we (like most other job training 
groups starting businesses) struggled to get these businesses to break 
even, the approach lost its luster. At EDD I discouraged this approach, 
except in rare cases.
At San Francisco Renaissance we also operated an entrepreneur-
ship center to train aspiring entrepreneurs who had limited ﬁnancial 
resources or who wanted to start businesses in the city’s low-income 
areas. The Renaissance Entrepreneurship Center was one of a variety 
of attempts by government and community-based agencies during the 
1980s to train or help ﬁnance inner-city and rural entrepreneurs. As 
these attempts, particularly the inner-city loan funds, have matured over 
the years, they have increased their professionalism and effectiveness, 
even if the number of businesses they reach is limited—100–200 busi-
nesses per fund.
FII takes a positive but cautious approach to entrepreneurship as 
a means to self-sufﬁciency. It relies on the families to come forward 
with business ideas and to request business training. FII provides some 
ﬁnancing to new business ventures by its participants, but only through 
the IDAs, which require match ﬁnancing from the participant’s per-
sonal funds. FII gives a more prominent role in self-sufﬁciency to as-
set accumulation through IDAs, and nearly all of the FII families have 
opened IDAs. In this way, FII reﬂects the broader movement in the 
1990s by foundations and community agencies to devise savings and 
asset accumulation strategies for the poor.
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The IDA program was launched in the early 1990s, mainly through 
the auspices of the Corporation for Enterprise Development (CFED). 
During the 1980s, CFED had been at the forefront of entrepreneurship 
projects, and while it has not abandoned these projects, its focus (and 
the focus of its long-term chair, Robert E. Friedman) has become the 
IDAs. Between 1997 and 2001, CFED sponsored the major nationwide 
IDA demonstration, the Down Payments on The American Dream Poli-
cy Demonstration, which involved 13 community organizations operat-
ing 14 IDA programs that had 1,326 participants.
I meet with Friedman in July 2000 to discuss the governor’s interest 
in self-sufﬁciency for TANF recipients. We consider possible changes 
in the state’s Welfare and Institutions Code to allow TANF recipients to 
participate in IDAs. Friedman is enthusiastic about the IDA experience 
up to this point, noting that there are 250 IDA programs, either active or 
in development, and that 36 states have authorized IDAs in their TANF 
plans or through separate legislation. To Friedman, the IDA experience 
shows that with matching resources and motivation, the poor can in-
crease savings rates and achieve a fuller stake in the market system, and 
he is committed to working on it full time.
FII differs from other IDA programs in its emphasis on the afﬁn-
ity group. FII tests whether, within the afﬁnity group, families can be 
pulled along by one another in asset accumulation, sometimes through 
direct loan or contribution of resources, often through encouragement 
and modeling by the better-off families.
In April 2002, the Annie E. Casey Foundation asks Maurice Mil-
ler to speak in Chicago at its Family Support America Conference, a 
gathering of staff from nonproﬁts that provide services to low-income 
families—especially teen mothers, mothers on welfare, and homeless 
families. Although this group is part of the social service establish-
ment, Miller’s presentation draws an enthusiastic response. “This is the 
start of what could be an awesome national change in how families are 
helped,” the pastor of an ethnic church writes. The executive director 
of a residential program for teen mothers declares that “two years is a 
great opportunity to really give the time and energy to bring these fami-
lies to self-sufﬁciency instead of being ‘poverty pimps.’” More than 20 
participants request additional information or offer to host an FII site.11
Miller, though, is slow to follow up, and a year later he has not seri-
ously pursued site requests. He questions whether these service provid-
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ers can make the leap and redirect resources from services. He believes 
that FII needs to show results in Oakland before adding sites. The en-
thusiasm at the conference and the attractiveness of economic self-suf-
ﬁciency, control of resources, and afﬁnity groups mean little unless the 
FII families show sustained economic gains over the next few years.
PART 6: PROJECT UPDATE—HOW FII HAS FARED OVER 
THE PAST TWO YEARS
By mid-2005, the FII families are showing mixed economic results, 
and FII is continuing to reﬁne its design.12 Three of the four original 
afﬁnity groups are still in operation and are pursuing varied economic 
strategies of home ownership, savings accounts, and entrepreneurial 
ventures. Fifty-one new families have been enrolled in nine new afﬁn-
ity groups and are setting their economic strategies. An FII project has 
been established in Hawaii. 
Twenty-one of the 24 families in the original four afﬁnity groups 
have remained in contact with the FII staff. The families no longer re-
ceive funds for their participation—the $3,000 that could be earned 
each year by each family was only for the ﬁrst two years of participa-
tion. These families, though, continue to ﬁle reports on their income 
and net worth, and they continue to come to FII for contacts at ﬁnancial 
institutions and public agencies.13
One of the two African American groups, the East Oakland group, 
has stopped functioning. Fragile from the start, the group dissolved in 
2004, and only one of the families remains in contact with FII. 
The other African American group, the West Oakland group, has 
continued to meet, carrying out individual ﬁnancial goals and two ma-
jor economic development projects. Several members of the group con-
tinue to plan an Afrocentric health center and spa. Other members are 
trying to develop an African American–themed residential and com-
mercial project in West Oakland called Village Bottoms. One of the 
members has purchased property in the area, and the group envisions an 
area for African American entrepreneurs to cluster their businesses in.
The Salvadoran group remains together and maintains its focus on 
home ownership. Each of the six families now has purchased a home in 
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the East Bay. The families also continue their individual employment 
and their business efforts in home maintenance and nonunion landscap-
ing.
Three families of the Iu Mien group have purchased homes, and 
home ownership has become a goal of the other families, along with in-
come and savings. The group is focusing on a major collective project, 
an East Bay Iu Mien community center. 
Overall, the FII data show that after three years, among the 21 
families still in FII contact, household income since enrollment has in-
creased 40 percent and household net worth 283 percent. The savings of 
the families have increased 64 percent—a drop from Year Two because 
more families spent savings to purchase a home in Year Three. Eleven 
of the families now own homes or property. Miller’s revised estimate is 
that a third of the families are self-sufﬁcient today, in mid-2005.14
The enrollment of new afﬁnity groups, projected to take place in 
the fall of 2003, did not start until mid-2004. Only now, in mid-2005, 
are the nine groups, representing 51 families, enrolled and ready to start 
their participation. The groups are mainly based on ethnicity and are 
weighted to immigrant ethnicities. They include one Vietnamese afﬁn-
ity group, four Cambodian afﬁnity groups, one new Iu Mien afﬁnity 
group, and one African American afﬁnity group. For the ﬁrst time, there 
are two mixed ethnicity groups, one centered on a local community 
college. Over three-quarters of the families are CalWORKs families, 
meaning that they are receiving some form of public assistance.15
FII in mid-2005 is beginning a structured evaluation process of its 
ﬁrst years by retaining an outside evaluator. Already, though, FII board 
members have started rethinking and reﬁning the program design to 
increase the economic gains of participating families and to broaden 
the reach of program funds. For example, rather than allow families to 
earn $3,000 in each of the ﬁrst two years, perhaps FII should spread the 
$6,000 per family over three or four years, thus encouraging longer-
term collaborations. Perhaps the family funds should be reserved for 
the IDAs or for other savings and ownership activities. Perhaps the next 
participating groups should utilize a form of random assignment so that 
truer measurement might be made of any gains over a control group. 
What is important is that FII continues to evolve and that the FII staff 
and board are honest about results. 
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Honesty and the ability to build on these ﬁrst years’ experiences 
will be key if FII is to expand, both across Oakland and to other cities. 
Over the past three years, FII has demonstrated not only the interest of 
families in working together and in acquiring wealth, but also the hun-
ger of practitioners and policymakers across the nation for alternatives 
to government antipoverty approaches. Maurice Miller did not follow 
up on some of the initial requests for FII sites in other cities. But the 
contacts from private foundations and practitioners continued, and in 
2004, three private foundations combined to start a $1 million FII proj-
ect in Hawaii, for which Miller became a consultant. The cities of San 
Francisco and Denver are considering variants of FII. Intuitively, many 
practitioners and policymakers understand the power of tapping into 
the antipoverty values of families, especially when those families work 
together for employment and ownership. 
Notes
 1. The Private Industry Council of San Francisco offers no-cost employment train-
ing services to San Francisco employers and to job seekers who are low-income 
or laid-off workers, on public assistance, or homeless.
 2. Maurice Miller, interview with the author, 2000.
 3. Michael Howe, interview with the author, 2000.
 4. Maurice Miller, interview with the author, June 2003.
 5. Miller, 2003 interview. Of the original 30 families, some had incomes above the 
poverty threshold, though all were below 200 percent of the threshold.
 6. IDA is a nationwide program that emerged in the 1990s to encourage low- 
income families to increase their assets. It matches deposits by the families on 
a one-to-one and even a two-to-one basis. The match funds have come mainly 
from private foundations. The money in the IDAs can be used only for certain 
asset-building activities—primarily home ownership, secondary education, busi-
ness development, and (in qualiﬁed cases) car ownership. The IDA is one of the 
centerpieces of FII, and all four afﬁnity groups were encouraged to participate.
 7. FII staff report, “Report to the FII Commission,” December 6, 2002.
 8. Ibid.
 9. The amount that the standard sets out differs by region in California.
10. FII case ﬁles. FII describes the case study as follows: “The family data and 
household income used for this case study belong to an actual family living in 
Oakland, California. FII has worked with this family since June 2001. Household 
size, 6: Mother (32), Father (27), Grandmother (66), Son (9), Son (4), Daughter 
(3). Figures are only available for family of 4. True costs for this family of 6 will 
be signiﬁcantly higher thus increasing the value of their social capital.”
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11. Quotations in this paragraph are from feedback forms distributed at Miller’s pre-
sentation. These were attached to FII staff’s “Report to the FII Commission,” 
May 2, 2002.
 12. The original text for this chapter was completed in late 2003. The following 
section was written and added in June 2005 to update the reader on how FII had 
progressed in the intervening two years. 
 13. Maurice Miller, interview with the author, May 2005; Marisa Castuera, interview 
with the author, May 2005.
 14. Miller, e-mail message to the author, May 19, 2005; also, Miller, Castuera, and 
Chao (2004).
 15. “Family Independence Initiative Update,” October 2004 FII Commission meet-
ing, Oakland, California.
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Principle Ten: Globalization
The Job Training Professional Assumes a 
Greater Role in a World of Globalization, 
Competition, and Outsourcing
James Lorenz served as EDD director during Jerry Brown’s ﬁrst 
term as governor in the mid-1970s. Lorenz’s directorship was a short 
one—just over six months. However, he subsequently wrote one of the 
ﬁnest books of the past 50 years about California government and poli-
tics—Jerry Brown: The Man on the White Horse (Lorenz 1978). The 
book chronicles Lorenz’s time as Brown’s campaign policy director in 
1974 and as EDD director in the ﬁrst half of 1975.
For Lorenz, his time in state government was “a long journey . . . 
like a trip down a river,” he writes.
In my imagination, I was back on the great river now, moving 
through the heartland of the country, where the truest, most pro-
found American archetypes reside, Huckleberry Finn and Tom 
Sawyer and Jim, the runaway slave—and somehow the story that 
Mark Twain composed ninety-two years ago seemed like a meta-
phor for us all. (Lorenz 1978) 
To an extent, every political campaign and new administration are 
a journey down the Mississippi. There are the hustlers and conﬁdence 
men like the King and the Duke, and the do-gooders like the judge who 
tries to reform Huck’s father and ends up hurting everyone. There is a 
lot of extraneous activity, like Tom’s elaborate schemes for freeing Jim 
from the woodshed. Sometimes, something is accomplished, like Huck 
reaching home and Jim being set free, though the process is a lot more 
convoluted than it should be.
For me, the journey in the Davis administration led back to where I 
had started, participating in job training projects on the local level. “I’ll 
do it for two years,” I told my wife, Donna, when we talked about the 
EDD director position in early 1999. Two years stretched to three, and 
then to nearly four, through Governor Davis’s reelection in November 
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2002. I was set to leave in July 2003 when the governor’s recall cam-
paign came alive and qualiﬁed for an October ballot. The recall suc-
ceeded, followed by a three-month transition to the administration of 
Governor Schwarzenegger. By that time, it was late January 2004, and 
the two years had turned into nearly ﬁve.
We continued to live in San Francisco through those ﬁve years, and 
I commuted to Sacramento and back three days a week. I drove with 
my colleague, Max Forman. Down U.S. Highway 80 we traveled each 
morning, over the Bay Bridge, past the University of California campus 
in Berkeley and the Golden Gate Fields racetrack, over the Carquinez 
Bridge and the wide open stretches of American Canyon, then on past 
the Scandia Miniature Golf Center in Fairﬁeld, the abandoned Nut Tree 
restaurant complex in Vacaville, and the University of California cam-
pus in Davis, until we crossed over Tower Bridge and came into sight of 
the state capitol dome. Through ﬁve years, the sight of the majestic state 
capitol at the end of Capitol Mall never failed to be an inspiration. 
Upon leaving state government, I returned to the position I had held 
before April 1999 as counsel to the HNTB Companies, a nationwide 
transportation and infrastructure design ﬁrm. And I came back to the 
world of community-based agencies and local training projects. I re-
joined several boards of community-based agencies and rejoined the 
community of job training practitioners designing and operating local 
projects.1
GLOBALIZATION AND EMPLOYMENT
Job training on the local level, as on the state level, has been re-
shaped by the forces discussed in this book: welfare reform, the Work-
force Investment Act and the One-Stop system, the drive to reduce the 
Supplemental Security Insurance rolls and to ﬁnd mainstream work 
roles for workers with disabilities, and the concern about wage mobili-
ty. There is an additional force that will reshape training’s role and form 
in the next years: globalization (the movement toward global economic 
integration and interdependence) and its related dynamic of outsourc-
ing (the movement of jobs and work tasks to countries outside of the 
United States). 
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Globalization and outsourcing will exercise three main inﬂuences 
on job training. First, they will increase the role of job training for work-
ers laid off or in danger of being laid off. Second, they will give greater 
prominence to job training organizations that are able to adapt rapidly 
to changing labor-market opportunities. Third, they will give push to a 
broader system of lifelong learning: a system that exists to an extent at 
present but can be improved to meet the heightened job restructuring. 
As we saw in Chapter 3, in the U.S. economy, in good times and 
bad, millions of jobs are being created and destroyed each month. The 
job creation and job destruction caused by globalization will add to this 
job dynamism, and especially it will add to the political and legislative 
focus on job training. 
During the 1980s and 1990s and continuing into today, globaliza-
tion reshaped jobs and wages in America’s manufacturing sector. For-
eign-based companies established manufacturing facilities in the Unit-
ed States and created new jobs. To a greater extent, American-based 
companies shifted manufacturing jobs and tasks to other countries that 
offered lower business and labor costs. Our profession responded with 
retraining programs—initially under the Job Training Partnership Act 
and subsequently under the Workforce Investment Act—to ease the 
transition of displaced workers to new jobs and occupations.
For some time, many of us in job training regarded the reach of 
globalization as being limited to job losses in manufacturing. Other 
sectors, we thought, could not easily move tasks offshore. But in the 
past decade globalization has extended its reach to jobs and occupa-
tions well beyond manufacturing. In a ﬁrst wave of services outsourc-
ing beginning around 2000, call center jobs, computer operation jobs 
and computer software jobs began going overseas in large numbers. 
This exodus was followed around 2002 by a second services outsourc-
ing wave that shipped out such jobs as bank loan processor and insur-
ance claims adjuster. 
A number of studies in 2004 have pointed to the greater role of out-
sourcing lately in job loss and have brought the issue to the attention of 
U.S. congressmen and state legislators. In Spring 2004, the Cambridge, 
Massachusetts, based Forrester Research, which had been tracking out-
sourcing, issued a projection that, dating back over the past few years, 
a total of 500,000 jobs would be outsourced overseas by the end of 
2004, and that 1 million jobs would be outsourced by the end of 2006. 
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Also in Spring 2004, the nationwide consulting ﬁrm A.T. Kearney re-
ported that over 90 percent of software and semiconductor companies 
in California’s Silicon Valley had moved tasks offshore and that these 
companies planned to increase, rather than decrease, this outsourcing. 
This report was followed in Summer 2004 by a University of Califor-
nia, Berkeley, study that said one in six jobs in Silicon Valley (and one 
in seven in nearby San Francisco) were at risk of being outsourced in 
the next few years.2 
Nationally, outsourcing had become a hot-button issue, and leg-
islators at ﬁrst responded to the outsourcing projections by attacking 
the practice and questioning the patriotism of the ﬁrms—John Kerry 
in 2004 denounced executives who moved jobs offshore as “Benedict 
Arnold CEOs” (Dealey 2004; McCullagh 2004). Legislation was intro-
duced in a number of states to prevent jobs in state government from 
going overseas and to give preference in state bids to contractors em-
ploying workers only in the United States. 
However, by late 2004, the outsourcing legislation had stalled. 
Economists, for the most part free-trade, had weighed in on the issue. 
They noted that the employment impacts of outsourcing were complex, 
that outsourcing could preserve and create jobs in the United States as 
well as eliminate them, and that attempts to limit outsourcing could 
bring negative job impacts. 
For example, in Spring 2004, the Democratic legislators in Cali-
fornia’s state legislature commissioned the Public Policy Institute of 
California to do a study of outsourcing in the state. The legislators had 
been the most vocal critics of outsourcing, and the report was expected 
to call for state actions to halt outsourcing in both the public and the 
private sector. Instead, the two economists who authored the report for 
the Public Policy Institute, Jon Haveman and Howard Shatz, argued 
that any attempt to curb outsourcing could rebound against the state’s 
economy in several ways (Haveman and Shatz 2004). Foreign countries 
could retaliate by restricting the purchase of California-produced goods 
and services. Foreign ﬁrms could curtail their insourcing of jobs to Cal-
ifornia. The cost of governmental and nongovernmental services could 
increase. Further, the number of workers whose jobs might be saved by 
any outsourcing restrictions would be small, and these workers would 
tend to be the more skilled workers with greater labor market options.3 
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Along with resistance from the free-trade economists, opposition 
to outsourcing restrictions also came from the Clintonian free-trade 
wing of the Democratic Party. Though labor unions and environmental 
groups championed restrictions on job movements, major sections of 
the party, who a decade earlier had been committed to globalization and 
free trade in the North American Free Trade Act (NAFTA) debate, now 
followed the same free-trade logic in the outsourcing debate.
Training to Meet the Impacts of Globalization
Outsourcing will increase rather than decrease in the coming years. 
In some states, restrictions might be placed on the contracting of direct 
government services. But these restrictions will not affect the great ma-
jority of the jobs that are being outsourced in the private sector. Instead, 
the policy focus will shift in the near future from putting restrictions on 
outsourcing to assisting worker transition into new jobs or new indus-
tries. In designing these worker transition policies, the expertise of job 
training practitioners will take center stage, as we will be called upon to 
identify and test training structures.
We will have to proceed with care in building these retraining struc-
tures, as there is much we need to learn about the number and charac-
teristics of workers affected and the importance of outsourcing in the 
decisions made by industry. Nevertheless, we can start by drawing on 
the experiences of previous government retraining programs, including 
the dislocated worker programs under JTPA and WIA and the Trade As-
sistance Act program. 
These experiences suggest a number of guidelines for retraining 
workers whose jobs are outsourced. We have learned, for example, that 
retraining succeeds best when it is tailored to the individual interests 
and skill levels of participants, and that this tailoring can take a variety 
of forms, from direct placement, to assistance in relocation to another 
part of the state or country, to new skills for upgrading in the ﬁrm, 
industry sector, or general labor market. Further, we have learned that 
skills training for a speciﬁc job opening is the optimal dynamic; alterna-
tively, identifying a pool of likely job openings is necessary. The train-
ing agencies that succeed are those that keep close tabs on the regional 
labor market and adapt quickly to changes in labor market supply and 
demand.
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Several new retraining approaches have been put forward in the 
outsourcing debate. Catherine Mann of the Institute for International 
Economics in Washington, D.C., has proposed a tax credit for compa-
nies to retrain workers whose jobs are being outsourced. The tax credit 
would be similar to the research and development tax credit. “Having 
retraining and skill upgrading done in the ﬁrm is known to be a far more 
productive strategy for both the ﬁrm and the worker,” Mann claims, “but 
ﬁrms don’t necessarily have an incentive to do it” (Lochhead 2004).
The tax credit approach has value in two ways: it provides a ﬁrm 
with incentive to keep and retrain its workers, and it tailors training to 
an identiﬁed job opening. However, ﬁrms that are outsourcing may not 
have sufﬁcient job openings to absorb the workers who are losing jobs. 
Further, while major employers can train effectively for jobs within 
their ﬁrms, they are not necessarily the most effective trainers for jobs 
outside their ﬁrms, and especially not for jobs outside their sector. 
In January 2003 the Bush administration released the proposal “Eco-
nomic Growth and Job Creation.” It contained a proposed program to 
help the unemployed called “Personal Reemployment Accounts,” which 
would create individual reemployment accounts for laid-off workers—
including those who lost their jobs because of outsourcing—who are 
likely to exhaust their unemployment insurance beneﬁts. Accounts of 
up to $3,000 would be available to certain unemployed workers. With 
this money, a worker could purchase job training and employment ser-
vices, child care, and other supports. Further, the worker, upon ﬁnd-
ing employment, could pocket any unused funds as a reemployment 
bonus.4
This retraining approach has the beneﬁt of placing decision making 
in the hands of the worker and giving the worker incentive to obtain the 
best training and placement services he can at the least cost. However, 
the reemployment account has been tried before in select states, and its 
impact on duration of unemployment and on reemployment and wages 
has been mixed (Davidson and Woodbury 1996).5 Additionally, the cost 
of the account program has been estimated by USDOL at $3.6 billion 
over two years—an amount that has given even training-friendly legis-
lators a pause.
Perhaps the main guideline in developing a retraining structure for 
workers whose jobs are outsourced is that such a structure not be sepa-
rated from a retraining structure for all laid-off workers. The number 
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of jobs lost to outsourcing, even as it grows, will be small compared 
to the number of jobs lost to the other impacts of globalization, espe-
cially to competition from foreign companies. Competition in services 
as well as manufacturing from companies in Singapore, China, India, 
and Malaysia, the result of free trade, will have many times the impact 
of outsourcing on job losses. 
As noted in Chapter 7, a sizable retraining system does exist in 
the United States, especially through community colleges and public 
school district adult education. The colleges and schools provide class-
es, at minimal cost, to adults for lifelong learning. These classes allow 
workers not only to improve their reading and vocational skills but also 
to retrain for new careers in health care, computer software, and ofﬁce 
administration.
This current retraining system will need to evolve as global com-
petition pushes the American economy to evolve. In this evolution, 
sectoral training—training rooted in the industry sector—will assume 
greater importance. Industrywide associations, primarily labor unions 
and employer associations, will join in designing, operating and fund-
ing training with the community colleges and with public school adult 
education. 
An example of an emerging sector-based partnership is the Allied 
Health Training Center being developed in Santa Clara. As envisioned 
by the WIB director for the Santa Clara area, Mike Curran, it will train 
young workers entering the labor market, current health care workers 
who want to advance, and displaced workers seeking new careers. “A 
job training charter school” is how Curran describes the center, mean-
ing that while community colleges and public school adult education 
will be participants, the center will operate outside of these established 
bureaucracies. Decision making will rest mainly with a separate, sector-
based board of employers, union representatives, and workforce profes-
sionals.6
Besides being sector-based, the center will be more entrepreneurial 
and market based than traditional job training programs. It will incorpo-
rate elements of the entrepreneurial private adult-training schools, such 
as the University of Phoenix. Its selection of jobs in which attendees 
can receive training will be ﬂexible, based on the real-time job needs of 
the hospitals and clinics on the peninsula (San Mateo and Santa Clara 
counties). Its funding will come from student loans and grants, which 
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typically fuel private adult training, as well as from employers, joint 
labor-management trust funds, and community colleges. 
Such a sector-based partnership is not limited to the health care 
ﬁeld. It is applicable to hospitality, ﬁnancial services, biotechnology, 
and information technology, to name a few of the expanding sectors 
that have jobs at a variety of levels, strong multiemployer associations, 
and existing ties with the community colleges.
While sector-based partnerships will be a greater part of the evolv-
ing job training and retraining system, they will not be the only part. 
A form of retraining tax credit will be valuable in cases where em-
ployers, who are outsourcing certain jobs, do have other jobs available 
for retraining employees in. Individualized skills training, relocation, 
and literacy all will play a role. The retraining system gives workers 
a choice among training options while also requiring them to make an 
investment in training, possibly through a training loan program similar 
to the loan programs for college students. 
FROM TYPEWRITER REPAIR TO THE NEW ECONOMY
When I started in the job training ﬁeld in 1979, we were training 
persons to repair typewriters, calculators, copiers. The ﬁrst training 
class operated by San Francisco Renaissance, the job training group I 
headed, was in business machine repair. We trained repairpersons for 
the small typewriter repair shops located in the South of Market area 
and the big typewriter and copier manufacturers like Olympia, Royal, 
and Burroughs, which maintained repair divisions. 
Today, the typewriter and electric calculator repairperson is nearly 
obsolete, having gone the way of the barrel maker and the switchboard 
operator, jobs of previous eras that were rendered superﬂuous by tech-
nological improvements. Further, most of the small-business machine 
repair shops we placed workers in have ceased operation, and in their 
storefronts South of Market, on Howard and Folsom streets, are soft-
ware engineers and Web designers. 
Over the next 25 years we will see even greater changes in the jobs 
and businesses we train for. Technology will create jobs not yet envi-
sioned. In 1979 few training practitioners foresaw Web designers or 
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network administrators, or even the great expansion of the health care 
workforce. Similarly, 25 years from now we will be training for jobs 
that don’t exist today. 
Yet the principles of effective job training will remain the same: all 
training is local or regional; keep close to the local labor market; keep 
close to employers; understand the workers being trained; make sure 
they’re invested in the training; foster a strong sense of mission among 
training staff—these principles of effective training and retraining will 
continue into the future. 
Further, while the future will require that we design effective train-
ing, the future lies also in antipoverty approaches outside of govern-
ment. The faith-based training is one approach; the Family Independent 
Initiative (FII), discussed in Chapter 11, is another. As we saw, FII uses 
using afﬁnity groups, groups based on ethnicity, neighborhood, or reli-
gion and linked by shared trust and mutuality. FII is in its ﬁrst years, and 
the impacts are very preliminary, but the program concepts are solid: 
low-income families working together outside of government, pursuing 
asset accumulation and being supported in their savings and investment 
efforts.7
THE COMMUNITY OF PRACTITIONERS
After the recall election in October 2003, Governor Davis had a ﬁ-
nal meeting with department directors, advising us that we all would be 
replaced. Despite talk from the incoming administration of bipartisan-
ship and working together, we’d all be gone soon. (“Any day after the 
ﬁrst month that you’re still in ofﬁce, consider a gift,” Davis counseled.) 
Yet none of us, from the governor down, had reason to complain. “None 
of us is entitled to or owed a state position,” Davis emphasized. “In a 
state of over 35 million people, each of us should consider ourselves 
fortunate to have spent time in California government.”
For 25 years, I’ve considered myself fortunate to be in the com-
munity of job training and employment practitioners. Returning to the 
themes raised in Chapter 1, I would say it is a community of profes-
sionals engaged in practical job strategies, not theory or ideology. It is 
a community of craftspersons who have eye to detail and quality and 
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results, not process or politics. You have met members of this com-
munity throughout this book, and beyond them are thousands of others 
across the nation. 
Driving through San Francisco’s neighborhoods today, I often see 
the ghosts of practitioners from years past—mentors from whom I 
learned lessons of our craft. There on Sixteenth and Mission is Leandro 
Soto, who founded Arriba Juntos in 1964 and headed it for nearly 30 
years. “Lee,” now retired, is not a scholar, but he has a high respect for 
the workforce profession and its scholarship. He taught everyone who 
worked for him to study past programs, learn from them, and keep cur-
rent on the latest research in the workforce ﬁeld.
On McAllister and Webster is the Ella Hill Hutch Community Cen-
ter, and in the director’s ofﬁce is Lefty Gordon. Lefty, who died in 2000, 
spent his whole working life as a workforce professional, starting as a 
youth worker and counselor with Youth for Service in the 1960s. Lefty’s 
work life shows the ability to grow and adapt to changing conditions 
without being tied to ideology. For example, he was one of the ﬁrst in 
San Francisco to speak out about teen pregnancy and to see the promise 
of the faith-based approaches. 
On Third and Newcomb in the Bayview is the late Harold Brooks, 
another veteran of the 1960s antipoverty programs. In 1979, Harold 
stood on this corner in front of run-down storefronts and described how 
it would be transformed into a hub for African American entrepreneur-
ship. Over the next 25 years, this transformation never occurred. Third 
Street remained a high crime area lined with vacant storefronts and 
marginal businesses, and no more than a handful of African American 
entrepreneurs emerged. 
But Brooks’s advocacy for entrepreneurship and ownership, for 
moving beyond the social services mentality of War on Poverty, was not 
lost. A new generation has emerged in the Bayview, and its members 
are building on his ideas, learning from the mistakes of past programs, 
and testing approaches to entrepreneurship and ownership through spe-
ciﬁc projects, closely evaluated. 
I recently called them to volunteer my services. After all, what else 
would an old practitioner do?
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Notes
 1. Some of the lessons I learned in my years as EDD director on how to serve ef-
fectively in the public sector are recounted in Appendix A, p. 229.
 2.  Most of these outsourced jobs were not to large outsourcing ﬁrms in India or 
Malaysia but to foreign subsidiaries of U.S. companies. Two-thirds of the U.S. 
companies that sent work offshore during the 1990s kept the work within their 
own units and afﬁliates. 
 3.  In Northern California’s Sonoma County, the local newspaper, the Santa Rosa 
Press Democrat, tracked the loss of over 2,000 jobs in local Hewlett-Packard 
and Agilent Technologies facilities and their transfer, primarily to Malaysia. The 
newspaper portrayed the dislocations brought about by the lost jobs but also 
identiﬁed the gains to struggling foreign economies and the value to American 
companies. Sung W. Sohn, chief economist for banking giant Wells Fargo & Co., 
expressed the view of many economists when he told the newspaper that “by 
outsourcing some jobs, Sonoma manufacturers are improving their proﬁtability 
and the productivity of the workers that remain employed. This helps ensure 
their survival in this competitive global marketplace” (Hay 2004).
 4. Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, http://www.cbpp.org/1-31-03ui.htm.  See 
also the Department of Labor’s Web page, http://www.doleta.gov/reemployment/ 
Final_QA.cfm (both accessed July 7, 2005).  
 5.   This is one of a series of research papers on Personal Reemployment Ac-
counts issued by the Upjohn Institute. To view this and other research papers 
from this series, go to the Upjohn Institute’s Web page, www.upjohninstitute 
.org, scan down the left-hand column topics, and click on “Personal Reemploy-
ment Accounts.” See also Robins and Spiegelman (2001). 
 6. Mike Curran, interview with the author, 2005.
 7. Just as major elements of the job training system will continue to evolve in the 
future, so must the Job Service, in a way that brings the service back to its one-
to-one job placement role. Appendix B, starting on p. 233, deals with this needed 
evolution in the Job Service.
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Appendix A
Heading a State Employment Service
                    
      
By the time I was appointed director of the state Employment Develop-
ment Department (EDD) in April 1999, I had over 20 years of experience in 
the employment ﬁeld and a background as an attorney, an elected ofﬁcial, and a 
board member of several major job training agencies. But I soon found there is 
really no experience in the private or public sector that prepares you for head-
ing a large state bureaucracy (EDD has more than 10,000 employees). 
Below are some of the lessons I learned about effectiveness in the public 
sector.1
1. Intellectual arrogance is the ﬁrst deadly sin in state government. 
A few years back, an EDD director was appointed who had a background as 
a public interest lawyer and a degree from Harvard Law School. He quickly 
gained the reputation of thinking he was smarter than anyone else. He was 
smarter in certain ways. But he lasted less than seven months—undermined by 
an intellectual arrogance and a bureaucracy that didn’t respect his ideas.
Just as there are various forms of intelligence in general, there are various 
forms of intelligence in government administration. As a director, recognize 
your limitations and surround yourself with experienced state employees and 
competent administrators. At EDD, I turned to Michael Krisman, whose state 
service dated back to the early 1970s. He served as my assistant director. “My 
main job is to keep you and the department out of trouble,” he would say, 
“—operational trouble, political trouble, governor’s ofﬁce trouble.” 
As chief deputy I appointed Deborah Bronow, a 25-year EDD employee 
who had started her career as an unemployment insurance examiner. After a 
few months, others at EDD came to me and said, “You know, Bronow disagrees 
with 50 percent of your ideas for the department.” “Precisely,” I replied; “that’s 
why she’s in the director’s ofﬁce—as a check on ideas I have or the governor’s 
ofﬁce has that aren’t so good.” Later, when Geneva Robinson, another 25-year 
EDD employee, became chief deputy, she assumed a similar role, torpedoing 
ideas that made no sense on the frontline level. 
The ﬁrst ﬁnance director in the Davis administration, Tim Gage, was ac-
cessible, humble, and open to the thoughts of others—even though he had 
attended the same vaunted institution of higher learning as the EDD director 
mentioned above. But another of Davis’s directors had a less affable style. In 
short, he yelled a lot. When we at EDD approached this man about our tech-
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nology projects, he made clear he knew more than our technology staff (he 
didn’t). In his belligerence, he almost undermined a key operational improve-
ment to the state’s unemployment insurance system.  
2. Don’t spend one minute on reorganization schemes or reorgani-
zation consultants. In each new administration, agency secretaries and de-
partment directors, encouraged by management consultants, feel compelled 
to reorganize their departments: rewriting mission statements, changing report 
requirements and branch structures. What a waste. The mission statements are 
vacuous documents, and the act of shifting reporting requirements rarely af-
fects the quality or integrity of front-line services. Krisman always asked of a 
reorganization proposal, “How does this impact the job seeker in Glendale?” 
and the answer was obvious: it didn’t.  
The organizational retreats “facilitated” by consultants should be elimi-
nated. At one retreat, the consultants led participants in a half-day, line-by-line 
dissection of a mission statement—as if they were studying the Talmud, not a 
three-paragraph, vague description of goals. Department leadership will learn 
about mission from front-line state staff in Modesto or Long Beach, not from 
management consultants.  
3. Reject the culture of meetings. George David Kiefer, a member of the 
Schwarzenegger transition team, once wrote a book, The Strategy of Meetings, 
whose front cover blurb read, “Meetings are where careers are made.” Not a 
good idea in state government, where meetings are the stock in trade and have 
led to “pre-meetings” and even “pre-pre-meetings,” There is value in face-
to-face communication—Governor Davis hoped to get one good idea for the 
time spent in a meeting. However, in state government, the culture of meetings 
has gone too far and needs to be reined in—otherwise one has something in 
common with Billy Crystal, whose character says in “City Slickers” of his job 
involving a lot of meetings, “I sell air.” 
4. Emphasize program integrity in public beneﬁt programs. In 1966, 
New York Mayor John Lindsay appointed as his ﬁrst commissioner of social 
services Mitchell Ginsberg, a liberal social-welfare professor at Columbia. 
Ginsberg believed that welfare eligibility rules were unnecessary and moved 
to open welfare to anyone who applied (the New York Daily News called him 
“Come-and-get-it-Ginsberg”). The welfare rolls soared, a political backlash 
resulted, and the city was forced to cut services to welfare recipients. The poor, 
whom Ginsberg allegedly was trying to help, became the ones hardest hit. 
The lesson for public administrators: take a cavalier attitude toward program 
integrity, and the credibility and political viability of the program will sharply 
decline—hurting recipients the most.
Appendix A   231
The state government administers a variety of public beneﬁt programs 
in health care, employment insurance, and workers’ compensation, and EDD 
operates two of the state’s main beneﬁt funds: the $6 billion unemployment 
insurance fund and the $2.6 billion disability insurance fund. We had several 
experiences that highlight the importance of program integrity. 
In 2002, the unemployment insurance program was hit by an increase in 
cases of identity fraud—claimants stealing Social Security numbers and ﬁl-
ing fraudulent claims. Though the program took action (adding questions to 
our claims script, immediately cutting off payments to suspect Social Security 
numbers), we were slower than we should have been in shifting resources to 
address this fraud. We also were slow in responding to a television segment 
portraying EDD as sending checks to anyone who gave us a phony name. The 
program’s credibility took a hit.
These days, state beneﬁt programs operate on limited staff yet still must 
meet a variety of goals, particularly the processing of claims without lengthy 
delays. Always, though, antifraud should be a priority. 
5. Maintain the small-town accessibility of state government. Often, I 
hear from Californians who are impressed that they can call EDD and get a live 
body answering their questions on an unpaid unemployment insurance claim, 
a disability insurance claim, or a job search application. In fact, at EDD, you 
can call persons at all levels and get through. In the director’s ofﬁce, my prac-
tice in the ﬁrst months was to take all calls, with no screening. This changed 
slightly, but only after discovering that a good proportion of calls to the direc-
tor were from unemployment insurance claimants who wanted to know why 
their checks were late. Still, I tried to take most calls and return any missed 
calls or e-mails that same day. 
In the Davis administration as a whole, director accessibility was mixed. 
Some directors and agency secretaries pointedly kept you waiting for a time 
if you went to their ofﬁces. They had their assistants call to “schedule a phone 
time,” rather than pick up the phone themselves. They insisted on being ad-
dressed by their titles, as “Mr. Director,” or Ms. Director.” These ofﬁcials were 
ridiculous ﬁgures—especially when juxtaposed with the small-town ambience 
and unpretentiousness that still characterize much of Sacramento. 
6. Above all, respect the professionalism and sense of mission of the 
bureaucracy. In 2001, I appeared on Bay Area Public Radio with one of our 
tax branch administrators. “Big campaign donors are able to inﬂuence tax de-
terminations,” the host said at one point, and I was taken aback. This just isn’t 
how things are done in Sacramento—in the Davis administration or in the Wil-
son or Deukmajian administrations. Nobody would even think of tinkering 
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with the tax authority, or with most other state contracting functions. The sense 
of professionalism among the state bureaucracies is too great.
I met with a large information technology ﬁrm, whose representatives 
asked whether they should hire a “Friend of Davis” lobbyist—a person who 
knew people in the governor’s ofﬁce. “Don’t waste your money,” I said. “In 
state government, nearly all contracting decisions are made by staff. Spend 
your time getting to know staff and what they want to accomplish.”
Beyond professionalism, most departments have a strong sense of mis-
sion, whether it be for protecting California’s forests, or building California’s 
highways, or paying disability insurance to Californians unable to work. When 
Krisman and I traveled to local EDD ofﬁces, the experience was always uplift-
ing. Though state employees receive set pay rates no matter what the quality 
of service, many state employees go out of their way to ensure a high service 
quality. The EDD ofﬁce in El Centro opened at 4 a.m. to meet the work sched-
ule of local farmworkers, and the Modesto EDD ofﬁce raised private funds to 
augment veterans’ employment services. Individual EDD employees go be-
yond nine-to-ﬁve in services: on his own time, a disability insurance claims 
examiner devised a reference system for claims examiners (a consulting ﬁrm 
would have charged $100,000), and a tax auditor volunteered his time to re-
duce backlog.   
To be in a leadership role is to be a steward of a state department. Whether 
for four months or four years or eight years, your time in Sacramento leader-
ship is limited. At the least, you want to take no action that undermines the 
department’s service ethos.
Note
 1. This appendix appeared in a May 2004 issue of the Sacramento Bee, Sunday 
Forum section, as “6 Lessons I Learned in the Capitol.”
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Appendix B
The Employment 
Development Department
The California State Employment Development Department (EDD) has 
10,000 employees, making it the largest state department of labor. 
Conﬁdent of its place, the department grew during much of the twentieth 
century, following the growth of the state’s role in addressing unemployment. 
This growth encompassed the establishment of Unemployment Insurance and 
Disability Insurance in the 1930s and 1940s, the expansion of the Employment 
Service in the 1950s, and the antipoverty programs of the 1960s and 1970s. 
Today, the department administers a number of major state services, in-
cluding the $6 billion Unemployment Insurance system, the $2.6 billion State 
Disability Insurance system, and California’s $30 billion employer tax collec-
tion. It administers the state’s Job Service and more than $1 billion in employ-
ment and training funds.
But the department’s future is far from certain, as the role of the state in 
social insurance and especially in job placement is being questioned. The Job 
Service has declined by nearly 50 percent in staff over the past two decades 
with the decrease in federal Wagner-Peyser funds. Further, the job placement 
ﬁeld is seeing the rise of several nongovernmental workforce intermediaries, 
as well as the growth of the private temporary or permanent job placement 
industry and the growth of Internet job placement sites, such as monster.com 
and careerbuilder.com.
EDD’s dilemma is shared by the Job Services of the other states. Below, I 
will brieﬂy discuss the department, starting with my own path as a workforce 
practitioner, a path that eventually led to EDD.
“Go work on the local level.” That’s the advice that Bill Spring, then Presi-
dent Carter’s advisor on job policy, gave me in 1979, when I was ﬁrst entering 
our profession. 
I had met Bill at Harvard in the early 1970s. He was a lecturer at the Ken-
nedy School of Government, teaching a seminar on the federal government 
and employment policy. After Harvard, I studied for two years at Oxford Uni-
versity, earning a BPhil in political theory, and spent the next three years in law 
school in California at UC-Berkeley’s Boalt Hall, which housed the School of 
Law. My ﬁnal year of law school, 1978–1979, I spent in Washington, D.C. As 
the school year was nearing an end and graduation approached, law practice 
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seemed dry compared to the job training ﬁeld, and I went to see Bill Spring at 
the Old Executive Ofﬁce Building.
I thought he would help me obtain a position in the White House or the 
Department of Labor. Instead, he emphasized, “If you want to learn about un-
employment, get out of Washington.”
With his assistance, my ﬁrst job after law school, in June 1979, was in 
a temporary position as an attorney with the Alameda County Training and 
Employment Board (ACTEB), headquartered in Hayward, California, a town 
about 30 miles outside of San Francisco. ACTEB administered the job training 
programs for Alameda County. When the position ended in late 1979, I moved 
into the city and began a partnership with Bill Russell-Shapiro, who was start-
ing San Francisco Renaissance.
Bill was 32 years old in 1979. He was a graduate of Yale who had gone 
on to MIT to study urban planning. Now he was an entrepreneur with a new 
food service business. Part of his entrepreneurship was in the public sector, 
and Renaissance was an attempt to test and reﬁne ideas for improved job train-
ing. From 1982 through 1986, Renaissance operated a series of job training, 
job creation, and entrepreneurship projects. These included literacy and GED 
classes, vocational classes in computer repair and business-machine repair, an 
older-worker placement program, an entrepreneurship center for aspiring and 
small businesspersons, and a series of business ventures in messenger service, 
computer cabling, carpet cleaning, and a downtown convenience store.
Much of Renaissance has continued until the present. The businesses were 
phased out. However, the entrepreneurship center grew considerably under 
its director, Claudia Viek, and purchased a building near downtown. The job 
training programs, under their own director, Tempi Priestly,1 relocated to the 
Bayview District and focused on high school dropouts.2
Upon leaving Renaissance in late 1986, I joined the law ﬁrm of Arnelle 
and Hastie and started a second career in the job training ﬁeld. Over the next 
12 years, I served as a volunteer board member of numerous community-based 
agencies, including the Mission Reading Clinic, Youth for Service, and the 
Ella Hill Hutch Community Center, where I was active on the EHHC board 
committee on teen fathers and reducing teen pregnancy. 
Then, in November 1998, Gray Davis was elected California governor, 
and the opportunity arose for me to head the state labor department. My wife, 
Donna, and I have known Gray since 1986, when we were introduced to him 
by Anthony Kline, a state appeals court judge who was active in job training in 
San Francisco. Gray was then running for controller, and we joined his ﬁnance 
committee. Over the next several years we were active in his campaigns for 
controller, lieutenant governor, and governor.3
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Davis was one of the few California Democrats who had supported Presi-
dent Clinton’s welfare reform in 1996, and he agreed that the ﬁrst years of wel-
fare reform had brought important beneﬁts. He wanted to expand the role of 
faith-based agencies, notably the African American churches, in working with 
long-term welfare recipients and other long-term unemployed. “We should be 
getting more resources into neighborhood and community groups outside of 
government, especially the African American churches,” he said when we met 
after the election. I handed him a memo about the key issues I saw in employ-
ment policy in California, such as the implementation of Welfare-to-Work, the 
low-wage workforce, and reducing taxes and regulations on the small-business 
community. I started as EDD director on April 1, 1999.
The main EDD building spreads over two city blocks, from Seventh to 
Ninth streets on Capitol Mall. The Director’s Ofﬁce is on the ﬁfth ﬂoor and has 
windows on two sides and a postcard view of the state capitol. Several other 
EDD buildings are in the vicinity.
Before EDD, in the early part of the twentieth century, job placement was 
was provided by “State Free Employment Bureaus”—the Los Angeles bureau 
is shown in Photo B.1. EDD was established by the California state legislature 
in July 1936 (initially as the Department of Employment) to administer the 
newly created Unemployment Insurance system and also to operate employ-
ment placement ofﬁces. Photo B.2 shows California Governor Frank Merriam 
presenting the ﬁrst unemployment checks in California to Los Angeles resi-
dents Anna Dougherty and Albert Kruse on February 14, 1938.
Photo B.1  State Free Employment Bureau—Los Angeles (1920s)
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Photo B.2  First UI checks issued by California Governor Frank Merriam (1938)
Over the next three decades, EDD ofﬁ ces were built to serve unemploy-
ment applicants and job seekers throughout the state. Photo B.3, taken in the 
late 1940s, shows a typical EDD ofﬁ ce, in which a counter spanned the length 
of the room. On one end of the room were the lines for UI beneﬁ ts; on the other 
end, the lines for job search assistance. On the walls were 3 × 5 cards telling of 
job openings and contacts.
That’s the way EDD ofﬁ ces looked when I ﬁ rst went to one on McCadden 
Street in Hollywood as a recent high school graduate in June 1970, searching 
for a summer job. From one of the 3 × 5 cards, I found a job opening for cleri-
cal work at a small collection agency on Sunset Boulevard.
Today, the 3 × 5 cards have been replaced by computers in the ofﬁ ce lobby 
that link job seekers to CalJOBS, the state’s automated labor exchange. Daily, 
there are around 165,000 jobs statewide listed on CalJOBS. The unemployment 
insurance lines are gone: EDD ofﬁ ces no longer pay unemployment insurance 
in person, and unemployment insurance transactions are done by telephone. 
Also, most EDD ofﬁ ces are being converted into One-Stop employment cen-
ters that join EDD staff with staff of the Department of Rehabilitation, county 
welfare ofﬁ ces, and local Workforce Investment Boards.
What remains constant, though, is the job focus. In a typical EDD ofﬁ ce, 
the lobby will have 15–20 job seekers doing job searches on the computers. 
Another 15–20 will be in an intensive assistance workshop for resumé writing 
and job leads. Other job seekers will be in a room of phones and computers 
set aside for Experience Unlimited, the job club for unemployed professionals. 
And still others, who are military veterans, will be meeting one-to-one with the 
veterans’ job representatives.
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Photo B.3  Unemployment Insurance/Job Service (1948)
EDD, as an institution, continues to be a presence in local communities, in 
both urban and rural areas. EDD ofﬁces are prominent on the main streets of 
Merced, Modesto, Redding, Stockton, Bakersﬁeld, and 20 other smaller cities 
throughout the state. EDD also is a part of the social fabric of each city. Local 
EDD staff are active in community projects, in workforce and economic devel-
opment projects, and, beyond these, in local charities and fundraisers.4
Despite these community roles, EDD Job Service staff, at the start of the 
twenty-ﬁrst century, view with uncertainty the future of the Job Service and 
their own jobs. The federal Wagner-Peyser money, which funds the Job Ser-
vice, has been decreasing steadily for two decades and is projected to continue 
to decrease. Some states are examining the possibility of privatizing the Job 
Service function by contracting with private placement ﬁrms. Federal legisla-
tion has been introduced in the past few years to transfer Job Service funds 
from state government to the local Workforce Investment Boards, and while 
this legislation has not been successful, the idea of turning over the Wagner-
Peyser funds to local Boards is still alive.
Further, the growth of labor market intermediaries has reduced the Job 
Service’s role in major industry sectors. In no industry sector is this more pro-
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nounced than in agriculture. For more than 60 years, from the 1930s through 
the early 1990s, EDD was the employment broker, helping growers to ﬁnd 
farmworkers for harvests, and helping farmworkers to ﬁnd work. Photo B.4 
shows an EDD representative with a grower in the Coachilla Valley in the 
1950s, and Photo B.5 shows EDD staff operating from one of the department’s 
Farm Labor Service trailers. In the Central Valley ofﬁces of Fresno, Mendota, 
Merced, and Modesto, a good percentage of EDD staff are assigned to agricul-
ture and are themselves the daughters and sons of growers or farmworkers.
In the past decade, agriculture in California has been battered by low-cost 
fruits and vegetables from other countries, leaving the family enterprises and 
smaller enterprises reeling. At the same time, farm labor contractors are sup-
plying a larger and larger part of the labor force, using mainly undocument-
ed workers to keep wages low. One of EDD’s farm labor advisors, Anthony 
Alvarado of Fresno State University, estimates that in the Central Valley 85 
percent of the workers are hired through farm labor contractors, and over 60 
percent are undocumented workers. And Diego Haro, EDD’s Central Valley 
manager, tells me that “the role we played in agriculture for decades is at an 
end.” 
“We used to know the growers by name and the farmworker families,” 
Haro says. “Now, with the use of farm labor contractors, the undocumented 
workforce, and the precarious state of farming, we’re not likely to do so in the 
future. It’s one of several ways that Job Service needs to be reconstituted, if it 
is to survive.”
Photo B.4  EDD representative with grower—Coachilla Valley (1950s)
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Across industry sectors, a greater role in job placement is being assumed 
by two labor market intermediaries: 1) the temporary help agencies, and 2) 
the Internet job placement services. As Susan Houseman and George Erickcek 
of the Upjohn Institute and Arne Kalleberg of the University of North Caro-
lina note in a study of temporary help agencies, employment through these 
agencies grew signiﬁ cantly throughout the 1990s. Employment in help sup-
ply services—primarily temporary help agencies—more than doubled, from 
1.2 percent of paid employment in 1990 to 2.6 percent in 2000 (Houseman, 
Kalleberg, and Erickcek 2003).
Further, the study notes that employment in temp agencies is likely to con-
tinue to grow as employers ﬁ nd value in the temp agency process. For employ-
ers, this process enables them to hire rapidly, screen employees, and lay off 
employees at less cost than they could with nontemp employees. For the un-
employed job seeker, the temp assignment represents not only income and job 
experience but also opportunity that might lead to permanent employment.
The Internet job placement services also have grown dramatically in the 
past decade, along with the growth of the Internet. These services, such as 
monster.com, careerbuilder.com, and hotjobs.com, are assuming a job match-
ing role once the domain of the Employment Service. The job seeker who pre-
viously might have gone to the Employment Service for job listings—whether 
Photo B.5  EDD staff at their trailer ofﬁ ce
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on a wall board or, more recently, on a computer—now has the option of log-
ging onto one of thousands of Internet services. These Internet services are 
increasingly sophisticated, ranging from enormous general job lists to ones 
specialized by occupation or sector or geography. 
 Rather than see these two growing labor market intermediaries as a threat 
to its survival, though, the Employment Service should recognize the oppor-
tunity presented to get back to a key core responsibility: one-to-one job place-
ment, coaching, and follow-up with job seekers who are experiencing great 
difﬁculty in ﬁnding or holding jobs. These job seekers might be long-term 
welfare recipients, workers with disabilities who are on SSI, older workers, 
laid-off specialized tech workers, or (most likely) workers who ﬁt no easy cat-
egory but have sent out hundreds of job inquiries without success. 
California’s Job Service Division of the EDD in previous decades did a lot 
of this one-to-one work. Indeed, I found that many EDD employees were at-
tracted to the Job Service because of the opportunity to work more intensively 
on the tougher employment cases. In the past decade, with the reduction in 
federal funds and the universal service requirements of WIA, the Job Service 
has moved away from this intensive job placement. But the past may be the 
future, and the low-tech placement and coaching role might be Job Service’s 
best role in the years ahead.
Notes
 1. Renaissance split into two agencies after I left in late 1986. The Renaissance 
Entrepreneurship Center was headed by Viek from late 1986 until a few years 
ago. The Renaissance job training programs have been headed by Priestly from 
late 1986 until the present.
 2.  In 1984, I wrote a piece for the Harvard Business Review on the promise of job 
training agencies operating private businesses. The businesses not only could 
generate income so that the agencies were not dependent on government funds, 
they also could provide paid work experience for trainees and could give the 
agencies a better understanding of business demands (Bernick 1984b). Over the 
subsequent years I have become convinced that job training agencies operating 
businesses is not generally a good idea. Most of these businesses struggle to 
survive, and only a few break even. They do generate jobs and a private sector 
orientation, but these gains rarely are worth the costs.
 3.  On election night 1986, Donna and I ﬂew from San Francisco to Los Angeles to 
be with Gray, his wife, Sharon, and Sharon’s parents at a small reception at the 
Los Angeles Hilton. “One day he’s going to be governor,” Sharon’s father told 
Donna that night. But, there were at least 50 other California politicians who 
were being mentioned as the next governor before Gray.
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   In 1990, Gray won reelection as controller, and in 1994 he won election as 
lieutenant governor. When Gray announced he was running for governor in 1997, 
he was given little chance—Dianne Feinstein, the senior senator from California, 
was the presumptive nominee for the Democrats. In the summer of 1997, San 
Francisco attorney Jerry Hallisey hosted a meeting for Gray in his conference 
room, and only a handful of people attended. When Gray gave a talk on educa-
tion at the Commonwealth Club, he received no press attention, and most of the 
chairs were empty.
   But, Gray persisted. When, in January 1998, Feinstein announced she was 
not running, two other Democrats—multimillionaire Al Checchi and Congress-
woman Jane Harman—emerged as the frontrunners. Gray was third in the polls, 
and throughout the ﬁrst two months of 1998 he was derided in political circles 
as “roadkill.” Then, Checchi spent millions on television ads attacking Harman. 
But rather than improve Checchi’s status, the ads caused both Checchi and Har-
man to dive in the polls.
   Suddenly, in April, Gray emerged on top. “Experience Money Can’t Buy” be-
came the Davis slogan. He won the primary easily. The general election, against 
Republican Dan Lungren, was expected to be close. Instead, Gray won by 15 
points, the biggest gubernatorial margin in California history.
 4.  From many experiences over ﬁve years, let me cite two that illustrate EDD’s 
various community roles. In December 2000, at 3:30 in the morning, assistant 
director Michael Krisman and I are at the EDD ofﬁce in Calexico for the Farm-
workers Breakfast, a community event. The Calexico ofﬁce opens at 4 a.m. dur-
ing harvest times, so the time is not unusual, nor is the silent line of workers 
walking over the border from Mexico to work in the ﬁelds and return at night. 
The ofﬁce, in downtown Calexico, is the hub for the labor exchange of growers, 
contractors, and workers that occurs early each morning as work crews assemble 
for the ﬁelds. Beyond job search, though, the ofﬁce throughout the day offers 
answers to questions about local unemployment data, businesses moving into 
and out of the area, and generally what is happening in the local economy. 
   On a Friday night in August 2002, with temperatures in the Central Valley 
over 100 degrees, Krisman and I drive to Modesto to throw out the ﬁrst ball 
at a minor league baseball game. The game is a fundraiser for local veterans 
programs, and local EDD staff serve as volunteers, selling tickets to the event, 
publicizing it, and taking pictures of those in attendance. At the ballpark, John 
Thurman Field, nearly everyone seems to know and greet the local EDD ofﬁce 
manager, Carlotta Steele Evans, and the veterans coordinator, Mel Hodges, who 
live in the area and are active civic volunteers.
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